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Public Health Regulation and the
Limits of Paternalism
DAVID ADAM FRIEDMAN
This Article explores the role of paternalism in regulatory efforts to
improve public health, focusing mostly on obesity, but also accounting for
recent developments in other public health arenas. First, the Article
describes a spectrum of interventions that regulators can implement in the
public health zone, ranging from soft paternalism to hard paternalism.
Second, the Article discusses the limits of these paternalistic interventions
in addressing the problem of high obesity rates in America. The analysis
shows that the underlying scientific and socioeconomic factors driving
obesity prove difficult to confront—a difficulty further complicated by the
lower tolerance that the public has expressed for regulatory interventions
that diminish individual autonomy. That is, soft paternalism may be too
weak to address obesity, and hard paternalism may prove socially
unpalatable to deploy. Third, the Article reinforces the notion that a
larger pattern may have emerged with respect to the limitations of
paternalistic approaches, and addresses recent attitudinal shifts against
marijuana prohibition and water fluoridation, as well as a wave of
activism combating the refusal of food producers to enable people to make
choices about consuming genetically-modified foods. The analysis
concludes that the negativity associated with the reduction of personal
autonomy has constrained the options of regulators already charged with
solving difficult problems. Ultimately, however, narrow opportunities for
intervention still exist. If regulators invest heavily in the soft paternalistic
initiatives that prove effective, and the hard paternalistic opportunities that
prove inoffensive, then the aggregate impact on public health, though
limited, may prove positive.
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Public Health Regulation and the
Limits of Paternalism
DAVID ADAM FRIEDMAN*
“The nice thing about [New York City’s attempt to enforce a
16-ounce container size limit on sweetened drinks] is it’s
really just a suggestion. So, if you want to buy 32 ounces,
you just have to carry it back to your seat in two cups. And
maybe that would convince you to only take one, but if you
want two you can do it. I think government’s job . . . is to
give you advice, not to force you [to] do things. . . .
Although . . . . I think some of these other things—calorie
counts we’ve done in chain restaurants so you can see what
you’re eating—[are okay]. But when it comes to forcing you,
. . . the only thing the government can do practically—and I
think should do—is education. Exercise is great for you, but
how do you convince people to do it? And should you force
them to do it? Probably not.”1
—Michael Bloomberg, New York City Mayor
I. INTRODUCTION
New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg, who was famously and
perhaps appropriately caricatured as “Nanny Bloomberg,”2 conceded that
practical limits to paternalism exist in public health, even in the obesity
sphere.3 Though his leadership on instituting a trans fats ban in New York
*
Associate Professor of Law, Willamette University College of Law. B.A., J.D., Yale
University. I thank the editors of the Connecticut Law Review for the invitation to write this lead
commentary and for soliciting responses. Participants at the Willamette University Faculty Colloquium
offered many helpful suggestions on an early draft of this Article. I sincerely thank each invited
respondent for engaging in this controversial and important dialogue. I am also deeply indebted to
Laura Appleman and Nancy Rapoport, for their detailed comments and feedback.
1
Colin Campbell, Bloomberg Says Government “Probably” Shouldn’t Force People to Exercise,
N.Y. OBSERVER (Mar. 8, 2013), http://observer.com/2013/03/bloomberg-says-government-probablyshouldnt-force-people-to-exercise/.
2
This label does not seem to bother the mayor. After the New York Post ran a front-page cartoon
of him as Mary Poppins, he responded: “I take that as a great badge of honor. I can’t think of anything
I like [more]. It says we’re trying to do something—save lives.” David Seifman, Say You’ll Mary Me!,
N.Y. POST, Mar. 19, 2013, at 3 (alteration in original).
3
See Campbell, supra note 1 (reflecting Bloomberg’s cognizance of the limits on paternalism).
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City presented a ripe and fruitful opportunity for hard paternalism,4 his
other, more notorious effort to limit the container sizes of sugar-sweetened
drinks fell flat with the public.5 Indeed, the portion-cap initiative (the “Big
Gulp ban”)6 arguably had fewer paternalistic attributes than the trans fats
ban. The trans fats ban compelled restaurants to change their offerings and
removed a choice from consumers, albeit on a less-detectable basis.7 On
the other hand, with the Big Gulp ban, New York City consumers were
free to imbibe as much sugar as they wanted—though they were obstructed
or “insulated”8 from making the choice to drink more. But despite the
ultimate freedom to drink up, a broad segment of the population objected
to this kind of paternalism, even though the regular consumption of large
sweetened drinks was limited to a small subset of consumers.9
Debates about the appropriateness of regulating personal behavior
have ancient roots,10 but are opening on new fronts. Pure, traditional
paternalism, labeled “hard” paternalism by some,11 has been critiqued by
those who believe that the same regulatory outcomes can be achieved
while preserving autonomy. Those who advocate “soft” or “libertarian”
paternalism argue that a careful construction of the decision-making
environment can lead people to make better choices without eliminating

4
See Sonia Y. Angell et al., Change in Trans Fatty Acid Content of Fast-Food Purchases
Associated with New York City’s Restaurant Regulation: A Pre–Post Study, 157 ANNALS INTERNAL
MED. 81, 84 (2012) (concluding that the initiative to restrict trans fats use by restaurants resulted in
decreased trans fats consumption).
5
See Michael M. Grynbaum & Marjorie Connelly, 60% in City Oppose Soda Ban, Calling It an
Overreach by Bloomberg, a Poll Finds, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 2012, at A19 (reporting poll results that
showed sixty percent of New York City residents opposed the ban).
6
Though this term, derived from an offering at 7-Eleven stores, has been used in common
parlance to describe the initiative, Bloomberg’s regulation did not apply to convenience stores, or to the
actual Big Gulp product. Glenn Blain, 7-Eleven’s Big Gulps Safe from Bloomberg’s Soda Ban, N.Y.
DAILY NEWS (Feb. 27, 2013), http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/big-gulps-safe-bloomberg-sodaban-article-1.1275438#ixzz2XMal5U3Q.
7
See Corby Kummer, The Trans-Fat Ban as a Model of Slow Health Policy, THE ATLANTIC
(Nov. 8, 2013), http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2013/11/the-trans-fat-ban-as-a-model-ofslow-health-policy/281299/2/ (describing the reach of the trans fats ban, and observing that “consumers
didn’t mind retooled fats”).
8
For a discussion of insulation methods, see infra Part II.B.4.
9
See Grynbaum & Connelly, supra note 5 (reporting that, while sixty percent of New Yorkers
opposed the ban, two-thirds of them had one or fewer sodas per week).
10
See NICKOLAS PAPPAS, THE ROUTLEDGE GUIDEBOOK TO PLATO’S REPUBLIC 229–39 (2013)
(discussing the Platonic and Socratic views of paternalism).
11
According to Sarah Conly, “hard paternalism . . . advocates making some actions impossible,
and soft paternalism merely recommends incentivizing certain preferable options.” SARAH CONLY,
AGAINST AUTONOMY: JUSTIFYING COERCIVE PATERNALISM 5–6 (2013). Cass Sunstein and Richard
Thaler define paternalism as having “the goal of influencing the choices of affected parties in a way
that will make those parties better off.” Richard H. Thaler & Cass R. Sunstein, Libertarian
Paternalism, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 175, 175 (2003). They distinguish soft paternalism from hard
paternalism by stating that the former lacks coercion. Id.
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12

less socially desirable choices outright.
Richard Thaler and Cass
Sunstein brought the concept of deploying soft paternalism to the forefront
with the publication of their book, Nudge, which drew upon much of the
literature about paternalism and behavioral economics.13 One critique of
the soft approach contends that the costs of permitting people to continue
to make bad choices are not justifiable when a hard approach would simply
eliminate the bad choice.14 Still others argue that libertarian paternalism
and state-guided efforts to enhance social welfare cannot be reconciled
with a libertarian point of view.15
Recently, paternalism’s modern role in regulation has surfaced at the
centerpiece of several high-profile clashes about public health, most
notably in policy debates about the prevalence of obesity.16 Despite recent
advances in slowing the growth of the obesity rate in the United States,17 it
appears that there are some limits to the types and degrees of regulatory
intervention that the public is willing to accept.
I explore this important topic in public health by way of examples,
with particular attention being given to obesity, but also to marijuana
12
Soft paternalism has been used to encompass a broad family of concepts—each of which have
quirks. Among these concepts are anti-anti-paternalism, asymmetric paternalism, libertarian
paternalism, and light paternalism. See, e.g., Colin F. Camerer et al., Regulation for Conservatives:
Behavioral Economics and the Case for “Asymmetric Paternalism,” 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1211, 1212
(2003) (defining asymmetric paternalism as a regulatory approach that “creates large benefits for those
who make errors, while imposing little or no harm on those who are fully rational”); Christine Jolls et
al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1541 (1998) (describing
anti-anti-paternalism as “a skepticism about antipaternalism, but not an affirmative defense of
paternalism”); George Loewenstein & Emily Haisley, The Economist as Therapist: Methodological
Ramifications of “Light” Paternalism, in THE FOUNDATIONS OF POSITIVE AND NORMATIVE
ECONOMICS: A HANDBOOK 210, 213 (Andrew Caplin & Andrew Schotter eds., 2008) (explaining that
“[l]ight paternalism aims to enhance decision making without restricting it”); Cass Sunstein & Richard
Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1159, 1201 (2003)
(identifying libertarian paternalism as “an approach that preserves freedom of choice but that
encourages both private and public institutions to steer people in directions that will promote their own
welfare”). Russell Korobkin assembled this conceptual inventory. Russell Korobkin, Libertarian
Welfarism, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 1651, 1652–53 (2009). In his article, Korobkin offers a theory of
“libertarian welfarism,” which advocates using the same tools as libertarian paternalism, but to serve
collective social welfare ends, rather than just individual ends. Id. at 1653.
13
CASS R. SUNSTEIN & RICHARD H. THALER, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH,
WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2008).
14
See generally CONLY, supra note 11 (arguing that soft paternalism is ineffective).
15
See generally Gregory A. Mitchell, Libertarian Paternalism Is an Oxymoron, 99 NW. U. L.
REV. 1245 (2005) (contending, inter alia, that the redistributive effects of libertarian paternalism are
inconsistent with libertarian values).
16
See, e.g., Robert Creighton, Cheeseburgers, Race, and Paternalism: Los Angeles’ Ban on Fast
Food Restaurants, 30 J. LEGAL MED. 249, 266 (2009) (discussing opposition to a fast food ban in Los
Angeles, which was rooted in anti-paternalism). See generally Colin Hector, Nudging Towards
Nutrition? Soft Paternalism and Obesity-Related Reform, 67 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 103 (2012) (discussing
both sides of the paternalism debate regarding obesity policy).
17
See, e.g., Betsy McKay, U.S. News: Obesity in Young Children Falls Sharply, WALL ST. J.,
Feb. 26, 2014, at A4 (describing a forty percent drop in preschool-age obesity over the past decade).
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legalization, water-supply fluoridation, and efforts to label foods with
genetically-modified organisms (GMOs). These flashpoint zones show a
general rejection of paternalism—especially visible, hard paternalism.
This leaves regulators with the more limited toolkit of soft paternalism to
attack some of the more difficult public health problems. In fact, a
rejection of hard paternalism can lead regulators either to use strategies
that preserve autonomy, or simply to do nothing to regulate personal
choices.
Assessing whether paternalism has reached its limits of effectiveness
in public health raises a number of questions, namely: Which types of
paternalistic initiatives have potential, and which have been exhausted? If
these questions can be answered practically, they might guide
policymakers more effectively. For example, according to a 2010 Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) study, the obesity problem may
have peaked.18 This might mean that in spite of certain public rejections of
paternalism, regulators may be justified in continuing with some of the
anti-obesity strategies. But, in light of the public attitude, having a
framework for deciding which strategies to pursue further may prove
helpful.
Though common wisdom holds that “[d]ata is not the plural of
anecdote,”19 truthful anecdotes provide an invitation to test certain
hypotheses and spark dialogue about their meaning. A cursory view of the
obesity problem alone demonstrates inconsistencies in scientific and
epidemiological viewpoints. Public attitudes toward paternalism can be
similarly inconsistent. Positing that paternalism has reached its limits can
be challenging to prove or disprove, but nowhere has the debate about
paternalism been sharper than in public health. Though I focus on various
components of the obesity problem and other public health issues, I
18
See Katherine M. Flegal et al., Prevalence and Trends in Obesity Among U.S. Adults, 1999–
2008, 303 JAMA 235, 240 (2010) (“These data suggest that the increase in the prevalence of obesity
previously observed . . . may not be continuing at a similar level over the period 1999–2008,
particularly for women but possibly for men.”).
19
E-mail from Fred Shapiro, Assoc. Librarian for Collections and Access and Lecturer in Legal
Research, Yale Law Sch. to American Dialect Society (July 6, 2004, 11:21 PM), available at
http://listserv.linguistlist.org/cgi-bin/wa?A2=ind0407a&L=ads-l&P=8874. Ironically, this common
saying appears to be a complete reversal of the original sentiment expressed by the original declarant,
noted political scientist Raymond Wolfinger. Id. Fred Shapiro, the author of the Yale Dictionary of
Quotations, emailed Wolfinger in 2004 for clarification about this aphorism. Wolfinger wrote:

I said “The plural of anecdote is data” some time in the 1969–70 academic year
while teaching a graduate seminar at Stanford. The occasion was a student's
dismissal of a simple factual statement—by another student or me—as a mere
anecdote. The quotation was my rejoinder. Since then I have missed few
opportunities to quote myself.
Id. As Shapiro observed, “What is interesting about this saying is that it seems to have morphed into
its opposite—‘Data is not the plural of anecdote’—in some people's minds.” Id.
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composed this narrative to show that paternalism may have reached the
natural limits of effectiveness. I also show, however, that paternalism and
public health intersect in different ways—and that neither term is
monolithic.
Generalizations, of course, invite the presentation of exceptions and,
though anecdotes can always be countered by anecdotes, discussing recent
reactions to public health regulation in a few other spheres provides a
starting point for answering the question of whether paternalism has
peaked. For example, the legalization of recreational marijuana use in
Washington and Colorado may embody a new movement away from
paternalism in the public health sphere.20 The successful challenges in
recent years to efforts to fluoridate drinking water in Portland, Oregon, and
a growing list of other locales may also reflect rejection of hard
paternalism.21 Moreover, the recent reaction to GMOs in the food supply
presents a question about who plays the paternalist.22 The grassroots
concerns about GMO ingredients, particularly activist efforts seeking food
labeling, could be viewed as a rejection of the paternalism led by corporate
interests and government complicity with those interests.23 With all of
these issues in controversy, I argue that a general pushback on the
advancement of paternalism reflects an overarching public attitude across
these quite different debates and movements in public health.
Will hard paternalism play a viable and significant role in public health
in the future? Predicting the future can prove humbling, even with a set
definition of a standard and a robust and consistent data set about past
patterns.24 Moreover, recent developments in public health regulation
indicate that regulators may have a more limited range of tools going
forward. In particular, when looking at obesity—which is the most
significant problem I will explore in terms of scale—finding viable
opportunities to change consumption and physical activity patterns through
20

See infra text accompanying notes 379–81.
See infra Part III.C.2.
22
See infra Part III.C.3. Connecticut became the first state to require labeling of geneticallymodified foods. More than twenty states are considering taking similar action. Stephanie Strom,
Connecticut Approves Genetic Labeling, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 2013, at B4.
23
Michele Simon, How Grassroots Advocates Beat the Biotech and Food Lobbies,
HUFFINGTON POST (June 5, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/michele-simon/gmo-labelingconnecticut_b_3386010.html. This would reflect Gerald Dworkin’s definition of broad paternalism,
which concerns “any paternalistic action: state, institutional . . . or individual.” Gerald Dworkin,
Paternalism, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (June 1, 2010), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/paternalism/.
24
Snowfall accumulation prediction provides an example. Even armed with mountains of
historical data and multiple predictive models, the task proves daunting. See generally Tyler
McCandless et al., Statistical Guidance Methods for Predicting Snowfall Accumulation in the
Northeast United States, 35 NAT’L WEATHER DIG. 149, 150, 152, 156 (2011) (detailing the difficulty
of accurately forecasting snowfall, despite technological advances in meteorology). Meanwhile,
degrees of paternalism are impossible to measure with precision. “How much” paternalism and “what
type” of paternalism can be directionally discerned at best.
21
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hard paternalism proves difficult, and soft paternalism can prove
ineffective.
In Part II of this Article, I describe the paternalism at issue in public
health in broad strokes, from traditional viewpoints about non-intervention
to soft paternalism and hard paternalism. I also discuss the application of
the different modes of paternalistic intervention in general terms. In Part
III, I discuss how paternalism in general may have met the limits of its
reach in public health, focusing substantially on obesity, but also looking at
other public health areas that may illuminate the trend. Obesity initiatives,
state-level efforts to decriminalize marijuana use, fluoridation initiatives,
and grassroots efforts to label GMOs all have different contours but share
an anti-paternalistic thread. Part IV argues that the limits of paternalism
and the challenges of public health should affirmatively focus regulators on
identifying and selecting opportunities that respect both the attitudinal
limits toward paternalism and the real scientific challenges to public
health. The limits of paternalism do not present an end to the gains in
public health regulation, but they do require regulators to prioritize their
efforts in light of those limits. Part V briefly concludes with an exhortation
to public health regulators, urging them to use a framework that
incorporates both policy efficacy and the true limits of paternalism into
regulatory decision making.
II. PATERNALISM
Paternalism has peaked, for now, in the realm of public health
regulation. Before providing support for that claim, I must first define the
forms of paternalism to which I refer. Forests have been felled in the name
of understanding and applying theories of paternalism,25 so for the
purposes of this Article, I adopt Gerald Dworkin’s broad definition of
paternalism because it comports with the other “flavors” of paternalism

25
Over the past few years, a large body of literature has emerged in the general sphere of public
health and paternalism, even when “health-care” policy is excluded. See, e.g., David R. Buchanan,
Autonomy, Paternalism, and Justice: Ethical Priorities in Public Health, 98 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 15,
15 (2008) (“On empirical and ethical grounds, public health should seek instead to expand individual
autonomy to improve population health.”); Thomas R.V. Nys, Paternalism in Public Health Care, 1
PUB. HEALTH ETHICS 64, 64 (2008) (challenging the “charges” of paternalism in public health); Robert
A. Skipper, Obesity: Towards a System of Libertarian Paternalistic Public Health Interventions, 5
PUB. HEALTH ETHICS 181, 181 (2012) (advocating deployment of libertarian paternalism to reduce
obesity); Lindsay F. Wiley et al., Who’s Your Nanny?: Choice, Paternalism and Public Health in the
Age of Personal Responsibility, 41 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 88, 88–89 (2013) (briefly exploring “the forces
behind the cultural and political resonance of concerns about public health paternalism, ‘personal
responsibility,’ and the ‘nanny state’”). For recent examples in the legal and regulatory literature, see
Rebecca L. Goldberg, No Such Thing as a Free Lunch: Paternalism, Poverty, and Food Justice, 24
STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 35 (2013), and Lindsay F. Wiley, Rethinking the New Public Health, 69 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 207 (2012).
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26

that will be described.
Dworkin described paternalism as the
“interference with a person’s liberty of action justified by reasons referring
exclusively to the welfare, good, happiness, needs, interests, or values of
the person being coerced.”27 Dworkin also recognized the distinction
between narrow and broad paternalism, with narrow paternalism
describing state action, and broad paternalism further including private
actors.28
Paternalism in public health sprawls beyond the context of public
regulation to include the private domain. It thus encompasses action by the
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to remove a person’s favored
medication from the market,29 as well as a wife physically blockading the
path of her husband’s car to prevent him from driving, rather than walking,
to buy unhealthy ice cream.30 Examples of private paternalism abound,
and oftentimes public paternalism has a secondary private effect. For
instance, the FDA has promulgated marketing restrictions for smokeless
tobacco,31 with the intention of protecting young consumers.32 But actors
other than the government can certainly influence young consumers.
Consider the behavioral changes that can result from such things as
privately-imposed bans and restrictions on the public use of chewing
tobacco in professional sports.33 In this case, paternalistically-motivated
and self-imposed, private restrictions reduce the glorification of
individually harmful behavior, while also limiting exposure to audiences
prone to engaging in the behavior.34
26

Gerald Dworkin, Paternalism, 56 THE MONIST 64, 65 (1972).
Id.
28
Dworkin, supra note 23.
29
See, e.g., Katherine Hobson, Without Darvon and Darvocet, What’s a Pain Sufferer to Do?,
WALL ST. J. HEALTH BLOG (Nov. 24, 2010, 5:04 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/health/2010/11/24/withoutdarvon-and-darvocet-whats-a-pain-sufferer-to-do/ (noting that many patients objected when the FDA
removed an established painkiller from the market because of cardiac risks).
30
See, e.g., Jenna Karvunidis, Policing Your Spouse’s Diet—NO ICE CREAM FOR YOU!, HIGH
GLOSS & SAUCE BLOG (June 11, 2012, 1:27 PM), http://www.chicagonow.com/high-gloss-andsauce/2012/06/policing-your-spouses-diet-no-ice-cream-for-you/ (“Run that house, ladies. Don’t think
you’re being nice by letting everyone get chubby! My unpopular opinion is if you really love someone,
you don’t let them make poor choices.”) Karvunidis’s actions and philosophy comport nicely with
broader definitions of paternalism that recognize paternal actions of private actors.
31
21 C.F.R. § 1140.10–1140.34 (2013).
32
75 Fed. Reg. 13225 (Mar. 19, 2010).
33
In 1993, Major League Baseball banned the use of chewing tobacco by minor league players.
Tobacco Ban in Minors, N.Y. TIMES (June 3, 1993), http://www.nytimes.com/1993/06/03/sports/tobacc
o-ban-in-minors.html. In 2011, Major League Baseball, after negotiations with the players’ union, did
not ban the use of chewing tobacco during play, but did restrict the carrying of pouches and use of tins
on the field, and also use during pre- and post-game interviews and at team functions. Bob Young,
“Giant” 1st Step, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Nov. 23, 2011, at C2.
34
Before the formal restrictions came into effect, baseball phenom Stephen Strasburg announced
that part of his motivation for quitting was that he “[did not] want kids who want to be like him to see
him with a packed lower lip.” Adam Kilgore, Strasburg Attempting to Shut Out Tobacco, WASH. POST,
27
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Paternalism broadly describes an approach to regulation, but
understanding the various dimensions of paternalism requires nuance.
Recently, soft paternalism has been offered as a broad alternative to hard
paternalism.
Hard paternalism “advocates making some actions
impossible, and soft paternalism merely recommends incentivizing certain
preferable options.”35 Sarah Conly recently offered a strong defense of
hard, coercive paternalism, concluding that regulators have a stark choice:
“[They] can leave people to suffer the effects of their errors, errors that can
ruin their lives, or [they] can intervene. Coercive paternalism is
humanitarian . . . and . . . reflects the value of human choice, since it helps
individual[s] to reach the goals they have set for themselves.”36
Soft paternalism values personal autonomy over coercion, seeking
opportunities to preserve choice and engender improved decision making.
Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein describe their brand of soft paternalism,
libertarian paternalism, as “preserv[ing] freedom of choice but . . .
authoriz[ing] both private and public institutions to steer people in
directions that will promote their welfare.”37 Though various definitions of
hard and soft paternalism circulate, I embrace the definitions offered by
Conly, Thaler, and Sunstein as current and concise.38
My analysis does not require exploration of the historical development
of thought about paternalism,39 but it does require this narrowing of the

Jan. 31, 2011, at A1.
35
CONLY, supra note 11, at 5.
36
Id. at 194.
37
Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 11, at 175, 179.
38
It is important to clarify terminology. Joel Feinberg used the term soft paternalism to describe
paternalism directed at someone who lacks voluntary choices, and hard paternalism to be directed at
those whose choices and actions are voluntary. JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF 12 (1986). Here, I use
soft paternalism to describe regulatory efforts that attempt to improve individual welfare by enhancing
decision making while preserving autonomy, and hard paternalism to describe regulatory efforts that
mandate the action that improves welfare, while removing discretion. One scholar, Thaddeus Pope, has
emphasized that the moral debate about deploying hard paternalism can only begin with a more
explicit, “honest[] and transparen[t]” definition of hard paternalism than that offered by Feinberg.
Thaddeus Mason Pope, Is Public Health Paternalism Really Never Justified? A Response to Joel
Feinberg, 30 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 121, 121–22 (2005). Pope argues that Feinberg dismisses the
necessity of deploying hard paternalism by stretching the boundaries of soft paternalism to encompass
interventions that would be classified as hard paternalism. Id. at 122. Elsewhere, Pope further
articulated the need to better define the boundaries of hard paternalism in order to clarify debates about
the justification for deployment. Thaddeus Mason Pope, Counting the Dragon’s Teeth and Claws: The
Definition of Hard Paternalism, 20 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 659, 660–62 (2004).
39
Theories of paternalism and their merits have been debated since the time of Plato and Socrates,
through the Enlightenment, and into the modern era—where the current scholarly debate has been one
that weighs libertarian approaches against paternalism and, within paternalism, soft paternalism versus
hard paternalism. See, e.g., JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 10–16 (Thomas I. Cook
ed., Hafner Pub. Co. 1965) (1690) (presenting Locke’s argument against paternal and regal power and
authority through his critique of the divine right of kings); PAPPAS, supra note 10, at 229–39
(discussing the Platonic and Socratic views of paternalism); F.M. Barnard, Will and Political
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working definitions of paternalism. Indeed, public health regulators today
intervene at various points along a spectrum, exploiting both “soft,”
libertarian paternalism, and “hard,” traditional paternalism.
In Part II.A, I briefly describe some of the contours of paternalism,
using this most recent framing and focusing on points along the spectrum
of paternalistic interventions. In Part II.B, I illustrate the points through
various applications.
A. Flavors of Paternalistic Intervention
Paternalism might be justified if the prescribed action corrects people
from making so-called bad choices or wrong choices.40 Take the example
of a lifeguard at a public beach, who has the ability to help directly with
the health and welfare of people in her territory.41 Assume that the
lifeguard knows that broken glass has presented hazards on her beach,
leaving several beachgoers to suffer cuts to their feet. As the lifeguard
watches people pass by her tower, plodding through the sand in bare feet,
she has several options. The first option is to do nothing and permit people
to make their own assessments about the pleasure of walking barefoot
against the risk of getting cut and the costs of gathering information about
beach safety. This non-intervention appears to respect the default, natural
preferences of people. There is no certainty that people will get cut, but
there is a certainty that permitting people to choose to go barefoot respects
their preferences. People can choose to ask the lifeguard about hazards,
but often the prospective costs of retrieving and processing information
exceed the expected potential benefits.
The lifeguard’s other options all involve layers of intervention to
correct the information problem or to simply prevent harm. All may be
justifiable, but they do involve changing the decision-making process and
some deprivation of autonomy. The lifeguard can shout, “Sharp glass is
hidden in the sand!” This would be the provision of pure, true information.
It might not change behavior—but personal decisions about the
risk/pleasure return would be of a higher, more informed quality. The
lifeguard can also shout, “Put on your sandals! Yesterday, two people cut
their feet on the glass in this sand and were taken by ambulance to the
Rationality in Rousseau, 32 POL. STUD. 369, 376–79 (1984) (discussing “Rousseau’s principled
opposition to paternalism”).
40
I note that moral justifications can be offered for different levels of paternalistic intervention,
but I do not make normative prescriptions based on morality. I advise using restraint and expecting
modest results from regulatory intervention in public health, based on the reality of public attitudes
toward paternalism and the complexity of the problem being addressed.
41
One popular encyclopedia uses a different lifeguard illustration, for a lifeguard presents a
natural example of an omniscient, benevolent decision maker responsible for public and individual
welfare. Paternalism, NEW WORLD ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Pat
ernalism#Soft_vs._hard_paternalism (last updated Apr. 2, 2008).
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hospital!” This truthful narrative of harm adds a degree of intervention
beyond pure information about the presence of the glass. The beach
regulator tells a salient story. Beyond that, the lifeguard could require all
beach walkers to don footwear—permitting people to enjoy the beach, but
with less autonomy about the way they can do it. The lifeguard insulates
the beachgoers from harm. At the most extreme, the lifeguard could
announce that the beach will be closed until it is made completely safe,
depriving the decision makers of all autonomy about judging risk.
Substitution of regulatory judgment for personal judgment about health
and safety would be fairly controllable in the well-defined beach
environment, which is a narrow zone where control can be exercised over a
narrow set of behaviors. Additionally, the values behind preserving
autonomy might be stronger in some circumstances than others.
Preventing people from taking a certain chance of drowning or from highrisk exposure to shark attacks might justify hard paternalism. Letting
people take the risk of cutting their feet might only warrant a softer
paternalism because the risk and magnitude of harm would be lower.
I structure the discussion of paternalistic intervention in public health
in a manner similar to that of the lifeguard example. Paternalistic
interventions can be framed to address knowledge or information errors in
decision making, or other biases. At their extreme, they simply prohibit
actors from making a harmful choice.
I present below a five-level spectrum of interventional efforts that I
derived from the work of Cass Sunstein and Christine Jolls.42 This
spectrum has been used in different contexts. For example, Daniel Young
further crystallized my approach in the context of regulating intervention in
health care markets.43 I have previously applied this framework in the
contexts of sugary drink container size limits44 and regulations of peer
endorsements in advertising.45 The five levels are arrayed accordingly:
(1) Libertarian or apaternalistic: government allows a fully
free market and relies on consumers to accurately process
relevant information;
(2) Weak-form debiasing: government provides raw statistical
and factual information to consumers in an attempt to make
them aware of relevant data;46
42

Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, Debiasing Through Law, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 199 (2006).
Daniel Young, Curing What Ails Us: How the Lessons of Behavioral Economics Can Improve
Health Care Markets, 30 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 461, 480–81 (2012).
44
David Adam Friedman, Micropaternalism, 88 TUL. L. REV. 75, 90–109 (2013).
45
David Adam Friedman, Debiasing Advertising: Balancing Risk, Hope, and Social Welfare, 19
J.L. & POL’Y 539, 556–59 (2011).
46
Jolls and Sunstein focus their article on the concept of using regulation to “debias” consumers.
Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 42, at 199–202. Debiasing describes regulatory efforts to improve welfare
43
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(3) Strong-form debiasing: government makes available a
“concrete instance of the occurrence” or “truthful narratives
of harm” in order to illustrate the downside effects of
various biases, although consumer choice remains
unrestrained;47
(4) Insulating strategies: government protects consumers by
creating barriers to entry or hard-to-satisfy standards;48 and
(5) Outright bans and mandates: government bars or prevents
consumers from choosing certain options in the
marketplace, or dictates mandatory practices.49
All across this intervention spectrum, obesity-reducing efforts or other
public health initiatives are at work. Even in the non-intervention sphere,
markets work to resolve obesity in some ways, even if by selfish means to
selfish ends.50 At the softer end of the spectrum, regulators attempt to
address cognitive biases through the presentation of more information to
improve the quality of decision making. At the other end of the
intervention spectrum, outright bans, reflecting hard paternalism, have
been in place.
B. Application of Paternalistic Interventions
To illustrate the paternalistic intervention spectrum described in
Part II.A, I apply it to domains that include but extend beyond public
health. Understanding the intervention tactics across the spectrum, their
effectiveness, and their implications for preserving autonomy facilitates a
full assessment of different approaches.
1. Apaternalism
The apaternalistic approach toward regulation does not necessarily
equate to indifference to social problems, but rather to a contention or
belief that markets naturally solve problems. A further extension of this
argument is that even regulators with good intentions can injure social
welfare through the unintended or undesirable consequences of their direct
without depriving the regulated subjects of autonomy or choice. People have natural biases, and the
premise of debiasing is that if you expose people to these biases or restructure their choices, they will
make superior decisions for their own welfare and welfare at large. See Friedman, supra note 45, at
543–44 (“Debiasing through law purports to bring attractive features to the regulatory arena, achieving
welfare-enhancing outcomes without paternalism.”).
47
Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 42, at 210, 215.
48
See id. at 225–27 (proposing that in some situations, “insulating” strategies will be preferable
options to “strategies for debiasing through law” or “refusing to respond at all”).
49
Id. at 207.
50
Certainly, markets have worked to generate obesity. Overconsumption of unhealthy foods
results from market-driven transactions, even if some of those transactions reflect information failures.
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51

intervention. Negative externalities from private behavior might justify
intervention,52 but the argument about whether markets or regulation
would best solve the externality issue remains.53
In the public health arena, externalities might reflect the public cost of
private decisions about consumption or the choice to remain sedentary.54
Redistributing this social cost out of fairness and out of a desire to reduce
the regulated activity is one pursuit. The other, which libertarians might
reject, is the paternalism that attempts solely to protect people from selfharm. This could be described as counter to John Stuart Mill’s harm
principal.55 Market enthusiasts might endorse an externality-related tax,
not for the primary purpose of displacing personal choice, but to ensure
that an actor’s choice is not distorted by making behavior less expensive to
the actor than it would be if internalized. In other words, if the tax
internalizes the externality of the behavior, balance would be restored to

51
For example, some nutrition scientists argue that agricultural subsidies may lead to excessive
production of unhealthy products. See James E. Tillotson, America’s Obesity: Conflicting Public
Policies, Industrial Economic Development, and Unintended Consequence, 24 ANN. REV. NUTRITION
617, 630–35 (2004) (arguing that agricultural policies in the United States are related to the prevalence
of obesity); David Wallinga, Agricultural Policy And Childhood Obesity: A Food Systems and Public
Health Commentary, 29 HEALTH AFF. 405, 407–09 (2010) (discussing how agricultural policies help to
determine what people eat, and ultimately are contributing to childhood obesity). But see Julian M.
Alston et al., Farm Subsidies and Obesity in the United States: National Evidence and International
Comparisons, 33 FOOD POL’Y 470, 473–74 (2008) (arguing that farm subsidies have generally small
and inconsistent effects on farm commodity prices, and that the resulting food prices of more- and lessfattening foods are similarly inconsistent); Bradley J. Rickard et al., How Have Agricultural Policies
Influenced Caloric Consumption in the United States?, 22 HEALTH ECON. 316, 329–35 (2013)
(minimizing the link between agricultural subsidies and the increasing availability of fattening foods).
52
See M. Todd Henderson, The Nanny Corporation, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1517, 1522–23 (2009)
(“[I]f those imposing costs on others are forced to pay for these costs, society will get the socially
optimal amount of the activity generating the costs.”). If regulators compel manufacturers to
compensate others for pollution, the manufacturers will internalize the costs. Id.
53
See Henry I. Miller, The Right Way to Fight Obesity, DEFINING IDEAS (June 19, 2013),
http://www.hoover.org/publications/defining-ideas/article/149881 (arguing that nanny-state activism
will be less effective than market-based reforms).
54
I discuss externalities resulting from individual choices in the context of Pigouvian
consumption taxes, infra Part II.B.4.b, under the category of insulation tactics.
55
Mill’s harm principle justified coercion only in the event of external harm to others, regarding
the protection of solely individual welfare beyond that of the rest of mankind. JOHN STUART MILL, ON
LIBERTY ¶ 1.9 (4th ed. 1869). In theory, this justification would mesh with Korobkin’s model of
libertarian welfarism, which proffers the notion that “nudging” interventions can substitute for
coercion. Korobkin, supra note 12, at 1653. As Mill wrote:

[T]he sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in
interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number is self-protection. That
the only purpose for which power can rightfully be exercised over any member of a
civilised community against his will is to prevent harm to others. His own good,
whether physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant.
MILL, supra, ¶ 1.9.
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56

the market.
The apaternalistic approach defers to the preferences of the individual.
Individuals make choices based on what they think will maximize their
own happiness, and tampering with such subjectivity will interfere with
that goal.57 One behavioral critique of this approach is that such decisions
are made with imperfect information and hard-wired cognitive errors. The
debiasing approaches discussed next attempt to preserve choice and
autonomy.58 The insulation approaches attempt to make certain choices
more costly, while bans completely substitute the regulator’s judgment for
that of the consumer.59
One other practice that apaternalists might tolerate would be voluntary
actions by producers to alter offerings in a way that might lead to better
choices. For example, if tastes change, consumers might start to care about
safety over other features when purchasing an automobile.60 The
categorization of the behavior as libertine becomes trickier if regulators
induced the preference or demand for the desirable feature. If consumers
were even slightly nudged toward this choice, then autonomy was slightly
reduced. This kind of problem clarifies why these categories must appear
on a spectrum. I use the spectrum to illuminate regulatory phenomena, not
to trap every regulatory effort into a box.
2. Weak-Form Debiasing
Weak-form debiasing describes the first and least-intrusive step into
the regulatory sphere. In this form of soft paternalism, regulators simply
provide decision-makers with information to make better decisions. No
choices are surrendered and personal autonomy is preserved. Objections to
weak-form debiasing tactics come from advocates of hard paternalism,
who contend that weak approaches will not yield the right decisions.
Today, the regulatory-commercial atmosphere bombards consumers
with more disclosures about public health and consumer products than any
other time in the history of industrial consumerism. Educational public
health initiatives in certain spheres have never been more robust.61 In other
56
See William J. Baumol, On Taxation and the Control of Externalities, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 307,
307, 312 (1972) (“[A] Pigouvian tax, without compensation to those affected by an externality” “is
compatible with optimal resource allocation”).
57
See Yofi Tirosh, The Right to Be Fat, 12 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 264, 266–67
(2012) (“American law should recognize a new realm of liberty: the realm of body size.”).
58
See infra Part II.B.2–3.
59
See infra Part II.B.4–5.
60
Volvo, for example, has built a strong brand around the centerpiece of safety. See Lois Geller,
Why a Brand Matters, FORBES (May 23, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/loisgeller/2012/05/23/abrand-is-a-specialized/ (“Think of Volvo, for instance, and your first thoughts are probably going to be
something like ‘well built, comfortable, Swedish’ and, most of all, ‘safety.’”).
61
See, e.g., DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., ENDING THE TOBACCO EPIDEMIC: A TOBACCO
CONTROL STRATEGIC ACTION PLAN FOR THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES
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consumer domains like the financial sector, mandatory disclosure seems to
be accelerating.62 Seldom do we see examples where regulators have
rolled back disclosure requirements.
Some commentators argue that this weaker form of debiasing may
have extremely limited effects,63 while others still warn of the
disproportionate or distortive effects of adding or removing information
from the decision-making atmosphere. Regarding the latter concern, the
availability heuristic describes the phenomenon where people use
information most readily available to them to extrapolate to a broader
picture.64 Weak-form debiasing can resequence information in ways that
can unpredictably distort decisions.65 For example, oversaturating people
with information about terrorist attacks leads them to believe that the
associated risk is greater than that for sunbathing, which actually poses a
greater threat.66 Similarly, because homicides are featured more heavily in
news reports, people are prone to believe that such killings are more
prevalent than suicides.67 Elsewhere, I have argued that boldfaced
disclosures on peanut butter jars about the acceptable amount of rat hairs
therein—per regulators—might make people shy away from a purchase
more than they ordinarily should.68
Weak- and strong-form debiasing strategies both carry the risk of
“overshooting.”69 Too much disclosure might distort risk assessment.
14–18, 43–57 (2010) (outlining federal, state, and local initiatives for tobacco prevention and control).
Relatedly, the Consumer Product Safety Commission provides readily available “Safety Guides” and
“Safety Education Centers” for consumer products ranging from ATVs to household items. Safety
Education, U.S. CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY COMM’N, http://www.cpsc.gov/en/Safety-Education/
(last visited Oct. 12, 2014).
62
See, e.g., Kenneth J. Benton, Consumer Compliance Outlook: An Overview of the Regulation Z
Rules Implementing the CARD Act, PHILA. FED. RES. BANK, http://www.philadelphiafed.org/bankresources/publications/consumer-compliance-outlook/2010/first-quarter/regulation-z-rules.cfm
(last
visited July 15, 2014) (providing examples of the disclosures required by the Credit Card
Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009).
63
One school of thought convincingly argues that information disclosures do not enhance
decision making. See, e.g., Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated
Disclosure, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 647, 650–51 (2011) (arguing mandatory disclosure has failed to achieve
desirable results for consumers); Howard Latin, “Good” Warnings, Bad Products, and Cognitive
Limitations, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1193, 1230–32 (1994) (arguing that overcoming consumer optimism
bias requires more than marginal informational disclosures).
64
See Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 STAN. L.
REV. 683, 685 (1999) (describing the availability heuristic as “a pervasive mental shortcut whereby the
perceived likelihood of any given event is tied to the ease with which its occurrence can be brought to
mind”).
65
See SUNSTEIN & THALER, supra note 13, at 24–26; Friedman, supra note 45, at 590.
66
SUNSTEIN & THALER, supra note 13, at 24–26.
67
Id.
68
Friedman, supra note 45, at 570.
69
See Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 42, at 230–31 (providing an example of overshooting where
truthful narratives are used in the context of consumer safety law, and consumers may be led to
“exaggerate the risks of consumer products”).
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Consumers may misapply information or develop false confidence from
having it.70 In public health, consumers are making complex sets of
personal choices and transactions—and one set of decisions might lead to
an inadvertently more harmful set of decisions. If disclosure unduly
pushes consumers to eschew more sugar, for example, which leads to
consumption of more salt, the net effect might not be desirable.71
Nonetheless, the premise that more information preserves choice while
providing information to make better decisions can have credibility in the
right contexts—and I discuss those contexts in Part III.
3. Strong-Form Debiasing
Strong-form debiasing describes an information-based strategy for
improving decision making, just as weak-form debiasing does. The
regulatory construction of “truthful narratives of harm” about certain
identified behaviors separates strong-form debiasing from weak-form
debiasing.72
To maximize effectiveness, these truthful narratives,
assembled from raw facts, must be designed to be compelling to the target
audience and must reference concrete examples of harm.73
The
concreteness of the examples taps directly into the availability heuristic.74
By making an example of harm more “available” and “vivid,” the
information may be riper for absorption.75 The narrative must be truthful
to be effective because if the narrative stretches credibility, then the target
of the narrative might write it off as a worst-case scenario.76
Narratives involving compelling harm are slightly harder on the
paternalism spectrum because instead of merely providing information, the
regulator deploys an argument. Regulators have deployed these arguments
most notably in efforts to curb drug abuse77 and cigarette smoking.78 The
70
See Lauren E. Willis, Against Financial-Literacy Education, 94 IOWA L. REV. 197, 235–36
(2008) (suggesting that improving consumer financial literacy can lead to overconfidence, which can
lead to poorer decisions than the status ante).
71
As I will discuss, infra Part III.B.2.c.ii, the effect of sugar taxes on public health may prove
ambiguous. Therefore, an extrapolation that the lighter intervention techniques of disclosure and
education might have unpredictable effects is within reason. At least one study suggests that the effects
of an aggressive tax strategy on sugary soda might modestly reduce child-adolescent consumption, but
that the calories forgone would be replaced with calories from the consumption of other sugary
beverages. Jason M. Fletcher et al., The Effects of Soft Drink Taxes on Child and Adolescent
Consumption and Weight Outcomes, 94 J. PUB. ECON. 967, 972–73 (2010). For a robust discussion of
the nuances and challenges associated with the taxation approach, see Katherine Pratt, A Constructive
Critique of Public Health Arguments for Anti-Obesity Soda Taxes and Food Taxes, 87 TUL. L. REV. 73,
111–35 (2012).
72
Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 42, at 210, 212, 215.
73
Id. at 210.
74
Id. at 212–17.
75
Id. at 212–13.
76
Id. at 214.
77
This makes the recent trend toward decriminalization of marijuana, discussed infra Part III.C.1,
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anti-tobacco advertising campaign sponsored by the American Legacy
Foundation published letters depicting dying mothers apologizing to their
families for the damage they had inflicted due to their impending tobaccorelated demises.79 In a well-known public service advertisement, famous
stage actor Yul Brynner appeared posthumously to warn people about the
deadly risks of smoking:
[The ad] opened with an image of Brynner’s tombstone, with
the inscription “Yul Brynner, 1920–1985.” An announcer
intoned, “Ladies and gentlemen, the late Yul Brynner.”
Next, Brynner appeared on the . . . video clip. His
antismoking advice was followed by another statement he
had made on the program: “If I could take back that smoking,
we wouldn’t be talking about any cancer. I’m convinced of
that.” With that, the 30-second spot ended.80
A private non-profit organization receiving only a small amount of public
funding, the American Cancer Society, paid for the Brynner ad.81
For obesity, some of the most interesting narratives have come from
the private sphere in long-form documentaries about the ills of fast food.
A notable example is Morgan Spurlock’s Super Size Me, in which he
demonstrated severe ill effects on his health from consuming nothing but
McDonald’s food for thirty days.82 Spurlock’s film could be classified as a
market-driven, apaternalistic venture in that it was not financed by the
somewhat ironic. In 1987, the Partnership for a Drug-Free America launched its famous “This is Your
Brain on Drugs” commercial, which made Time’s top-ten list of public service advertisements. See
There Goes My Appetite, Top-10 Public-Service Announcements, TIME (Sept. 4,
2009), http://content.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,1920454_1920455_1920449,00.
html (“[T]his iconic PSA makes use of everyday household items—namely, an egg and a frying pan—
to illustrate how narcotics affect the body.”).
78
See Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 42, at 214–15 (displaying graphic pictures and warnings about
the harms of cigarettes).
79
An example of a simple anti-smoking narrative devised by the American Legacy Foundation:
“Dearest Jon, I am so sorry my smoking will cheat us out of 20 or 30 more years together. Remember
the fun we had every year at the lake. I will ALWAYS love and treasure you. Linda.” Women, AM.
LEGACY FOUND., http://women.americanlegacy.org/includes/pdfs/ad2.pdf (last visited July 15, 2014).
80
Barron H. Lerner, In Unforgettable Final Act, a King Got Revenge on His Killers, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 25, 2005, at F5.
81
Lerner, supra note 80. The American Legacy Foundation is funded by tobacco settlement
money procured by state attorneys general, rendering it more accountable to regulators. Jolls &
Sunstein, supra note 42, at 215.
82
SUPER SIZE ME (Samuel Goldwyn Films 2004). The Spurlock narrative, along with other fast
food documentaries, has so pervaded the public consciousness that they have been parodied. See New
Documentary to Finally Shed Light on Nation’s Fast Food Chains, THE ONION (June 19,
2013), http://www.theonion.com/articles/new-documentary-to-finally-shed-light-on-nations-f,32887/
(claiming, sarcastically, that America is in desperate need of a documentary to show the realities of the
fast food industry because no such movie exists). For further discussion of Spurlock’s narrative
approach, see infra Part III.B.2.b.
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government or produced by regulators: the movie was privately produced
for profit.83 Of course, one can envision how regulators could use similar
tactics to tap the power of a truthful narrative of harm.
4. Insulation Strategies
Moving further toward the hard end of the paternalism spectrum, some
regulation aims to insulate people from harm, while still preserving the
choice to engage in the core activity. I divide insulation strategies into two
categories: (1) mandates that make activities safer, while still permitting
engagement in the activities; and (2) taxes imposed with the purpose of
curbing a behavior, even if that behavioral goal does not constitute the
entire purpose. The taxes could be collected to compensate others or the
general public for negative externalities, thereby compelling actors to
internalize the costs of their behavior and incentivizing reduction of that
behavior.84 I outline each category in turn.
a. Conditional Mandates
Conditional mandates only require restriction in specific contexts that
still leave the actor free to choose. These restrictions often surface in the
product safety realm. For example, mandates that make riding in an
automobile safer are not absolute; technically, riders are still free to select
an alternate means of transportation. The air bag installation mandate
provides an illustration—albeit a controversial one in some circles, because
air bag deployments have both saved lives and taken them.85 Automobile
manufacturers are required to install airbags and consumers are compelled
to absorb some of the associated costs through the price of the automobile.
Every intervention can potentially redistribute risk in unanticipated ways.
This mandate does remove a degree of choice, seeing as a consumer must
buy airbags when buying a car. But beyond raising the consumer cost of
the car slightly, the mandate hardly interferes with the ability to drive.
Motorcycle helmet laws provide another example of an insulation
regulatory strategy.86 In the name of safety, these laws permit people to
83
See Super Size Me: Company Credits, IMDB.COM, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0390521/comp
anycredits (last visited July 15, 2014) (showing that the movie was privately produced by The Con,
Kathbur Pictures, and Studio on the Hudson).
84
See A.C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 168–79 (1920) (describing how taxes can be
used to internalize externalities); see also Baumol, supra note 56, at 307 (bolstering the “impeccable”
“Pigouvian tradition” by demonstrating applications on top of “theoretical nicet[ies]”).
85
See David J. Houston & Lilliard E. Richardson, Jr., The Politics of Air Bag Safety: A
Competition Among Problem Definitions, 28 POL’Y STUD. J. 485, 487 (2000) (discussing the contours
of the air bag safety policy debate).
86
According to the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety, nineteen states and the District of
Columbia require the use of motorcycle helmets. Motorcycle Helmet Use, INS. INST. FOR HIGHWAY
SAFETY, http://www.iihs.org/iihs/topics/laws/helmetuse?topicName=motorcycles (last visited July 15,
2014).
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ride motorcycles subject to the conditional mandate that they wear helmets.
The choice to ride the motorcycle is preserved, but some degree of
freedom has been removed in the interest of individual and social
welfare.87 The Big Gulp ban, as Bloomberg noted, would not have
removed the consumer option to ingest large amounts of sugary
beverages—it would merely slow the consumer down.88 Thus, it would
constitute insulation. But this Big Gulp paternalism, though not of the
hardest variety, was visible enough to draw notable public ire from those
who felt the New York City Board of Health overreached with this
deprivation of autonomy.89
b. Taxation
Taxation of harmful goods, when enacted with the intent to change
behavior or curb consumption, can also be a form of insulation.90 The
mandatory nature of taxation places it on the hard paternalism end of the
regulatory spectrum, but it is not the “hardest” tactic. With taxation, the
choice to smoke or drink has not been eliminated—it has merely been
impeded by compelling the consumer to internalize the social cost of
consumption. Yet again, though, this type of intervention can lead to
counterintuitive results.91
If revenues compensate the appropriate parties for external costs,
taxation still advances individual welfare because individual decisions will
87
See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-42, MOTORCYCLE SAFETY: INCREASING
FEDERAL FUNDING FLEXIBILITY AND IDENTIFYING RESEARCH PRIORITIES WOULD HELP SUPPORT
STATES’ SAFETY EFFORTS 1 (2012) (explaining how social welfare is affected by motorcycle crashes,
as “society bears about three-quarters of the measurable costs of all motor vehicle crashes.”). Costs
associated with motorcycle accidents were estimated to be $16 billion in 2010, though this study did
not account for “longer-term medical costs.” Id.
88
See Campbell, supra note 1 (quoting Bloomberg as stating “if you want to buy 32 ounces, you
just have to carry it back to your seat in two cups”).
89
See Michael Grynbaum, At Movie Theatres and Beaches, the Soda Industry Makes Its Case,
N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2012, at A19 (citing instances of public backlash against the ban).
90
See Kelly D. Brownell et al., The Public Health and Economic Benefits of Taxing SugarSweetened Beverages, 361 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1599, 1604 (2009) (arguing that sugary beverage taxes
will reduce consumption); Jennifer Cantrell et al., Purchasing Patterns and Smoking Behaviors After a
Large Tobacco Tax Increase: A Study of Chinese Americans Living in New York City, 123 PUB.
HEALTH REP. 135, 136 (2008) (describing the impact of taxes on reducing cigarette consumption);
Frank J. Chaloupka et al., The Effects of Price on Alcohol Consumption and Alcohol-Related Problems,
NAT’L INST. ON ALCOHOL ABUSE & ALCOHOLISM (Aug. 2002), http://pubs.niaaa.nih.gov/publications/
arh26-1/22-34.htm (describing how increased alcohol prices, such as those achieved through taxation,
reduce drinking as well the consequences of alcohol abuse). For a brief discussion of sugar-related
taxes, see also infra Part III.B.2.c.ii.
91
See Pratt, supra note 71, at 112 (“Consumers may or may not substitute equally caloritic or
more caloritic untaxed foods or drinks for the foods or drinks that are subject to the tax.”). Katherine
Pratt describes the literature that argues that tobacco taxes might not prove to conform to the Pigouvian
model. Id. at 79. The reasoning is that smokers have higher mortality rates, which effectively leads to
an earlier transfer of their pension, social security, and elder care costs to non-smokers. Id. Slowing
down smoking with taxes decelerates this transfer. Id.

2014]

PUBLIC HEALTH REGULATION AND THE LIMITS OF PATERNALISM

1707

factor in the true costs of the transaction. The tax maximizes social
welfare because non-participants no longer absorb the external costs of the
behavior of others, and yet transactions may continue, unlike with a ban.
Since transactions may continue, with the actors absorbing the true costs,
welfare stands to be enhanced. In theory, a smoker can still choose to
smoke, provided that the tax transfers resources in a way where nonsmokers are not injured, enhancing social welfare.92
Next on the spectrum, the regulators remove all choice and autonomy
from decisions. Rube Goldberg methods involving cognitive psychology
and negative incentives are eschewed in favor of directly ensuring that the
behavior leading to the harm is prohibited.93 This next approach is the
hardest form of paternalism.
5. Outright Bans and Mandates
Regulatory bans on behavior, consumption, and transactions eliminate
choice and autonomy. Mandated behavior inherently coerces compliance.
Paternalism, when deployed in these hard, most absolute forms, substitutes
the wisdom of regulators for the wisdom of individuals in making
decisions about individual and collective welfare. Historical bans on
marijuana fall into this category,94 as do bans on certain consumer financial
transactional activities.95 In such instances, the regulator implicitly
weighed the harm as being great enough to warrant deprivation of
autonomy. The measure of a given ban or mandate’s sustainability would
be the level of public toleration for the autonomy loss.
The 1978 ban on the use of lead as a paint ingredient provides a
92
But see Pratt, supra note 71, at 131 (noting the disproportionate effect taxes on tobacco have on
the poor).
93
See CONLY, supra note 11, at 16 (“[S]ociety . . . should . . . make people do what is good for
them.”).
94
See Gerald Caplan, Medical Marijuana: A Study of Unintended Consequences, 43 MCGEORGE
L. REV. 127, 128 (2012) (providing a general overview of the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) and
FDA’s paternalistic justification for such a sweeping ban). Some inferences can be drawn from the
federal ban, namely, that lawmakers intended not merely to protect the immediate user, but to blunt
societal problems that would affect others. A 2009 study by neuroscientists concluded that chronic
marijuana smoking would lead to “negative consequences” associated with deteriorated decision
making. Staci A. Gruber et al., Altered Affective Response in Marijuana Smokers: An FMRI Study, 105
DRUG & ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 139, 151 (2009). The study cited other findings that marijuana users
tend to be impulsive and underperform in the workplace. Id. at 140. In addition to the user absorbing
this cost, others do, too. This is not to say that legalization of medical marijuana is without a plethora
of benefits and justifications. In fact, it is difficult to find a recent law review article written by
academics that opposes the legalization of medical marijuana.
95
Lending transactions that amount to usury would fit into this “absolute” ban category. See
Christopher L. Peterson, Usury Law, Payday Loans, and Statutory Sleight of Hand: Salience Distortion
in American Credit Pricing Limits, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1110, 1114 (2008) (providing a discussion of
usury laws and presenting “an empirical analysis of all fifty states’ usury laws in two time periods:
1965 and the present”).
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remarkable example of a major industrial change mandated by the
government in the interest of public health.96 Despite demonstrable
dangers, the national ban took fifty years to implement because of
aggressive political tactics employed by the paint manufacturing industry.97
But public opposition to the lead ban after thirty-six years proves to be
low, possibly because the end product essentially appeared unchanged
when lead was removed.98 In fact, over the past thirty-six years, efforts to
address lead paint dangers became even more aggressive.99 One set of
commentators even analogized the dynamics of regulating lead paint,
including the obstructionary tactics used by its producers, to that of
regulating soda, noting that “[d]emanding that all scientific questions be
answered and all aspects of a rule be completely consistent before
regulations are put in place is a frightening requirement.”100
Analogizing the regulation of lead paint to the regulation of soda,
though provocative, has flaws. Lead paint had long been known to present
serious health risks, but those risks were attributable to just one
ingredient—albeit an important one—in the product line.101 Ultimately,
paint manufacturers satisfactorily replaced the lead ingredient with
titanium dioxide, which had little impact or visibility to the consumer.102
Limiting soda production or changing the composition of soda directly
affects consumer choice and autonomy daily. And rather than regulating
one ingredient in one product, food regulators need to consider myriad,
constantly-consumed ingredients and other causes beyond the composition
of food. A ban on soda would not address the web of other problems that
contribute to obesity; it might just shift unhealthy consumption around to
96
Press Release, U.S. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n, CPSC Announces Final Ban On LeadContaining Paint (Sept. 2, 1977), available at http://www.cpsc.gov/en/Recalls/1977/CPSC-AnnouncesFinal-Ban-On-Lead-Containing-Paint/.
97
See David Rosner & Gerald Markowitz, Why It Took Decades of Blaming Parents Before We
Banned Lead Paint, THE ATLANTIC (Apr. 22, 2013), http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2013/0
4/why-it-took-decades-of-blaming-parents-before-we-banned-lead-paint/275169/ (describing how the
paint manufacturing industry had “fought every attempt at regulation” since the 1920s).
98
Authorities warn that lead paint cannot be visually identified. See, e.g., True/False Questions
on Lead, N.Y. STATE DEP’T HEALTH, http://www.health.ny.gov/environmental/lead/exposure/childhoo
d/leadq.htm (last visited July 15, 2014).
99
See 40 C.F.R. § 745(E) (2013) (regulating lead-based paint poisoning prevention in residential
property renovation). This regulation took effect primarily in 2010. Id. § 745.81.
100
Rosner & Markowitz, supra note 97.
101
See Tristan Fowler, A Brief History of Lead Regulation, SCI. PROGRESS (Oct. 21, 2008),
http://scienceprogress.org/2008/10/a-brief-history-of-lead-regulation/ (providing a background on lead
paint regulation and a brief historical summary of the known health hazards caused by lead-based
products). Lead lends pigmentation and durability attributes to paint. James Mitchell Crow, Why Use
Lead in Paint?, ROYAL SOC’Y CHEMISTRY (Aug. 21, 2007), http://www.rsc.org/chemistryworld/News/
2007/August/21080701.asp.
102
See Crow, supra note 101 (observing that the lead pigments were replaced by titanium dioxide,
“which is so safe it’s also used in food colourings as well as in sunscreen”).
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103

other substitute products.
Trans fats bans, however, much more closely resemble lead paint
bans.104 Though the trans fats have been removed, consumers have
accepted their substitutes with little protest or notice.105 In fact, since local
bans began proliferating, many national companies have voluntarily
reduced or eliminated trans fats in their products.106 When a paternalistic
move does not visibly reduce choice but enhances individual welfare, the
ban may prove to be a practical and effective prescription for a problem,
even if a narrow one.
If the ethos of soft paternalism is to protect autonomy but push the
actor toward the better choice, the hidden ban functions the same way.
The forgone autonomy is invisible or simply has no value. If opportunities
to deploy hidden paternalism emerge, they can be valuable for regulators to
exploit. However, not all bans can be as narrow in scope, deep in effect,
and stealthy in implementation as the trans fats ban. The limits of hard
paternalism begin to emerge when autonomy disappears. Practical limits
to hard bans, in the form of consumer substitution, also emerge.107
***
Sarah Conly views the avoidance of hard paternalism in favor of
autonomy as morally questionable.108 Such hard-paternalists argue that, if
the welfare answer is known and harm can be prevented, the state should
act directly, instead of implementing a strategy to merely influence people
to make the right choices.109 The resilience of the permissibility of known
dangers speaks to the difficulties that paternalistic strategies encounter.
For example, though the complete elimination of consumer fireworks sales
would make people safer,110 those sales will likely continue. After all,
what is more popularly associated with celebrating autonomy and liberty

103

See Pratt, supra note 71, at 109, 112.
For a more in-depth discussion of trans fat bans, see infra Part III.B.2.d.ii.
105
See infra notes 366–69.
106
See infra note 200.
107
Some studies suggest that raising the minimum legal age for alcohol consumption (a ban) led
those affected to substitute to marijuana use. See Benjamin Crost & Santiago Guerrero, The Effect of
Alcohol Availability on Marijuana Use: Evidence from the Minimum Legal Drinking Age, 31 J.
HEALTH ECON. 112 (2012); John Dinardo & Thomas Limieux, Alcohol, Marijuana, and American
Youth: The Unintended Consequences of Government Regulation, 20 J. HEALTH ECON. 991 (2001).
108
CONLY, supra note 11, at 176.
109
Pope, supra note 38, at 683–84.
110
See, e.g., John R. Hall, Jr., Fireworks, NAT’L FIRE PROT. ASS’N,
http://www.nfpa.org/research/reports-and-statistics/fire-causes/fireworks (last visited July 15, 2014)
(offering statistics regarding the 9600 fireworks-related injuries that required emergency-room
treatment in the United States during 2011).
104

1710

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:1687

111

than fireworks?
Consumer fireworks provide an appropriate vehicle for concluding this
broad overview of the paternalistic-intervention spectrum. Public efforts
have been initiated on all places of the paternalism spectrum to make
consumer fireworks safer. Weak-form debiasing appears in the form of
basic disclosures about dangers.112 Strong-form debiasing emerges in
narratives of harm about fireworks-related injuries, often promoted by
local officials during the days leading up to the Fourth of July.113 Most
regulation of consumer fireworks reflects insulating strategies relating to
conditions of fireworks sales and restrictions on their explosive content.114
Some of the regulatory approaches to fireworks can be categorized as
absolute bans on a wide range of consumer fireworks.115
As Part III will demonstrate, the same spectrum of options for
addressing fireworks has been deployed against the more complex and
layered Gordian knot of obesity. As will be shown, some of the keys to
reducing obesity—like decreasing the heavy consumption of processed
grains or increasing physical activity levels—may prove at once critical for
advancement of public health and resistant to regulatory intervention.
III. PATERNALISM AND PUBLIC HEALTH
The overall purpose of this Article is to assess the role of paternalism
in public health and whether paternalism, particularly paternalism in its
harder forms, has reached natural limits in terms of popular viability and
practical effectiveness. Obesity provides perhaps the most logical starting
point for this exercise. Arguably, obesity presents perhaps the biggest and
most complex public health challenge facing regulators. Yet, as the
111
Even the U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission concedes as much. “Fireworks are
synonymous with our celebration of Independence Day. Yet, the thrill of fireworks can also bring pain.
200 people on average go [to] the emergency room every day with fireworks-related injuries in the
month around the July 4th holiday.” Fireworks Information Center: Fireworks Injuries, CONSUMER
PROD. SAFETY COMM’N, http://www.cpsc.gov/Safety-Education/Safety-Education-Centers/Fireworks/
(last visited July 15, 2014).
112
See id. (diagramming the body parts most often injured by fireworks and issuing a stern
warning).
113
See, e.g., Sarah Cody, It’s the Time of Year for a Grill and Fireworks Safety Refresher,
HARTFORD COURANT, July 1, 2013, at B8 (weaving in a dramatic story involving burn injuries to ESPN
television reporter Hannah Storm); Shawne K. Wickham, A Fireworks “Nightmare,” UNION LEADER,
June 30, 2013, at A1 (summarizing a fire chief’s recounting of a fireworks mishap that resulted in a
major house fire and “burns and puncture injuries” to eight adults and five children).
114
See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 29-357(a) (2013) (restricting the weight of “pyrotechnic
mixture” per item of consumer fireworks); WASH. REV. CODE § 70.77.395 (2011) (specifying in detail
the days and hours when fireworks may be legally sold).
115
In Maine, for example, localities have banned fireworks in the wake of the repeal of a
statewide ban. See David Harry, Police in Maine Wary of Fireworks Use, Despite Local Bans,
FORECASTER (June 26, 2012), http://www.theforecaster.net/news/print/2012/06/26/police-maine-waryfireworks-use-despite-local-bans/127972.
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obesity problem looms large, public reactions to other public health
initiatives can inform the broader understanding of the trend. To help
discern patterns, it is worthwhile to look beyond obesity at public attitudes
toward the legalization of marijuana at the state level, local water
fluoridation initiatives, and GMO food labeling battles.
Part III.A describes the basic drivers of the obesity problem. I
emphasize the term “basic,” because the obesity problem presents
complexities and controversies from medical, epidemiological, and
regulatory perspectives beyond the scope of any one article. Part III.B
proceeds by exploring efforts to regulate obesity along the paternalism
spectrum, including efforts that have emerged or are reflected in the
marketplace. Then, in Part III.C, I assess the limits of paternalism’s
potential in light of developments in marijuana legalization, mandatory
fluoridation, and the GMO disclosure movement.
A. Defining the Obesity Problem and Its Drivers
Obesity remains at the forefront of a national, if not global, debate
about public health. According to the CDC, more than thirty-five percent
of the American population falls into the “obese” category.116 Though a
consensus has formed about the basic drivers of obesity in the United
States, it can be difficult to discern where and how regulatory efforts can
be deployed most efficiently and effectively to mitigate this public health
issue. It also appears that certain factors driving obesity rates may prove
difficult for regulators to change.
In June 2013, the American Medical Association (AMA) House of
Delegates voted to recognize obesity as a disease.117 Like many contours
of the debate about obesity, this vote was not without controversy. The
vote of the House of Delegates overrode the specific recommendation of
the AMA’s own Council on Science and Public Health, which, after a yearlong study, expressed concerns about labeling obesity as a disease when
the phenomenon lacked reliable means of diagnosis.118
Within the medical community, agreement prevails about the
seriousness of the broader obesity problem, but disagreement reigns about
the epidemiological classification problem. AMA board member Dr.
Patrice Harris endorsed the delegate vote, arguing that “[r]ecognizing
obesity as a disease will help change the way the medical community
116
CYNTHIA L. OGDEN ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., NCHS DATA BRIEF
NO. 82, PREVALENCE OF OBESITY IN THE UNITED STATES, 2009–2010, at 2 (2012).
117
Melissa Healy & Anna Gorman, Obesity to Be Viewed as a Disease; The AMA Decision Is
Likely to Alter Insurers’ and Doctors’ Approach to the U.S. Epidemic, L.A. TIMES, June 19, 2013, at
AA1.
118
Andrew Pollack, A.M.A. Recognizes Obesity as a Disease, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 2013, at B1.
The council eschewed the body-mass index (BMI) diagnostic metric as “simplistic and flawed.” Id.
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tackles this complex issue that affects approximately one in three
Americans.”119 Dr. David Katz of the Yale University Prevention
Research Center rejected the disease label “because disease occurs when
the body is malfunctioning. . . . Turning surplus calories into a fat reserve
is not malfunction, it is normal physiology.”120 Katz labeled obesity as
“largely a societal problem” resulting from societal changes.121 He
stressed, “Obesity is rampant in the modern world not because of changes
in our bodies, but because of changes in the modern world. We are
drowning in excess calories and labor-saving technologies.”122
Without serious dispute, obesity presents a grave public health issue,
whether categorized as a disease or not. Even a cursory examination of the
data reveals that such a label is well deserved. An extensive 2009 study
revealed that dietary and physical activity factors collectively comprise the
leading risk factor for preventable deaths in the United States.123 The study
ranks “overweight-obesity” as the third leading stand-alone risk factor
(216,000 deaths per year), right behind high blood pressure
(395,000 deaths), and smoking (467,000 deaths).124 It is notable that many
of the other leading preventable risk factors are related to dietary or
lifestyle habits that drive obesity.125 Without a doubt, basic theories of
both soft and hard paternalism would support interventions like that
119
Id. Advocates for the obese recognized the potential impact of the disease designation.
Morgan Downey, publisher of an obesity report, believes the label will lead the medical community to
“tak[e] obesity more seriously [and] counsel[] patients about it.” Id.
120
Steven Reinberg, U.S. Doctors’ Group Labels Obesity a Disease, HEALTHDAY NEWS (June
19, 2013), http://consumer.healthday.com/vitamins-and-nutritional-information-27/obesity-healthnews-505/u-s-doctors-group-labels-obesity-a-disease-677526.html.
121
Id.
122
Id.
123
Goodarz Danaei et al., The Preventable Causes of Death in the United States: Comparative
Risk Assessment of Dietary, Lifestyle, and Metabolic Risk Factors, PLOS MED., Apr. 2009, at 15 tbl.8,
19 [hereinafter Harvard School of Public Health Study].
124
Id. at 10, 14, 15 tbl.8.
125
As summarized by the Harvard School of Public Health Study:

•
•
•
•
•
•
•

•
•
Id. at 15 tbl.8.

Inadequate physical activity and inactivity (191,000 deaths)
High blood sugar (190,000 deaths)
High LDL cholesterol (113,000 deaths)
High dietary salt (102,000 deaths)
Low dietary omega-3 fatty acids (84,000 deaths)
High dietary trans fatty acids (82,000 deaths)
Alcohol use (64,000 deaths) (alcohol use averted a balance of 26,000 deaths
from heart disease, stroke and diabetes, because moderate drinking reduces
risk of these diseases. But these deaths were outweighed by 90,000
alcohol-related deaths from traffic and other injuries, violence, cancers and
a range of other diseases).
Low intake of fruits and vegetables (58,000 deaths)
Low dietary poly-unsaturated fatty acids (15,000 deaths)

2014]

PUBLIC HEALTH REGULATION AND THE LIMITS OF PATERNALISM

1713

suggested by the study’s senior author: “[t]he government should . . . use
regulatory, pricing, and health information mechanisms to substantially
reduce salt and trans fats in prepared and packaged foods and to support
research that can find effective strategies for modifying the other dietary,
lifestyle, and metabolic risk factors that cause large numbers of premature
deaths.”126
Despite the significant resources and broad public campaigns that have
been deployed to address obesity, the CDC recently classified 35.7% of all
adults as obese.127 Obesity rates were highest among older adults,
particularly females over sixty years old.128 The obesity rates for children
ranging from two to nineteen years old were approximately 17%.129
Moreover, “[a]lthough national, state, and local governments and many
private employers and payers have increased their efforts to address
obesity since 1998, data from the [CDC] . . . reveal[ed] that obesity rates
increased by 37[%] between 1998 and 2006.”130
Though the prevalence of obesity increased over the past few decades,
obesity rates appear to have stabilized recently.131
Whether this
stabilization is attributable to obesity efforts, or some natural
epidemiological limit, is difficult to discern.132 One medical association
casually speculated that the saturation of health-oriented media or a
“biological limit on obesity” could be causing this slowdown.133 Dr. David
Ludwig134 has speculated that some people are genetically impermeable to
obesity, and implies that the epidemic may be halted by the presence of
these genes.135 Further, he offers reasoning as to why certain individuals
126
Smoking, High Blood Pressure and Being Overweight Top Three Preventable Causes of Death
in the U.S., HARV. SCH. PUB. HEALTH (Apr. 27, 2009), http://www.hsph.harvard.edu/news/pressreleases/smoking-high-blood-pressure-overweight-preventable-causes-death-us/.
127
OGDEN ET AL., supra note 116, at 1 fig.1.
128
Id.
129
Id. at 5–6.
130
Eric A. Finkelstein et al., Annual Medical Spending Attributable to Obesity: Payer-and
Service-Specific Estimates, 28 HEALTH AFF. w822, w823 (2009).
131
OGDEN ET AL., supra note 116, at 1.
132
See B. Rokholm et al., The Levelling Off of the Obesity Epidemic Since the Year 1999—A
Review of Evidence and Perspectives, 11 OBESITY REVS. 835, 842 (2010) (suggesting that “[a]lthough
intuitively appealing, clear evidence, beyond parallel correlations” between ecological factors and
obesity “is lacking” and that the plateauing of the obesity epidemic may not be a “result of public
health campaigns . . . influencing food and exercise habits”).
133
Obesity, CEU UPDATE (Nat’l Ass’n of Health Profs., Gardner, KS), June 2012, at 1, available
at http://www.nahpusa.com/userfiles/file/CEU/0612%20CEU.pdf.
134
David Ludwig, M.D., Ph.D. is the Director of the Optimal Weight for Life Program at Boston
CHILD.
HOSP.,
Children’s
Hospital.
David
Ludwig,
MD,
PhD,
BOS.
http://www.childrenshospital.org/researchers/david-ludwig (last visited July 14, 2014).
135
See Pam Belluck, After a Longtime Rise, Obesity Rates in U.S. Level Off, Data Suggest, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 14, 2010, at A20 (indicating that Dr. Ludwig suggests that the stabilization of obesity rates
“could be that most of the people who are genetically susceptible, or susceptible for psychological or
behavioral reasons, have already become obese”).
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encounter a natural limit on just how obese they can get, which prevents
the total population from getting heavier indefinitely.136 Nonetheless,
stability does not mean that the epidemic has been reversed, and Dr.
Ludwig appears to agree with Dr. William Dietz, who stated that “we [do
not] have in place the kind of policy or environmental changes needed to
reverse this epidemic just yet.”137
In terms of the financial impact to society, one study estimated that the
medical costs attributable to obesity rose from $78.5 billion in 1998 to
$147 billion by 2008.138 Therefore, in addition to concerns about
individual health, the external costs of obesity are pressing, and perhaps
justify harder paternalism—or at least rendering the label of paternalism
less pejorative when justifying certain initiatives. For comparison, costs
related to violent deaths in 2005, which include homicide and suicide, were
$47.2 billion.139
High obesity levels in the United States can be attributed to many
reinforcing root causes. Some of these root causes may prove challenging
to address individually, never mind together. According to the National
Heart, Lung and Blood Institute, obesity can be caused by energy
imbalance (i.e., greater energy intake than expenditure), inactive lifestyle,
environment, genes, family history, health conditions, medication,
emotional factors, cessation of smoking, age, pregnancy, and lack of
sleep.140 Though some may quibble with this list, or reorder the causes in
terms of importance, consensus emerges around the primacy of nutrition,
energy intake, and inactivity in contributing to the obesity problem. This
Article will therefore discuss that trio of obesity drivers before briefly
remarking on a few others.
American nutrition and energy intake patterns have changed over the
past forty years.141 The composition of the American diet, both in sources
and number of calories, presents a prodigious challenge for those who wish
to address the intake portion of the obesity problem. According to the U.S.
Department of Agriculture (USDA), the population’s average daily calorie
intake increased by nearly 25% between 1970 and 2000.142 The biggest
contributor to that intake gain was an increase in refined grain products
136
See id. (relaying Dr. Ludwig’s explanation that “[w]hen people eat more . . . at first they gain
weight; then a growing share of the calories go ‘into maintaining and moving around that excess
tissue,’ . . . so that ‘a population doesn’t keep getting heavier and heavier indefinitely’”).
137
Id.
138
Finkelstein et al., supra note 130, at w822.
139
Cost of Violent Deaths in the United States, 2005, CDC, http://www.cdc.gov/violencepreventio
n/violentdeaths/index.html (last updated Feb. 24, 2011).
140
What Causes Overweight and Obesity?, NAT’L HEART, LUNG & BLOOD INST. (July 13, 2012),
http://www.nhlbi.nih.gov/health/health-topics/topics/obe/causes.html.
141
U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., AGRICULTURE FACT BOOK 2001–2002, at 14 (2003).
142
Id.
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143

(9.5%), followed closely by added fats and oils (9.0%).
Added sugars
(4.7%) also drove the intake gain,144 but seem to attract a disproportionate
share of the policymaking frenzy.145 A focus on regulating specific
products or categories may prove effective, but golden opportunities like
the trans fats ban do not present themselves readily. Addressing the caloric
intake gain from refined grain products146 seems to be an obvious potential
area of focus, but the roster of popular foods that fall into this category
would prove daunting to attack.147
Data linking energy intake to obesity can prove counterintuitive
though. One study based on CDC data revealed that total average daily
caloric intake spiked 16% between 1971–1975 to 2003–2004.148 Then,
average caloric intake dropped three percent between 2003–2004 and
2009–2010.149 During this period, obesity rates held the same for women
and increased for men.150 Dr. Dietz, a co-author of this caloric study,
observed that it is “hard to reconcile what these data show, and what is
happening with the prevalence of obesity . . . . [The caloric intake drop is]
a lot, and . . . we would expect to see a measurable impact on obesity.”151
One might deduce that the stubbornness of obesity in this circumstance
is attributable to lack of energy expenditure or physical activity. But the
data supporting that thesis is surprisingly ambiguous. A study conducted
on the county level revealed widespread increases in individual physical
143

Id.
Id.
145
See Mark Bittman, What Is Food?, N.Y. TIMES OPINIONATOR (June 5, 2012,
9:00), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/06/05/what-is-food/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0
(“Added sugar, as will be obvious when we look back in 20 or 50 years, is the tobacco of the 21st
century.”). Note that sugary sodas are but one component of these added sugars. See Anahad
O’Connor, The Claim: Most of the Added Sugar in Our Diets Comes from Sugar Drinks., N.Y. TIMES,
May 7, 2013, at D5 (asserting that nearly 70% of calories from added sugars come from processed
foods).
146
“Refined grains have been milled, a process that removes the bran and germ. This is done to
give grains a finer texture and improve their shelf life, but it also removes dietary fiber, iron, and many
B vitamins.” U.S. Dep’t of Agric., What Foods Are in the Grains Group?, CHOOSEMYPLATE.GOV,
http://www.choosemyplate.gov/food-groups/grains.html (last visited July 15, 2014).
147
The USDA includes the following in the refined grain category: cornbread, corn tortillas,
couscous, crackers, flour tortillas, grits, noodles, pitas, pretzels, white bread, white sandwich buns and
rolls, white rice, spaghetti, macaroni, and corn flakes. Id.
148
Earl S. Ford & William H. Dietz, Trends in Energy Intake Among Adults in the United States:
Findings from NHANES, 97 AM. J. CLINICAL NUTRITION 849, 849 (2013). The National Health and
Nutrition Examination Survey (“NHANES”), assembled by the CDC, estimated adjusted mean energy
intake at 1955 kcal/d over the 1971–1975 period, which increased 16% to 2269 kcal/d in 2003–2004.
Id.
149
Id. NHANES estimated adjusted mean energy intake at 2196 kcal/d in 2009–2010, a reduction
of 3% since 2003–2004. Id.
150
Id. at 849.
151
Kathryn Doyle, Despite Obesity Rise, U.S. Calories Trending Downwards, CHI. TRIB.
(Mar. 6, 2013), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2013-03-06/news/sns-rt-health-obesityusl4n0bz0go20130306_1_obesity-rise-calorie-intake-activity-and-obesity.
144

1716

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:1687

activity, but a low correlation between increased activity and obesity
rates.152 This study still heralded the benefits of increased physical
activity, but, ironically, pointed back toward lowering caloric intake as the
key to reducing obesity.153 Of course, one may be able to sort through
various studies and find contradictions.154 It may nonetheless be possible
to reconcile certain studies, e.g., perhaps in this case it matters who has
been reducing calories and increasing physical activity—the obese may be
getting more obese, the healthy may be getting healthier. Either way,
while there tends to be agreement about the dangers of obesity, consensus
about cutting into the problem may not be as clear as one would expect at
first glance. For the purposes of this Article, I will assume that an attack
on the sedentary lifestyle might reduce obesity rates and have other
salutary effects.
A relationship between socioeconomic status and obesity has also been
identified.155 Aggregate data collected by the CDC presents guidance
about where obesity prevalence lies, and some of it is not intuitive. Most
obese people are not of low-income status,156 which would mean that
regulators have to view this problem not as one that could be addressed
with simply a paternalistic focus on low-income households. Obesity
indeed has grown more aggressively within low-income segments, but the
data shows that in absolute numbers, obesity persists across income
levels.157
Nonetheless, it is worth asking whether obesity rates are higher within
certain socioeconomic groups because it may indicate that targeted efforts
might help these groups. According to the CDC, between 1988–1994 and
2007–2008, obesity prevalence increased across all income groups and all
152
Laura Dwyer-Lindgren et al., Prevalence of Physical Activity and Obesity in US Counties,
2001–2011: A Road Map for Action, POPULATION HEALTH METRICS, July 2013, at 4, 6.
153
Id. at 10.
154
Cf. Ann Smith Barnes, Obesity and Sedentary Lifestyles: Risk for Cardiovascular Disease in
Women, 39 TEX. HEART INST. J. 224, 226 figs.1 & 2 (2012) (making connections between sedentary
lifestyle, obesity and mortality through comparisons of maps).
155
See, e.g., Paul A. Diller, Combating Obesity with a Right to Nutrition, 101 GEO. L.J. 969, 982
(2013) (“Although obesity was mainly a ‘disease of affluence’ for centuries after the beginning of
civilization, it is now more prevalent among poorer segments of the population in developed countries
like the United States, a trend that is particularly pronounced among children.” (footnote omitted));
Wendy C. Perdue, Obesity, Poverty, and the Built Environment: Challenges and Opportunities, 15
GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 821, 821 (2008) (“Not only are obesity rates generally higher among
those with lower socioeconomic status, but the chronic conditions caused by obesity may present a
particular challenge for the poor who often lack access to necessary ongoing medical supervision.”
(emphasis added) (footnote omitted)); Trenton G. Smith et al., Why the Poor Get Fat: Weight Gain and
Economic Insecurity, 12 F. FOR HEALTH ECON. & POL’Y 1, 16 (2009) (explaining obesity as an optimal
response to economic insecurity).
156
CYNTHIA L. OGDEN ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., NCHS DATA BRIEF
NO. 50, OBESITY AND SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS IN ADULTS: UNITED STATES, 2005–2008, at 2 (2010).
157
Id.
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attained levels of education.
Among men, obesity rates tend to be
slightly higher at higher income levels.159 Among women, however,
obesity rates tend to be higher in lower income households.160 Also,
among women, lower education levels correlate with higher obesity
prevalence—a phenomenon that is not exhibited among men.161
Further, race and ethnicity intersect with the obesity phenomenon.
According to the Kaiser Family Foundation, in 2011, studied groups had
the following “overweight/obesity” rates: Whites (62.5%), Blacks (71.7%),
Hispanics (68.2%), American Indian/Alaskan Native (68.9%), and
Asian/Pacific Islanders (40.9%).162 Neighborhood effects also emerge.
New York City obesity rates vary widely by neighborhood, from as low as
6.8% up to 31.7%, with one study isolating the “availability of
supermarkets, restaurants, fast food outlets, beverage and snack food
stores, fitness facilities, and commercial land use” as the driving factors.163
The study’s authors regarded its findings as consistent with prior studies
showing that area income, food availability, and physical activity resources
are related to obesity.164
Further demonstrating that the matrix of demographics and intake
patterns can present complexities, consider the consumption patterns of
fast food. A 2013 study of eight fast food chains revealed an increase in
the nutritional quality of the menus since the late 1990s, but observed that
room for further improvement exists.165 One can speculate about the
difficulty of achieving incremental improvements in this area.
Fast food consumption has been linked to hectic lifestyles that would
naturally lead to putting “quick availability” and “takeout” at a premium in
dietary choices.166 The most notable finding from a recent National Health
and Nutrition Examination Survey might be that among all adults, the
fraction of daily caloric intake attributable to fast food did not vary by

158

Id. at 4–5.
Id. at 1.
160
Id. at 2. “Upper income” households are considered to be above 350% of the poverty level and
“lower income” households are below 130% of the poverty level. Id.
161
Id. at 3.
162
Overweight and Obesity Rates for Adults by Race/Ethnicity, HENRY J. KAISER FAM. FOUND.,
http://kff.org/other/state-indicator/adult-overweightobesity-rate-by-re/ (last visited July 15, 2014).
163
Jennifer L. Black et al., Neighborhoods and Obesity in New York City, 16 HEALTH & PLACE
489, 495 (2010).
164
Id. at 496–97.
165
See Mary O. Hearst et al., Nutritional Quality at Eight U.S. Fast-Food Chains, 44 AM. J.
PREVENTIVE MED. 589, 591–92 (2013) (stating that the results of the study showed an increase in
nutritional scores in areas such as meat, saturated fat, and calories from solid fats, but no change or a
decrease in scores in other areas).
166
CHERYL D. FRYAR & R. BETHENE ERVIN, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., NCHS
DATA BRIEF NO. 114, CALORIC INTAKE FROM FAST FOOD AMONG ADULTS: UNITED STATES, 2007–
2010, at 1 (2013).
159
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income.
Among adults between the ages of twenty and thirty-nine, the
average caloric intake did exhibit a slight negative correlation with income
level.168 Overall, age seemed to be a primary differentiator for fast food
consumption, with those under age forty taking in almost two-and-a-half
times the amount of fast food calories than those over age sixty.169 Also,
differences in consumption patterns emerge among race and ethnicity
dimensions. The survey found that non-Hispanic Black adults received a
significantly higher percentage of calories from fast food than Hispanics
and non-Hispanic white adults.170 Within this category, non-Hispanic
Black adults under age forty received nearly twice their portion of daily
calories from fast food as the total adult average.171
Counterintuitive to some, groups traditionally aligned with social
justice issues prioritized other concerns during the litigation over New
York City’s Big Gulp ban.172 Both the NAACP and the Hispanic
Federation, for example, sided against the New York Department of Public
Health.173 Though some argue that these groups were influenced by the
well-established philanthropy of “Big Soda,”174 the core arguments made
in their joint amicus brief stand as an example of the expression of
competing social interests that emerge when paternalism is introduced.175
Childhood obesity presents an entirely separate layer of complication
to the obesity problem. As the CDC noted, in a thirty-year period leading
to 2012, obesity rates skyrocketed for young people—more than doubling
for all children, and quadrupling in the adolescent age group.176
Remarkably, however, in a new study of trends between the years 2008
and 2011, rates of childhood obesity appear to have stabilized or reversed
167

Id. at 3.
Id.
169
Id. at 1 fig.1.
170
Id. at 2.
171
Id. at 2 fig.2.
172
E.g., Nancy Huehnergarth, How Big Soda Co-Opted the NAACP and Hispanic Federation,
HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 25, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/nancy-huehnergarth/minoritiessoda-lobby_b_2541121.html).
173
Memorandum of Law of Amici Curiae the New York State Conference of the NAACP and the
Hispanic Federation in Support of Plaintiffs-Petitioners’ Verified Article 78 & Declaratory Judgment
Petition, N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Health &
Mental Hygiene, 970 N.Y.S.2d 200 (2013) (No. 653584-2012) [hereinafter Memorandum of Law].
174
Huehnergarth, supra note 172.
175
See Memorandum of Law, supra note 173, at 2–3, 8–9 (expressing concern about the ban’s
interference with personal choice and freedom, especially in predominantly minority communities).
The potential negative impact of Big Gulp Regulation on African-American and Hispanic-owned small
businesses was one factor. Id. at 3, 8.
176
Childhood Obesity Facts, CDC, http://www.cdc.gov/healthyyouth/obesity/facts.htm (last
visited July 15, 2014); see also Cynthia L. Ogden et al., Prevalence of Obesity and Trends in Body
Mass Index Among US Children and Adolescents, 1999–2010, 307 JAMA 483, 483 (2012) (stating that
there has been a significant increase in childhood obesity since the 1980s).
168
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course.
Paternalism meshes a bit more effectively with childhood
problems,178 because the regulatory apparatus has means for controlling
children’s access to food and encouraging physical activity (i.e., public
schools).179 The reduction has been attributed to myriad factors, such as:
increases in breastfeeding, improvements to the Supplemental Nutrition
Program for Women, Infants and Children (WIC), school lunch and
nutrition improvements, restaurant changes to child menus, and increases
in physical activity generated by programs like “Let’s Move!”180 Some
health scientists believe that a combination of these factors working
together contributed to the advancement.181 But again, there remains the
contention that this reversal, along with others, merely reflects that obesity
levels have a natural limit, driven by factors like environment and genetics,
not regulatory interventions.182
B. Addressing Obesity Along the Paternalism Spectrum
Even this broad, but not fully complete, description of the obesity
problem makes plain that the causes of obesity are intertwined and difficult
to address. The only real way to solve the obesity problem in the United
States, if one accepts that regulators are capable, would be to press forward
with solutions on every dimension of the problem. Regulators could target
certain categories of foods or delivery outlets for foods. Specific groups
could be selected for messaging about nutrition and activity—like African
American men under the age of forty, or all females over the age of sixty—
or certain geographic regions of the country. Campaigns to convince
people to eat less and more nutritiously could be launched and certain
ingredients could be banned. The promotion of physical activity could
continue to be pursued beyond the public schools.
In a full-court press against obesity, regulators would encounter
political resistance to paternalistic endeavors, at least if recent responses to
autonomy loss can be thought to constitute a trend. Anything less than a
full-court press, however, might result in minimal returns. Obesity
177
See Ashleigh L. May et al., Vital Signs: Obesity Among Low-Income, Preschool-Aged
Children—United States, 2008–2011, 62 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 629, 630 (2013)
(“[A] total of 19 states/territories reported significant downward trends in obesity prevalence among
low-income preschoolers . . . [a]n additional 21 states/territories experienced no significant trend in
obesity prevalence. Three states experienced a significant upward trend in obesity prevalence.”).
178
Not without irony, consider the root of the word “paternal”—“father.” MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S
COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 908 (11th ed. 2003).
179
See infra Part III.B.2.d.i.
180
Cathy Payne & Michelle Healy, A Closer Look at Why Child Obesity Rates May Be Falling,
USA TODAY, Aug. 7, 2013, at ARC. In the early wake of this study, root cause analysis for this
specific reversal has not been well developed in formal literature. For a move detailed discussion of
the “Let’s Move!” initiative, see infra text accompanying notes 202–16.
181
Id.
182
Id.
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reduction on a massive scale involves changing the way people of different
ages, ethnic and racial backgrounds, and socioeconomic strata behave
when they eat or drink—and whether they elect to pursue physical activity.
Changing such inherently personal habits involves broad strategies,
targeted strategies—and certainly a dose of paternalism. The regulators
would be substituting their choices for the current choices of the
population.
Consider how comparatively simple it has been to address the
epidemiological challenge of smoking. With smoking, regulators could
hone in on an unnecessary habit involving one controlling substance. They
deployed a laser-like focus on tobacco—through public education,183 label
mandates,184 and sales restrictions.185 Locations for public smoking could
be restricted one step at a time.186 A narrow set of products could be
taxed.187 The success enjoyed by those who targeted tobacco use will be
much harder to achieve in this field. With obesity, the inputs are required
for everyday living. The tools are fewer, the public appetite for hard
paternalism in many spheres can be uneasy, and the theaters of “battle,”
ranging from public schools to the corner food market are various, plenty,
and fraught with complexity.
For the purposes of determining whether and which paternalistic
strategies could be effective or have remaining potential for addressing
obesity, the analysis must focus on the strategies that the public will
support, or at least not aggressively oppose. If regulators fail to employ
rigorous criteria to choose initiatives, a full-court-press could be a waste of
regulatory capital and public resources.
The complexity of a
comprehensive solution only seems to increase upon close scrutiny.
Before assessing the limits of current efforts regulators have deployed
to combat obesity—using the paternalism spectrum—I will discuss the
nature of the apaternalistic or free market workings against this public
problem. I will then discuss the primary cognitive bias that obesity
regulators must combat—the present bias—and assess the impact and
limitations of such efforts.

183
See, e.g., Guidelines for School Health Programs to Prevent Tobacco Use and Addiction, 43
MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1, 1 (1994) (outlining the CDC’s guidelines for school health
programs to prevent tobacco use).
184
15 U.S.C. § 1333 (2012).
185
See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53-344(b) (2013) (prohibiting the sale of tobacco to minors).
186
See Patrick Kabat, Note, “Til Naught but Ash is Left to See”: Statewide Smoking Bans, Ballot
Initiatives, and the Public Sphere, 9 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 128, 138–45 (2009) (outlining
different levels of smoking bans in public places across several states).
187
See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., PREVENTING TOBACCO USE AMONG YOUTH
AND YOUNG ADULTS: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL 698–701 (2012) (demonstrating the
effects of federal, state, and local excise taxes on cigarette sales to minors).
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1. Free Market Approaches
The most powerful solution available that eschews all paternalism in
favor of autonomy would be a natural collective preference to engage in
proper caloric intake and energy discharge. Though other factors like
genetics might play into obesity, if these preferences, which would lead to
better health and longer life expectancy, were dominant, free choice would
lead to healthier decisions.
Social norms can prove immensely powerful in influencing
preferences.188 The literature on social norms has grown deep,189 but
Richard McAdams’s view that people adhere to social norms to appeal to
the “esteem of others”190 appears to be on trial in the obesity arena. Stigma
about obesity already exists, which incidentally, was a concern expressed
by physicians who opposed the AMA’s disease label.191 Beyond a doubt,
society puts a premium on looking healthy:
Weight bias translates into inequities in employment settings,
health-care facilities, and educational institutions, often due
to widespread negative stereotypes that overweight and obese
persons are lazy, unmotivated, lacking in self-discipline, less
competent, noncompliant, and sloppy. These stereotypes are
prevalent and are rarely challenged in Western society,
leaving overweight and obese persons vulnerable to social
injustice, unfair treatment, and impaired quality of life as a
result of substantial disadvantages and stigma.192
Yet, despite these individual costs, the behavior and choices that drive
high obesity rates persist. If the McAdams theory of social norms worked
here, the expected obesity rate would be lower. Or, perhaps, people’s
preferences for their consumption and physical activity levels simply
trump the value of the esteem. The norms within individual social
networks in which people travel may also overpower broader societal

188
Korobkin, supra note 12, at 1659. As Korobkin notes, there are different theories about the
power of social norms. See id. at 1659 n.43 (explaining that Robert Cooter believes the source of the
power of norms comes from “internalization” of external influencers, while Eric Posner believes norms
are followed because of their value as a signal of responsibility and willingness to cooperate with other
people).
189
See Cass R. Sunstein, Empirically Informed Regulation, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 1349, 1408 n.262
(2011) (citing to recent social norm literature).
190
Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV.
338, 342 (1997) (emphasis omitted).
191
Dr. Daniel H. Bessesen, an obesity specialist at the University of Colorado, noted that “the
term disease is stigmatizing, and people who are obese don’t need more stigmatizing.” Healy &
Gorman, supra note 117.
192
Rebecca M. Puhl & Chelsea A. Heuer, The Stigma of Obesity: A Review and Update, 17
OBESITY 941, 941 (2009) (citations omitted).
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values.
Another notion, which I discuss below, is that present bias
reveals its power here. The instant rewards from current choices are
valued disproportionately and, perhaps irrationally, higher than collective
costs in the future.
Unsurprisingly, the marketplace taps into this norm, either serving the
segment that prefers health or those who aspire to improve their health.
Natural preferences and aspirations have enabled the emergence of a
substantial weight-loss and exercise industry. Though market forces might
already be influenced by regulation, private solutions to the obesity
problem may already be at work. One Wall Street firm recognized that the
obesity fight presents a significant investment opportunity over the next
twenty-five to fifty years, recommending scrutiny of fifty companies as
long-term investment opportunities.194 Estimates vary but one private
group measured the size of the global weight loss and diet management
products and services market at $390 billion in 2010, growing at an annual
rate of 11.5% to $672 billion by 2015.195
Voluntarism has also emerged in the food industry in the form of
disclosing calorie counts196 or reducing portion-size offerings.197
Voluntarism might emerge out of sheer private paternal goodwill, may
simply be good for business, or might be designed to preempt regulation.198
Some businesses, like McDonald’s, were publicly shamed for their
business practices with respect to nutrition.199 With trans fats, several
restaurant chains and food manufacturers followed a regulatory trend and
voluntarily eliminated the substance as an ingredient in their food
offerings.200 Nonetheless, industry voluntarism appears vastly outsized by
193
See Jean K. Langlie, Social Networks, Health Beliefs, and Preventive Health Behavior, 18 J.
HEALTH & SOC. BEHAV. 244, 244–45 (1977) (discussing the Social Network Model and its
incorporation of social-psychological characteristics).
194
Fight Against Obesity Is Major Investment Trend—BofA, REUTERS INDIA (July 17, 2012),
http://in.reuters.com/article/2012/07/16/obesity-report-merrilllynch-idINL6E8IGG1020120716.
195
Press Release, MarketResearch.com, Weight Loss Market to Reach $672 Billion by 2015
(Sept. 27, 2011), available at http://www.marketwired.com/press-release/weight-loss-market-to-reach672-billion-by-2015-1565973.htm.
196
For example, Starbucks, Panera Bread, and Subway have all voluntarily disclosed calorie
counts. Atossa Araxia Abrahamian, Starbucks to Post Calorie Counts in Stores Nationwide,
REUTERS (June 18, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/06/18/us-starbucks-caloriesidUSBRE95H0KD20130618.
197
See infra note 199.
198
Public endorsement of voluntarism can be traced back to the era of Herbert Hoover. See JOAN
HOFF WILSON, HERBERT HOOVER: FORGOTTEN PROGRESSIVE 38 (Oscar Handlin ed., 1975).
199
See SUPER SIZE ME, supra note 82 (chronicling the health effects of eating McDonald’s for
one month). Though McDonald’s disavows a link to the negative movie publicity, it eliminated supersizes after the release.
Associated Press, McDonald’s Phasing out Supersize
Fries, Drinks, NBC NEWS.COM (Mar. 3, 2004), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/4433307/ns/businessus_business/t/mcdonalds-phasing-out-supersize-fries-drinks/#.UwFPfldWBJ.
200
For example, within a relatively short timeframe, McDonald’s, Burger King, KFC, Wendy’s,
Disney (theme parks), and the Girl Scouts (cookies) all made voluntary commitments to reduce or
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the scope of the obesity problem, even if it does address a small piece.201
The diverse elements of the problem—including food manufacturing,
consumption patterns, household income and structure, and physical
activity—present difficulty beyond addressing one product, place, or
behavior through voluntarism.
Characterizing government efforts to induce voluntarism can prove
challenging, for it is difficult to observe exactly how much the government
pressures the industry to resolve its own problems (under an implied threat
of heavier regulation). Because such industry actions are considered
voluntary, I place them at the very edge of apaternalistic regulation.
For example, consider high-profile government initiatives like the
White House’s “Let’s Move!” campaign, which is led by First Lady
Michelle Obama.202 The campaign nudges people toward better nutrition
choices and moves the industry toward voluntarily adopting healthier
production practices.203 Mrs. Obama, upon launching the campaign,
declared that “[t]he physical and emotional health of an entire generation
and the economic health and security of our nation is at stake.”204 Even
with these self-declared high stakes, “Let’s Move!” ultimately relies on
people to make the right choices after educating them about exercise and
diet, rather than dictating choices.205
From the industry side of the equation, “Let’s Move!” claims some
eliminate trans fats from their foods. Robert Niles, Disney Plans to Dump Trans Fat at U.S. Theme
Parks, THEME PARK INSIDER (Oct. 16, 2006), http://www.themeparkinsider.com/flume/200610/212/;
Adrian Sainz, Burger King to Use Trans-fat-free Oil, ASSOCIATED PRESS (July 6, 2007),
http://phys.org/news102934980.html; KFC Announces Switch to Zero Trans Fat Cooking Oil
Following Two-Year Test for Same Great Taste, KFC.COM (Oct. 30, 2006),
http://web.archive.org/web/20070119110204/http://www.kfc.com/about/pressreleases/103006.asp;
McDonald’s Finally Picks Trans-fat-free Oil, NBCNEWS.COM (Jan. 30, 2007),
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/16873869/#.UwvLPPldWBJ; Statement from GSUSA CEO Kathy
Cloninger: Girl Scout Cookies Now Have Zero Trans Fats, GIRL SCOUTS (Nov. 13,
2006), http://www.girlscouts.org/news/news_releases/2006/gs_cookies_now_have_zero_trans_fats.asp;
Wendy’s Significantly Cuts Trans Fats—Switch to New Cooking Oil Under Way, WENDY’S (June 8,
2006), http://web.archive.org/web/20061109131923/http://www.wendys.com/about_us/news/index.jsp
?news=5.
201
Voluntarism in other contexts, like reducing on-screen smoking, has been simpler. Movies
reach a large volume of people, and the industry was small and tightly knit through its trade
association. See William Triplett, Smoking in Movies to Affect Ratings, VARIETY (May 10, 2007),
http://variety.com/2007/film/news/smoking-in-movies-to-affect-ratings-1117964655/ (reporting that
pervasive smoking in movies will negatively affect ratings).
202
White
House
Task
Force
on
Childhood
Obesity,
LET’S
MOVE!,
http://www.letsmove.gov/white-house-task-force-childhood-obesity-report-president (last visited July
15, 2014).
203
I distinguish these voluntary efforts, which are the product of a government nudge, from the
voluntarism emanating from purely market-driven reasons.
204
First Lady Michelle Obama Launches Let's Move: America’s Move to Raise a Healthier
Generation of Kids, THE WHITE HOUSE (Feb. 9, 2010), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/first-lady-michelle-obama-launches-lets-move-americas-move-raise-a-healthier-genera.
205
See id. (discussing how “Let’s Move!” educates families to make healthy choices).
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advancement, most notably, Wal-Mart’s voluntary commitment to lower
the cost of fruits and vegetables, to help food producers reduce added
sugars by ten percent by 2015, and to provide healthy labeling for
customers.206 The largest restaurant company in the country, Darden
Restaurants,207 voluntarily improved the nutrition content of its children’s
menu, at the urging of Mrs. Obama.208 Further, in 2010, a coalition of
producers and retailers agreed to eliminate 1.5 trillion calories from their
sales within five years.209 Though these moves have been voluntary, they
were made with the encouragement of the White House. One can
speculate as to just how voluntary these moves really were, but they were
not openly compelled.
Even this light level of intervention drew political fire from activists
who thought that the “Let’s Move!” effort was too light or timid,210 and
others who expressed an anti-paternalistic reaction, essentially arguing that
206
First Lady Michelle Obama Announces Collaboration with Walmart in Support of Let’s Move!
Campaign, THE WHITE HOUSE (Jan. 20, 2011), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2011/01/20/first-lady-michelle-obama-announces-collaboration-walmart-support-let-s-.
WalMart, the largest retailer and grocer in the United States, maintains roughly a twenty percent share of
the dry grocery market and fifteen percent of the fresh groceries. Stephanie Clifford, Walmart Strains
to Keep Aisles Stocked Fresh, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 2013, at A1.
207
Our Brands, DARDEN, http:www.darden.com/restuarants/ (last visited July 15, 2014). Darden
owns “Olive Garden, Red Lobster, LongHorn Steakhouse, the Capital Grille, Bahama Breeze, and
Seasons 52.” Marion Nestle, Michelle Obama Gets Darden’s to Promise Healthier Kids’ Meals, THE
ATLANTIC (Sept. 17, 2011), http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2011/09/michelle-obama-getsdardens-to-promise-healthier-kids-meals/245211/.
208
Nestle, supra note 207.
209
Mary Clare Jalonick, Food Makers to Trim 1.5 Trillion Calories, NBC NEWS (May 17, 2010),
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/37195646/ns/health-diet_and_nutrition/t/food-makers-trim-trillioncalories/#.UxDch_IdWBJ.
210
E.g., Bridget Huber, Michelle Obama’s Moves: Has the First Lady’s Anti-Obesity Campaign
Been too Accommodating Toward the Food Industry?, THE NATION (Oct. 10, 2012),
http://www.thenation.com/article/170485/michelles-moves#. Dr. Yoni Freedhoff of the University of
Ottawa has been a leading advocate of stronger interventions with food manufacturers. As the noninterventionist advocate Jeff Stier noted in an op-ed:

[R]egulation-hungry activist[] . . . Dr. Yoni Freedhoff[’s] . . . fiery YouTube video
last month drew more than 200,000 views, was the basis of headlines in the Los
Angeles Times, and rallied the food police to renew their campaign for more
government regulation against his sole stated cause of obesity: under-regulated
corporate peddlers of inexpensive calories. In his screed, Freedhoff lays the blame
for obesity on public health officials for not doing more to pressure people to
“legislate change.” He says governments are also to blame, since they have not
issued enough regulations, changed enough laws, spent enough money, or instituted
enough fat taxes. He says we need government and public health officials to
intervene, since industry isn’t to blame for doing [its] job, which he says is to
“misinform consumers” in their quest to sell as many cheap calories as possible.
Jeff Stier, The Food Police Lay the Groundwork for a 2013 Food Fight, FORBES (Jan. 3, 2013),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2013/01/03/the-food-police-lay-the-groundwork-for-a-2013-foodfight/.
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the whole of “Let’s Move!” reflected regulatory overreach in the spirit of
Big Brother.211 Defining Ideas, a libertarian-leaning online journal
maintained by the Hoover Institution, posted an article that took the middle
ground, lauding “Let’s Move!” for endorsing the “major role that voluntary
choices play in weight control” and recognizing the initiative’s “modest
successes” in working with industry.212
Some looked at the whole of the “Let’s Move!” display, despite its
relative respect for personal autonomy, with hostility.213 Much of the anti“Let’s Move!” rhetoric focused on hypocrisy, noting that the First Lady
was not setting an example that was consistent with her own behavior,214
though some of the rhetoric could be discounted as having partisan
motivation. For example, “some conservatives even suggested that [Mrs.]
Obama was endangering people, blaming an increase in pedestrian deaths
on the first lady’s campaign by saying that Americans were putting
themselves at risk by walking more.”215
The point of describing “Let’s Move!” is to illustrate an initiative that
straddles voluntarism and the very edge of paternalism, and show that even
a light amount of intervention sparks a debate about any intervention. Is
this slight intervention intended to be a “buy off” of the food industry—or
is the collaboration with Big Food a beachhead for tyranny? “Let’s
Move!” shows that the politics of paternalism prove challenging in
environments where some people favor drastically more state intervention
and others want less. In this sense, “Let’s Move!” shares certain
commonalities with the Big Gulp effort. Meanwhile, the voluntary calorie
disclosures made by Starbucks, Panera Bread, and Subway did not provoke
a great deal of controversy—perhaps because the government stood apart
from the move.216
With obesity, the spectrum of apaternalism ranges from the purest
forms of unfettered market phenomena to the influenced voluntarism
embodied by “Let’s Move!” Regulatory interventions in the larger food
211
E.g., James Oliphant, Conservatives Dish Out Criticism of Michelle Obama’s Anti-Obesity
Campaign, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 26, 2011.
212
Henry I. Miller & Jeff Stier, The Right Way to Fight Obesity, DEFINING IDEAS (June 19, 2013),
http://www.hoover.org/research/right-way-fight-obesity.
213
See Oliphant, supra note 211 (“Former First Ladies Barbara and Laura Bush worked to end
illiteracy. Nancy Reagan famously took on teenage drug use. Lady Bird Johnson planted flowers. But
none of them have been seared for something as seemingly benign as calling for kids to eat more
vegetables, as Michelle Obama has.”).
214
Radio-talk-show host Rush Limbaugh, after noting that Michelle Obama had been observed in
public eating unhealthy foods said, “If we are supposed to eat roots, berries and tree bark, show us
how.” Id. Such comments could be characterized as social and political satire, and though many may
find difficulty placing Rush Limbaugh in the same category as Mark Twain and Will Rogers, the
permeation of his comments into cornerstone media outlets like the Los Angeles Times warrants notice.
215
Id.
216
See Abrahamian, supra note 196.
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arena emerge from all quarters, local and federal, and can pull in different
directions.217 As noted throughout this Article, the government subsidizes
the production of certain foods that contribute to an unhealthy diet, yet also
deploys a variety of interventions to combat obesity. Though the
comparison is not nearly as stark, this tension is reminiscent of how the
federal government subsidizes tobacco farming,218 while simultaneously
taxing tobacco consumption.219
Indeed, the same marketplace that lures an estimated one hundred
million Americans into dieting of some sort each year220 also generates
substantial sales of unhealthy food at the hands of food marketers.221
Individual preferences differ and overlap. The market pulls in different
directions. The evidence overwhelmingly indicates that the obesity
problem has not been resolved by the combination of market forces and
reactive intervention.
The ensuing Subsections describe points along the spectrum of
regulatory intervention, with each point presenting tradeoffs in terms of
ease and effectiveness. But before the paternalism spectrum is applied in
detail, I will briefly describe the cognitive error that regulators may be
attempting to correct in obesity: the present bias.
2. Paternalistic Approaches
Regulatory strategies can be designed to address a bias or error that
interferes with decisions, leading people to make suboptimal or harmful

217
See Sunstein, supra note 189, at 1362–63 (discussing short term versus long term benefits of
regulation).
218
See, e.g., Ramsey Cox, Senate Rejects Amendment to End Tobacco Farm Subsidies, THE HILL
(May 23, 2013, 6:54 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/floor-action/senate/301645-senate-rejectsamendment-to-end-tobacco-farm-subsidies (discussing the U.S. Senate’s rejection of an amendment
that would have ended crop insurance subsidies for tobacco farmers).
219
See Tax and Fee Rates, TTB.GOV, http://www.ttb.gov/tax_audit/atftaxes.shtml (last updated
Nov. 6, 2013) (listing the federal tax rates for various tobacco products).
220
100 Million Dieters, $20 Billion: The Weight-Loss Industry by the Numbers,
ABC NEWS (May 8, 2012), http://abcnews.go.com/Health/100-million-dieters-20-billion-weight-lossindustry/story?id=16297197.
221
The Federal Trade Commission estimated that in 2006, food and beverage companies spent
over $1.6 billion marketing their goods to just children and adolescents. FED. TRADE COMM’N,
MARKETING FOOD TO CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS: A REVIEW OF INDUSTRY EXPENDITURES,
ACTIVITIES, AND SELF REGULATION ES 11 (2008), http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/re
ports/marketing-food-children-and-adolescents-review-industry-expenditures-activities-and-selfregulation/p064504foodmktingreport.pdf. Note, though, that the market creates room for upscale,
healthy food retailers like Whole Foods—which address a demographic not in the obesity target zone.
As one potential competitor put it: “As long as Whole Foods stays in the higher income areas, they will
do well . . . . They wouldn’t last two weeks in my area, as customers can not afford the higher prices,
and there are many towns just like ours.” Tom Ryan, Whole Foods Market Aims for 1,000 Stores in the
U.S., FORBES (July 5, 2011), http://www.forbes.com/sites/retailwire/2011/07/05/whole-foods-marketaims-for-1000-stores-in-the-u-s/.
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222

choices.
Logically, identifying appropriate interventions first requires
isolating the biases that lead people to make harmful choices. Regulators
can then use appropriate tools across the paternalism spectrum to remove
the bias and prevent it from impacting the behavior of the individual. But
before delving into this process, a normative value judgment must be made
about whether wrong or harmful decisions exist that people should be
nudged away from or forbidden to make.223 After all, the regulation of
caloric intake and expenditure stands to interfere with some deeply
personal trade-offs that individuals must make about their health,
appearance, and instant enjoyment of life.
The first question to pose is whether an individual’s decisions over
time to consume certain foods and remain sedentary comprise a harm that
should be corrected. Though the medical community seems to be largely
unified around the consensus that obesity presents a social problem,224
other points of view about “fatness” and identity have been expressed. As
Yofi Tirosh observed, “Recognizing the expressive role of the law enables
us to realize the importance of the message sent by contemporary law—a
message that life as a fat person is less valuable in many respects and
merits less effort to create conditions for full realization of its potential.”225
One spillover from making a normative decision to attack the obesity
problem is the social cost it may have for people who have affirmatively
made a legitimate lifestyle choice. Law reinforces norms,226 and those who
live outside those norms may suffer unwarranted individually-borne
costs.227
The notion that these highly personal decisions about consumption or
physical activity are irrational or poor would have to incorporate the idea
that people willfully act against their own objective interests or that a
cognitive distortion drives their behavior. Is eating a carton of ice cream in
one sitting irrational? Is empty pleasure-seeking or instant gratification
irrational? Is never exercising irrational? The answers to these questions
rest upon a tangled intersection of utility curves and personal discount
rates. The answers also depend upon whether regulators should be
concerned with the aggregate social problem as opposed to individual
personal choice. Nonetheless, regulators frequently attempt to improve
222
See Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 42, at 206–07 (describing the Truth in Lending Act, which
requires that credit-seeking consumers be given certain information that counters optimism biases).
223
I have noted elsewhere in the context of advertising regulation that debiasing decisions always
have a normative root. Friedman, supra note 45, at 606.
224
Addressing Overweight and Obesity: Evolving to a Medical Consensus, 108 J. AM.
OSTEOPATHIC ASS’N 52, 52 (2008).
225
Tirosh, supra note 57, at 283.
226
See McAdams, supra note 190, at 397–98 (discussing how law can strengthen a norm merely
by expressing it).
227
See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
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decision making or, quite often, to guide people to make the right decisions
and develop the right habits.
In the obesity arena, regulators are mostly attempting to provide people
with data to make better decisions that can incorporate that extra
information. The major cognitive bias that they may be trying to counter,
among many, is present bias.228 For regulators attempting to debias people
to make better long-run decisions about consumption, the present bias
emerges as a formidable obstacle.
Put simply, a large segment of the population values instant
gratification over future consequences,229 whether the consequences are a
benefit or a detriment. This discounting is natural and perhaps appropriate.
Therefore, the first question that regulators seeking to deploy soft
paternalism through debiasing must address is what the appropriate
discount rate might be. The second question such regulators must address
is how to effectively move that rate, so that people are making the correct
temporal valuations on their own.
Economists Ted O’Donoghue and Matthew Rabin describe present
bias as a human tendency toward impatience.230 People “like to experience
rewards soon and to delay costs until later.”231 As a basic model, present
bias explains such inter-temporal, behavioral-finance social challenges as
short-sighted retirement planning232 and the over-accumulation of
consumer debt.233 But it could also explain consumption behavior that
leads to obesity.234 When people “consider[] trade-offs between two future
moments, present-biased preferences give stronger relative weight to the
earlier moment as it gets closer.”235 That is, people may disproportionately
prefer the pleasure of eating something obesogenic now over diffusing
228
See Andrew S. Hanks et al., Healthy Convenience: Nudging Students Toward Healthier
Choices in the Lunchroom, 34 J. PUB. HEALTH 370, 370–71 (2012) (explaining that present-bais
motivates students to repeat the same familiar, unhealthy food choices).
229
See Joel Stein, Instant Gratification, TIME (May 7, 2012), http://content.time.com/time/magazi
ne/article/0,9171,2113162,00.html (“[M]ost obesity isn’t caused by a lack of access to affordable
produce or time to cook. It’s the result of short-term over long-term thinking.”).
230
Ted O’Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, Doing It Now or Later, 89 AM. ECON. REV. 103, 103
(1999).
231
Id.; see also Jess Benhabib et al., Present-Bias, Quasi-Hyperbolic Discounting, and Fixed
Costs, 69 GAMES & ECON. BEHAV. 205, 222 (2009) (finding “clear experimental evidence against
exponential discounting in that it exhibits a present bias”).
232
Richard Thaler & Shlomo Benartzi, Save More Tomorrow™: Using Behavioral Economics to
Increase Employee Saving, 112 J. POL. ECON. S164, S167–68 (2004).
233
Stephen Meier & Charles Sprenger, Present-Biased Preferences and Credit Card Borrowing, 2
AM. ECON. J.: APPLIED ECON. 193, 195 (2010).
234
See Charles J. Courtmanche et al., Impatience, Incentives, and Obesity 26 (Andrew Young
Sch. of Pol’y Stud. Res. Paper Series, Working Paper No. 2012-7-4, 2012), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2139065 (demonstrating that “present-bias and long-run patience are
statistically significant and negatively associated with BMI”).
235
O’Donoghue & Rabin, supra note 230, at 103, 106.
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potentially negative impact later.
Humorist Erma Bombeck less famously, but more recently, wrote:
“Seize the moment. Remember all those women on the Titanic who waved
off the dessert cart.”236 Bombeck was merely sliding the discount rate
around on present bias, encouraging people to discount the unknown future
and revel in the consumption of today. Is this normatively wrong? The
enjoyment of food, whether consumed in a fancy bistro or casually, has
true value as a soothing part of everyday life. Regulators attempt to
address caloric intake despite this obvious fact that people tend to enjoy
eating—it is in the biological nature of the species to do so, and
occasionally and sometimes regularly, to excess.237
Note that in the subsequent discussion of weak-form and strong-from
debiasing, the debiasing efforts focus on providing information or
narratives that enhance decision making, but take on the present bias
somewhat indirectly. Disclosing caloric information, for example, may
help the discounter in valuing the present pleasure of eating a bran muffin
for breakfast against the long-term costs, but it does not directly confront
the consumer with the dynamics behind the intertemporal tradeoff.
Harder paternalism, on the other hand, may put a thumb on the scale to
mitigate present bias by making certain harmful choices more difficult or
impossible. The hardest forms of paternalism eliminate the discounting
dilemma entirely, with the regulator making the decision for the consumer
that consuming a certain item, e.g., trans fats or sugary drinks, does not
provide an appropriate present value.
a. Weak-Form Debiasing
Weak-form debiasing describes regulatory efforts to present consumers
with information that should fill gaps and enhance decision making, with
the notion that better decisions will be made.238 Again, this premise
already rests on one compound assumption—that the possession of more
information will benefit the recipient and that the recipient will use it.
Debiasing efforts through mandatory information disclosure should
improve people’s ability to value or discount future costs more accurately.
Further, decision making may prove to be more conscious or current if, for
example, every time a consumption purchase is made, consumers are not
only confronted with the price, but also with the associated caloric
intake.239 Caloric disclosures have long been in place on product
236

SHEILA ELLISON, IF WOMEN RULED THE WORLD 26 (2004) (emphasis omitted).
J.R.R. Tolkien celebrated this truth: “If more of us valued food and cheer and song above
hoarded gold, it would be a merrier world.” J.R.R. TOLKIEN, THE HOBBIT 290 (1937).
238
See supra Part II.B.2.
239
See Brian Elbel et al., Calorie Labeling and Food Choices: A First Look at the Effects on
Low-Income People in New York City, 28 HEALTH AFFAIRS w1110, w1115–16 (2009)
237
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packaging, but are increasingly entering fast food and service
environments and other education campaigns.240
These mandates encounter a few natural limits. One boundary is that
the disclosures are often only made at the point of sale, rather than a
context where consumption is most likely to occur, such as in the home.
Only thirty-five percent of average daily energy intake traces to food
purchased in restaurants.241 Another boundary presents through cognitive
overexposure, because consumers might become desensitized to
disclosures.242 Moreover, mandating caloric disclosures in fast food
restaurants may cause people to shift their patronage to contexts where
there will not be an interference with the instant enjoyment of their
consumption.243
This is not to say that the effect of disclosures will necessarily prove
harmful, but if disclosures (and weak-form debiasing) become a symbolic
substitute for all regulatory action, they may crowd out public support or
backing for other measures. As I will discuss below in the exceptional
case of Mississippi,244 these initiatives can draw fire not just from those
who think that they are insufficient, like the hard-paternalist critics of
“Let’s Move!,” but also from those who think they go too far.
Here, in further describing weak-form debiasing, I focus on the actual
experiences with implementing calorie-count disclosures in public food
service settings. Again, though these mandates compel producers to
disclose, consumers remain free to choose, and if they absorb and process
the additional information, in theory, they become more equipped to make
accurate decisions about the transaction and consumption.
In 2008, New York City led the way on caloric disclosure245 by
(“[A]pproximately 88 percent [of individuals who noticed labeling] indicated that they purchased fewer
calories in response to labeling.”).
240
See id. (discussing the increasing popularity of menu labeling).
241
Lorien E. Urban et al., Accuracy of Stated Energy Contents of Restaurant Foods, 306 JAMA
287, 291 (2011). This Article critiques the accuracy of restaurant disclosures, which should be
calibrated as carefully as possible if consumer faith in the system is to be preserved. Id. at 287.
242
Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 63, at 687–88.
243
See Christian Turner, The Burden of Knowledge, 43 GA. L. REV. 297, 346–47 (2009) (noting
how knowledge can affect conduct). One prominent behavioralist, George Loewenstein, points out that
caloric disclosures could potentially be used as a proxy for value by some, which would have the
opposite desired consumption effect. George Loewenstein, Editorial, Confronting Reality: Pitfalls of
Calorie Posting, 93 AM. J. CLINICAL NUTRITION 679, 680 (2011) (“When comparing a $3 Big Mac at
540 calories with a similarly priced chicken sandwich with 360 calories, the financially strapped
consumer (who is also often the overweight consumer) may well conclude that the Big Mac is a better
deal in terms of calories per dollar.”).
244
See infra text accompanying notes 260–65.
245
See Elbel et al., supra note 239, at w1111 (“New York City became the first U.S. jurisdiction
to implement this legislation, on 19 July 2008.”). National regulation will soon follow, but state and
local governments can play a large role in supplementing the federal requirements, should they choose.
See Sara N. Bleich & Lainie Rutkow, Improving Obesity Prevention at the Local Level—Emerging
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commencing enforcement of a rule that required chain restaurants to
conspicuously display the caloric content of food and beverage
offerings.246 The 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
(“ACA”)247 mandated similar requirements at the federal level, but as of
late 2013, the FDA had not yet implemented this provision of the law.248
Early evidence regarding the efficacy of caloric disclosure appears
rickety. A major research foray into the New York City calorie disclosure
mandate’s effect on the low-income population indicated that the
information provision did not affect calories purchased.249 Although nearly
twenty-eight percent of the surveyed population that noticed the calorie
labeling indicated that it factored into purchasing decisions, the net impact
was apparently negligible.250 Another study also saw uneven results in
consumption patterns after the regulation.251 Further contributing to an
array of questions about disclosure efficacy, another survey revealed that
supplying recommended caloric intake benchmarks along with the caloric
disclosures had no behavioral impact.252 The additional disclosure did not
“moderate the impact of calorie labels on food purchases [and] appeared to
promote a slight increase in calorie intake.”253
However, some data emerging from mandatory caloric disclosures
support the notion that such programs may prove mildly effective in some
zones.254 A study of consumer behavior in Starbucks after disclosure
revealed that the caloric content of the average transaction declined by six
percent after the regulatory change, with no measurable impact on

Opportunities, 368 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1761, 1762–63 (2013) (“Because it is estimated that the ACA
provisions will affect less than half of U.S. restaurants—and restaurants with fewer than 20 locations
will not necessarily volunteer to comply—state and local menu-labeling regulations remain
important.”).
246
N.Y.C., N.Y., HEALTH CODE tit. 24, § 81.50(a)–(c) (2013).
247
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. 111-148, § 4205, 124 Stat. 119, 573–76
(2010) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 343(q)(5) (2012)).
248
For an overview of the FDA’s potential promulgation, see Overview of FDA Proposed
Labeling Requirements for Restaurants, Similar Retail Food Establishments and Vending Machines,
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/Food/IngredientsPackagingLabeling/LabelingNutrition/uc
m248732.htm (last updated Apr. 24, 2013).
249
Elbel et al., supra note 239, at w1115–16.
250
Id. at w1114–15.
251
See Tamara Dumanovsky et al., Changes in Energy Content of Lunchtime Purchases from Fast
Food Restaurants after Introduction of Calorie Labelling: Cross Sectional Customer Surveys, 343
BRIT. MED. J. 4464, 4464 (2011) (“Although no overall decline in calories purchased was observed for
the full sample, several major chains saw significant reductions. After regulation, one in six lunchtime
customers used the calorie information provided, and these customers made lower calorie choices.”).
252
Julie S. Downs et al., Supplementing Menu Labeling With Calorie Recommendations to Test
for Facilitation Effects, 103 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1604, 1606 (2013).
253
Id. at 1604 (emphasis added).
254
See Bryan Bollinger et al., Calorie Posting in Chain Restaurants, 3 AM. ECON. J.: ECON.
POL’Y 91, 99–105 (2011) (indicating that posting calorie information may decrease consumers’ intake).
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255

Starbucks’ profitability.
In fact, it even appeared that the calorie counts
may have driven revenue away from Dunkin’ Donuts and toward
Starbucks in areas where they competed closely.256
Weak-form debiasing efforts are still being made on the caloric
disclosure front. Even though efficacy of these efforts may be in doubt,
only five years of data exists with respect to New York City’s mandate.
Perhaps pressing forward with provisions of consumer information may, at
the very least, convey important expressive value. No sweeping argument
has been made that disclosure is unambiguously harmful, though the FDA
estimates that compliance costs of the ACA disclosure regulation will be
substantial.257
Disclosure may also prove to be a less intrusive means of regulatory
recourse when harder paternalistic endeavors fail. In the wake of the Big
Gulp ban’s legal and political fallout, the New York City Board of Health
planned to spend $1.4 million on advertising to “urg[e] people to reduce
consumption of these drinks given the risk of obesity-related illnesses.”258
Though it may be unclear whether this fallback will be more of a weakform or strong-form narrative method of debiasing, it is clear that the City
is retreating to the less controversial strategy of providing information.
The political reaction to the federal mandates of disclosure may prove
difficult to assess, as the regulation may be viewed through the lens of
general support for or hostility toward the ACA. It is possible that people
will disaggregate the federal mandatory calorie disclosure and evaluate that
piece of the ACA on its own terms, especially once it rolls out to
jurisdictions without local calorie disclosure. There is, however, at least
one notable local example of strong resistance to weak-form debiasing.
In Mississippi, on the heels of a New York trial court’s decision to
strike down the Big Gulp ban,259 the legislature passed a law banning
localities from requiring food service businesses to disclose calorie
counts.260 Mississippi also holds the ignominious distinction of having the
255

Id. at 112–14.
Id. at 113–14.
257
CTR. FOR FOOD SAFETY & APPLIED NUTRITION, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., DOCKET NO. FDA2011-F-0172, FOOD LABELING: NUTRITION LABELING OF STANDARD MENU ITEMS IN RESTAURANTS
AND SIMILAR RETAIL FOOD ESTABLISHMENTS NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULEMAKING 9–12 (2011).
258
Matthew Mientka, Cola Wars Refreshed: New York City Launches Attack Against Sugary
DAILY
(June
4,
2013),
Beverages
Via
TV
and
Bus
Ads,
MED.
http://www.medicaldaily.com/articles/16171/20130604/nyc-health-department-advertising-campaignsugary-beverages-sweetened-drinks-obesity-diabetes.htm#Yc0aGVHCOwU3pVGe.99.
259
N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Health &
Mental Hygiene, No. 653584/2012, 2013 WL 1343607, at *20 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 11, 2013), aff’d, 23
N.Y.3d 681 (2014).
260
S.B. 2687, 2013 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2013); see also Liz Neporent, Mississippi Governor
Signs “Anti-Bloomberg” Bill, ABC NEWS (Mar. 19, 2013), http://abcnews.go.com/Health/mississippigovernor-signs-anti-bloomberg-bill/story?id=18731896 (describing the legislation).
256
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second highest adult obesity rate and lowest life expectancy of any
state in the country. Yet, even with public health concerns at the forefront,
Mississippi, in a rare display of bipartisanship, passed a law to dampen the
enactment of the mildest of paternalistic mandates—the requirement to
disclose raw information.263
Mississippi Governor Phil Bryant, after signing the bill into law,
proclaimed: “It is simply not the role of government to micro-regulate
citizens’ dietary decisions . . . . The responsibility for one’s personal health
depends on individual choices about a proper diet and appropriate exercise
. . . . [I]t is a personal priority of mine to educate Mississippians on the
importance of making good health decisions.”264 One might puzzle about
exactly how this law would help the governor meet this priority. Indeed,
passage of the Mississippi law surfaced the notion that business interests
solidly supported and promoted the legislation265 and that any public
reaction to paternalism may have only played a partial role.
With the exception of Mississippi, the positive reaction to the soft
paternalism of mandatory calorie disclosure has not been overwhelmed by
any noticeable popular backlash,266 even in the aftermath of Bloomberg’s
unpopular Big Gulp effort. If public attitudes toward paternalistic efforts
are positive, it could indicate an appetite for more interventions on that
particular regulatory plane. Even if the effort does not carry a significant
direct impact, the indirect cultural signals could be beneficial.
The political feasibility of disclosure may indeed tempt policymakers.
But many are still skeptical about whether this easier form of regulation,
which preserves political autonomy, will prove effective.267 It is not
261
See Adult Obesity Facts, CDC, http://www.cdc.gov/obesity/data/adult.html (last updated Aug.
13, 2013) (estimating Mississippi’s obesity rate as 34.6%; only Louisiana rates higher at 34.7%).
262
See Rong Wei et al., U.S. Decennial Life Tables for 1999–2001: State Life Tables, NAT’L
VITAL STAT. REP., Sept. 14, 2012, at 1, 4 tbl.A (estimating Mississippi’s overall life expectancy as
73.88 years, while the national average is 76.83 years).
263
Even one prominent medical community opponent of the Big Gulp ban balked at the
Mississippi approach: “[T]his bill goes too far . . . . If we refuse to engage in any attempts at all, we
will fail to learn what works and what doesn’t . . . . It’s an effort to shut down all attempts.” Aaron
Carroll, JAMA Forum: Tackling Obesity and Learning What Works, NEWS@JAMA (Mar. 20, 2013),
http://newsatjama.jama.com/2013/03/20/jama-forum-tackling-obesity-and-learning-what-works/.
264
Emily Wagster Pettus, Phil Bryant, Mississippi Gov., Signs Law Banning Restrictions on Food
Portions, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 19, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/03/19/phil-bryantmississippi_n_2908804.html.
265
The president of the Mississippi Poultry Association put it simply: “Don’t mess with the
buffet.” Id.
266
The Mississippi law has been characterized as a “backlash” to Bloomberg. Jeffrey Hess, Soda
Wars Backlash: Mississippi Passes “Anti-Bloomberg” Bill, NPR (Mar. 12, 2013, 3:58 AM),
http://www.npr.org/blogs/thesalt/2013/03/12/174048623/mississippi-passes-anti-bloomberg-bill.
267
As noted, Sarah Conly argues that such measures are too weak to have any effect on public
behavior and that hard paternalism is the most effective policy option. See supra text accompanying
note 14. Behavioral science researchers George Loewenstein and Peter Ubel observed: “[T]he
[behavioral-economics] field has its limits. . . . Indeed, it seems in some cases that behavioral
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necessarily a question of whether hard paternalism is more justifiable in
scenarios where regulators know that they can prevent harm. The question
in this instance is how far weak-form debiasing can advance public
interests in the obesity realm, and in public health at large.
Whether one heeds the following exhortations of George Loewenstein
or not, they are worth considering not just for evaluating obesity
interventions, but also for assessing all seemingly clever interventions:
“Never let the truth get in the way of a good story” provides
an apt description of the rush to calorie labeling at fast-food
establishments . . . . Calorie labeling, in effect, puts the onus
of weight reduction on consumers, but consumers have not
grown fat because they have stopped paying attention to what
they eat; they have grown fat because processed food has
become cheaper (both in terms of money and time), whereas
fresh food has become more expensive. The most serious
risk associated with calorie labeling, therefore, is not its
effect on consumers themselves, which is likely to be
minimal; the real danger is that it will substitute for, or delay,
more substantive policies that get at the root cause of the
problem.268
When experimenting with weak-form debiasing and other behavioral
tools, policymakers should move beyond pure intuition and measure the
effectiveness of the results. There are some who may confuse an effort
with a solution. In every intervention involving debiasing, research will be
required to ensure that the desired consequences are realized and to
monitor unintended outcomes as well.
b. Strong-Form Debiasing
Regulatory efforts to improve decision making by stringing data
together into truthful narratives of harm appear infrequently. Vast,
narrative driven communication campaigns about obesity, whether publicly
or philanthropically funded, have not been broadcast widely to the
public—and certainly not in the volume of anti-smoking campaign
efforts.269
However, powerful and truthful narratives about harms to health,
particularly as they relate to weight gain from overconsuming certain
foods, have been told. Over the past decade or so, the private sector
economics is being used as a political expedient, allowing policymakers to avoid painful but more
effective solutions rooted in traditional economics. . . . Behavioral economics should complement, not
substitute for, more substantive economic interventions.” George Loewenstein & Peter Ubel,
Economics Behaving Badly, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2010, at A31.
268
Loewenstein, supra note 243, at 679.
269
For examples of particularly vivid anti-smoking campaign efforts, see supra notes 78–81.
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produced at least one movie and one notable book franchise that provided
truthful narratives of harm about obesity. The 2004 film Super Size Me
told a compelling, salient narrative about the harms of fast food through
the truthful tale of a thirty-day journey of consuming nothing but
McDonald’s food offerings.270 This movie followed on the heels of a
successful book, Fast Food Nation, which described the evolution of the
fast food industry, both in terms of marketing and production.271 Fast
Food Nation has even been compared to Upton Sinclair’s The Jungle.272
The market for private storytelling has limits, but public regulators also
have the opportunity and means to string together compelling truthful
stories out of data for the purpose of improving choices.
One study found that showing Morgan Spurlock’s movie, Super Size
Me, to young adults had an impact on their attitudes toward fast food.273
Specifically, the study’s authors found, “[T]he experimental group
advanced to a significantly higher stage [for reducing fast food intake] at
the posttest than the control group. This significant difference was
maintained at the follow-up test.”274 The study concluded that this
particular film alone “may substantially affect individual client outcomes,
and may ultimately lessen the impact of the obesity epidemic”275 and
suggested that “[f]ood and nutrition professionals practicing in the field of
weight management could benefit patients by incorporating this film into
behavioral counseling sessions or utilizing it as a consciousness-raising
and emotional arousal adjunct to counseling.”276
Compelling and entertaining stories like the one of Morgan Spurlock
literally putting his body on the line for science might be put to more
regular use. Such narratives could be assembled more frequently. Captive
audiences who have not yet attained more general autonomy, like
adolescents and young adults, could benefit especially. But so would
broader audiences, given the commercial appeal of some of these
endeavors. Storytelling is powerful, but underused. Stories could be
narrowed and targeted toward the audiences that are most at risk. For
example, if poorer women have a disproportionate problem with obesity,277
a narrative could be tailored and delivered to them through appropriate
270

SUPER SIZE ME, supra note 82.
ERIC SCHLOSSER, FAST FOOD NATION: THE DARK SIDE OF THE ALL-AMERICAN MEAL (2001).
The book was also turned into a feature film. FAST FOOD NATION (Fox Searchlight 2006). In theory, a
documentary like Super Size Me preserves the purity of truthfulness more than an artistic depiction.
272
CECILIA TICHI, EXPOSÉS AND EXCESS: MUCKRAKING IN AMERICA, 1900/2000, at 2 (2004).
273
Ellen Cottone & Carol Byrd-Bredbenner, Knowledge and Psychosocial Effects of the Film
Super Size Me on Young Adults, 107 J. AM. DIETETIC ASS’N 1197, 1201 (2007).
274
Id. at 1200.
275
Id. at 1202.
276
Id.
277
See supra text accompanying note 160.
271
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communication channels.
The point of telling a narrative about fast food consumption is to link
the causes and effects of obesity and show how choices can have
consequences over time. Ideally, this will lead people to overcome present
bias. The behavioral science about narratives and present bias has been
developing, not as much in public health, but more so in the field of
personal finance and the emerging crisis from collective underfunding of
personal retirement.278 In that realm, researchers sought to identify ways to
neutralize the present bias and get people “to think about their future selves
more concretely and vividly.”279
Decision theorist Dale Griffin
summarized recent research, noting that the “quick answer [to present bias
problems] is that we need to imagine our future self just as concretely and
vividly, and take the time to imagine in detail the problems that our future
self will encounter. In other words, we need to force ourselves to plan for
that far off future in detail.”280
One particular experimental effort to improve consumer decision
making warrants brief description, if only to suggest that there still remains
untapped potential to create narratives for influencing consumption,
physical activity, and other health issues, especially with expanded
accessibility to certain technologies. A recent cross-disciplinary study
revealed that “people can be encouraged to make more future-oriented
choices by having them interact with age-progressed renderings of their
own likenesses.”281 The authors understatedly deemed this approach “a
new kind of intervention.”282 Though the results should be treated as
preliminary because of the strikingly novel technique, it appears that
experimental “exposure to visual representations of one’s future self leads
to lower discounting of future rewards.”283 The study showed that these
results arose not because subjects were “thinking about aging per se,” but
“simply from direct exposure to renderings of the future self.”284
These findings may have emerged from a novel experimental setting in
a different zone of personal decision making, but one wonders what might
emerge from exposing visual representations of self to people, crosstemporally, reflecting different decisions about caloric intake and
278
See Kelly Greene & Vipal Monga, Workers Saving Too Little to Retire, WALL. ST. J., Mar. 19,
2013, at A1 (noting that more people report having less money saved for retirement and less confidence
in their ability to retire comfortably than in previous years).
279
Dale Griffin, Planning for the Future: On the Behavioral Economics of Living Longer, SLATE,
http://www.slate.com/articles/health_and_science/prudential/2013/08/_planning_for_the_future_is_sca
ry_but_why_is_that.html?wpisrc=slate_embeddedtap3 (last visited July 15, 2014).
280
Id.
281
Hal E. Hirschfield et al., Increasing Saving Behavior Through Age-Progressed Renderings of
the Future Self, 48 J. MARKETING RES. S23, S33 (2011).
282
Id.
283
Id. In this study, it is in the form of higher theoretical contributions to savings. Id. at S32.
284
Id. at S33.
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expenditure. Perhaps regulators should pursue more experimentation
along this direction to see if personalized visual narratives of harm can lead
people to make better decisions about discounting on matters of personal
health.
If a narrative device works, whether it takes the form of a series of
documentaries or the next innovative technology, obstacles still emerge.
Even with personal finance, it may prove difficult to compel people to go
through a de-biasing—or some might pejoratively say brainwashing—
exercise. A sustained campaign, particularly on film, could be viewed as
propaganda. Though placing narratives of harm in the public sphere might
prove simple if dropped into powerful public service advertisements, like
the Yul Brynner smoking ad,285 more complicated narratives involving
longer stories or the personal construction of narratives through sit-down
exercises become logistically difficult. Schoolchildren can certainly be
compelled to do these exercises as a form of hard paternalism, but would it
be too intrusive (or even lawful) to require public-assistance recipients to
sit through such exercises? Would the outrage from the autonomic
deprivation be greater than any outrage from the Big Gulp ban? These
questions warrant further thought.
Without doubt, these delivery mechanisms for new and different types
of narratives have yet to be exploited. It is difficult to assess their potential
power in the absence of a real effort, but it may behoove regulators to
invest more in uncovering the raw cognitive science and in finding avenues
to deploy these intervention vehicles. Note that this strong-form debiasing
should not dramatically diminish autonomy and should still reflect a low
level of intervention and paternalism. Telling stories also follows an old
tradition dating back to the morality tales embedded in Aesop’s fables—
but, in this instance, where one tells the stories could prove to be the most
serious challenge. Also, regulators would need to exercise restraint, or else
they run the risk of appearing to propagandize, which could raise public
hackles about paternalism.
If markets and voluntarism fail to influence behavior, and if soft
paternalism fails to influence choices, regulators can also pursue harder
forms of paternalism.286 Insulation strategies, which permit more limited
autonomy and make consumption safer, can be deployed. The true
autonomy-depriving bans and mandates associated with hardest
manifestation of paternalism require more political capital, unless the
regulators shield the public from experiencing the autonomy deprivation.
285

See supra text accompanying note 80.
Of course, regulators need not pursue strategies in this order. In fact, Sarah Conly’s work
might suggest the opposite. See CONLY, supra note 11, at 5 (recommending hard paternalism over soft
paternalism). I order the interventions in this way because putting them on a spectrum helps to
contextualize them.
286
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c. Insulation
Insulation strategies can appear in various forms. Product use can be
made safer, or harmful choices can be made more costly. In the obesity
context, I discuss two traditional insulation strategies for the purpose of
showing how difficult they can be to implement with the intended effect. I
focus first on the attempted Big Gulp ban in New York City, and then I
turn to a brief review of the efficacy of consumption taxes.
I follow this with a brief discussion of consumption subsidies.
Subsidies are a regulatory intervention often designed to encourage the
consumption or use of selected goods or services that are deemed socially
desirable.287 Consumption taxes can be engineered with the opposite
intent, to discourage socially undesirable consumption or usage.
Though the lens of pure microeconomics, these strategies mirror each
other, but taxation tends to carry a more paternalistic flavor because it
presents a barrier to choice, thereby reducing autonomy. Subsidies, though
they mirror taxation, appear to promote more choice and encourage certain
choices, likely surfacing fewer autonomy objections. Subsidies may not
feel like insulation, but I discuss them in this section to demonstrate how
two closely aligned approaches may appear different to the public.
i. Conditional Mandates: The Big Gulp Ban
The failed New York City Big Gulp ban provides the most current
example of an insulation strategy in regulatory efforts to address obesity.288
Mayor Bloomberg, in the quote that opens this Article, maintained that the
portion cap did not really stop potential consumption. He effectively
characterized the Big Gulp ban as a debiasing effort, since manipulating
available container sizes would put a speed bump in consumption. Again,
as Bloomberg directly put it:
The nice thing about the soda thing is it’s really just a
suggestion. So, if you want to buy 32 ounces, you just have
to carry it back to your seat in two cups. And maybe that
would convince you to only take one, but if you want two you
can do it. I think government’s job . . . is to give you advice,
not to force you [to] do things.289
Bloomberg perhaps attempted to do two things with this particular
effort. By raising transaction costs and perhaps providing pause for

287
Sometimes subsidies are designed to keep producers afloat—agriculture and automobile
manufacturing serve as examples.
288
I discussed this regulatory effort extensively in a prior article, from which I draw heavily
within this Subsection. Friedman, supra note 44, at 101–04.
289
Campbell, supra note 1 (emphasis added).
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290

consumer’s remorse, Bloomberg hoped to slow down or diminish the
amount of sugary drink consumption. That is, not to eliminate sugary
drink consumption, but to insulate consumers from the effects of overimbibing. The facts, however, did not support the notion that this
regulation would have any concrete effect, and Judge Melvin Tingling
struck down the portion-cap regulation partially on grounds that the
regulation was arbitrary and capricious, exacting a burden without a
reasonable basis.291
The Harvard School of Public Health offers facts supporting the
premise that soda consumption has indisputably increased in the United
States.292 The standard serving size for soda shifted from twelve ounces to
twenty ounces between the 1960s and 1990s.293 Nonetheless, targeting
sugary drinks alone would only have a limited impact, which one might
not expect given the political efforts that Bloomberg invested in the Big
Gulp ban.
The percentage of aggregate caloric intake that is attributable to sugary
drinks expanded at a robust rate from the 1970s to 2001, from about 4% to
about 9%.294 The latter number, however, demands further attention.295 As
noted previously, during this same era, total average caloric intake
increased by nearly 25%, with much of the increase accounted for by the
heavier consumption of refined grains.296 The Center for Science in the
Public Interest complicates the picture, presenting data showing that the
consumption of carbonated sugary drinks, omitting diet drinks, has already
declined by 24% since 1998 on a per capita basis,297 leaving speculation
about how much further decline could be realized.
A recent CDC survey found that half of the population consumes a
sugary drink daily.298 But it also found that only 5% of the population
290

Because refills of drinks can be free, I do not use the phrase “buyer’s remorse.”
N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Health &
Mental Hygiene, No. 653584/2012, 2013 WL 1343607, at *19–20 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 11, 2013), aff’d,
23 N.Y.3d 681 (2014).
292
HARVARD SCH. OF PUB. HEALTH, FACT SHEET: SUGARY DRINK SUPERSIZING
AND
THE
OBESITY EPIDEMIC 1 (2012), available at http://cdn1.sph.harvard.edu/wpcontent/uploads/sites/30/2012/10/sugary-drinks-and-obesity-fact-sheet-june-2012-the-nutritionsource.pdf.
293
Id.
294
Id. at 1.
295
Of course, not all calories are equal. Some may accompany more nutrition than others. See
What Are Empty Calories?, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC., http://www.choosemyplate.gov/weight-managementcalories/calories/empty-calories.html (last visited July 15, 2014) (“Solid fats and added sugars add
calories to . . . food[,] but few or no nutrients.”).
296
See supra text accompanying note 142.
297
Michael J. Jacobson, Good News!, NUTRITION ACTION HEALTHLETTER,
https://www.cspinet.org/nah/memo/JUN2012.html (last visited July 15, 2014).
298
CYNTHIA L. OGDEN ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., NCHS DATA BRIEF
NO. 71, CONSUMPTION OF SUGAR DRINKS IN THE UNITED STATES 2005–2008, at 2 (2011).
291
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consumes more than 567 calories in sugary drinks daily—equating to
roughly four cans of soda.299 Sixteen ounces of Coca Cola contain
approximately 187 calories,300 which means that any effective marginal
discouragement would only remove a small fraction of calories from the
daily diet of consumers who fall into the heavy-drinker category.
This Big Gulp ban may have been bounded by its potential impact on
the aggregate diet, but the other obstacles that the initiative encountered are
worth noting. The New York City Board of Health could only regulate
portion sizes within its jurisdiction, which is limited to restaurants, delis,
food carts, movie theaters, stadiums, and arenas.301 Therefore, a consumer
who wanted to have a larger drink could still patronize a supermarket, a
convenience store, a vending machine, or a newsstand—all of which are
unregulated by the Board of Health.302 Thus, had the ban been enacted,
large servings of sugary drinks still would have been readily accessible to
the public.
Again, this attempted regulation did not prohibit the consumption of
sugary drinks—it merely limited container size. Nothing except a minor
additional expense or inconvenience would have prevented a consumer
from drinking as much sugar as she wanted. Within the realm of
consumption, regulating the purchase of sugary drinks in units above
sixteen ounces could have an impact, but only a narrow impact.
This high-profile effort to insulate, stymied by the courts, would likely
have had minimal impact on sugary drink consumption, sugar
consumption, and obesity—if one accepts the notion that sugary drinks are
a smaller part of the problem that proves stubborn to regulate. Perhaps the
expressive value of the regulation would have influenced people to be
more health conscious. But it turned out that the public overwhelmingly
opposed this autonomy deprivation,303 even though the excessive
consumption habit in question was only engaged in by a small part of the
public.304
I have argued elsewhere that Bloomberg may merely have wanted the
battle over soda to lead to a public dialogue about its consumption.305 But
note that this public dialogue only emerged because the public had a low
299

Id.
Elisabeth Dahl, Calories from 16 Ounces of Coke, LIVESTRONG.COM (Aug. 16, 2013),
http://www.livestrong.com/article/295932-calories-from-16-ounces-of-coke/.
301
Michael M. Grynbaum, Mayor Planning a Ban on Big Sizes of Sugary Drinks, N.Y. TIMES,
May 31, 2012, at A1.
302
Id.
303
E.g., Grynbaum & Connelly, supra note 5.
304
See supra text accompanying note 299.
305
See Friedman, supra note 44, at 78 (“[Michael Bloomberg] has repeatedly deployed
paternalistic regulatory strategies in narrow spheres to spark a colorful and controversial public
dialogue.”).
300
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tolerance for paternalism—even though the paternalism was mostly
directed at others and targeted at a narrow category and manner of
consumption. If Bloomberg did indeed receive his desired public dialogue
about soda, he needs to hope that the residual legacy will be the public
inculcation of a truthful narrative of harm about overconsumption—
because the insulation function evaporated.
ii. Consumption Taxes
Taxes can insulate by making certain transactions more expensive,
leading consumers to recalculate present-bias influenced decisions.306 The
concept of levying taxes on sugar or obesogenic products307 has been
promoted recently in the popular sphere,308 but, as Katherine Pratt
observes, empirical evidence that such taxes will achieve their desired
effects on public health can be difficult to find.309 She notes that “public
health advocates often make empirical assumptions, which are consistent
with their common sense but may turn out to be erroneous, about the
consequences of their proposals.”310 For example, the taxation of
sweetened beverages might reduce consumption, but could lead consumers
to substitute other, untaxed obesogenic food and beverages in their
place.311
Some studies conclude that no evidence supports the notion that soda
taxes affect obesity,312 while one even predicts that these taxes could
increase obesity.313 I offer an excerpt from the conclusion of the latter
study, conducted by a trio of economists, to offer a window into one view
306
See Rachelle Holmes Perkins, Salience and Sin: Designing Taxes in the New Sin Era, 2014
BYU L. REV. 143, 157–58 (discussing policymakers’ commonly proffered justifications for sin taxes).
307
For a developed proposal from public health scientists, see generally Brownell et al., supra
note 90.
308
See, e.g., Patrick McGreevy, Oil and Soda Taxes Advance in California Legislature, L.A.
TIMES (May 1, 2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/may/01/local/la-me-pc-tax-votes-20130501
(discussing a California bill that would institute a “tax on sweetened beverages, including sodas, in
hopes of reducing obesity among young people”).
309
Pratt, supra note 71, at 113.
310
Id. at 111–12.
311
Id. at 112; see also Eric A. Finkelstein et al., Impact of Targeted Beverage Taxes on Higherand Lower-Income Households, 170 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 2028, 2033 (2010) (suggesting that
taxation just leads individuals to substitute one high-calorie food for another).
312
E.g., Finkelstein et al., Pros and Cons of Proposed Interventions to Promote Healthy Eating,
27 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. 163, 169 (2003).
313
Gideon Yaniv et al., Junk-Food Home Cooking, Physical Activity and Obesity: The Effect of
the Fat Tax and the Thin Subsidy, 93 J. PUB. ECON. 823 (2009). Some findings, however, have
predicted some promise for potential weight loss from these taxes. See, e.g., TRAVIS A. SMITH ET AL.,
U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., TAXING CALORIC SWEETENED BEVERAGES: POTENTIAL EFFECTS ON BEVERAGE
CONSUMPTION, CALORIE INTAKE, AND OBESITY, at iii–iv (2010) (explaining study results showing that
“[t]he weight loss induced by the tax could reduce the . . . prevalence of obesity from 33.4 to 30.4
percent”). The general point here is that there may be more for empiricists to uncover on this front, just
as there is more to uncover about the effectiveness of disclosure.
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of the complexity of using taxation as an insulation strategy:
[S]ome adverse possible consequences . . . might have been
overlooked by [fat tax] advocates . . . . [W]hile a fat tax will
unambiguously reduce the obesity level of a non-weight
conscious individual, it will not necessarily do so for a
weight-conscious individual. In particular, if the individual
is physically active, a fat tax will unambiguously increase
obesity if a certain relationship between the parameters of the
model holds. The reason for this is that weight is gained
when calorie intake exceeds calorie-use through physical
activity. A fat tax, when reducing junk-food consumption,
encourages the preparation of healthy meals which
necessitates time for cooking and health-ingredient shopping,
at the expense of physical activity. Consequently, obesity
might rise in spite of the fall in junk-food consumption,
exacerbating the problem the fat tax proposal intended to
eliminate.314
This ambiguous dynamic, where unintended consequences emerge
from intervention into decision making, echoes the surprising outcomes in
calorie disclosure efforts.315 Thus, deploying this particular taxation
strategy, an insulation strategy on the harder paternalistic edge of the
spectrum, might not address the obesity problem.
***
Insulation tools can be difficult to identify and deploy. As with other
interventions in decision making, consequences of actions can be
unproductive or even counterproductive. Further, the political cry from
autonomic deprivation can present obstacles and make the public weary—
although, a good fight always draws a crowd. If that crowd can be
influenced by a cultural debate about obesity, it may make even a failed
intervention somewhat productive.
iii. Subsidies
Paul Diller and Samantha Graff offer a number of examples of
localities exercising their authority to issue mandates that in effect
constitute hidden paternalism because the paternalism is difficult for the
public to detect.316 Though these initiatives have been made on a smaller

314

Yaniv et al., supra note 313, at 829.
See supra note 243 and accompanying text.
316
See Paul A. Diller & Samantha Graff, Regulating Food Retail for Obesity Prevention: How
Far Can Cities Go?, 39 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 89, 89–90 (2011) (describing local efforts using police
315
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scale, should they prove effective, they exemplify the types of efforts that
may not set off the autonomy-deprivation warning alarm.
The
interventions identified take the form of seemingly benign subsidies that
promote healthy food options by directly expanding the set of choices for
consumers.317 Many of the local initiatives Diller and Graff identify appear
laudable, pragmatic, and aligned with providing healthy choices, but they
may be incremental and indirect compared to more paternalistic endeavors.
For example, facilitating zoning for farmers markets and community
gardens318 may only marginally help a group of people already inclined to
make healthy choices.
These strategies extend beyond mere provision of information, pushing
them further along the spectrum toward hard paternalism, but consumers
are not compelled to make the healthier choices. Though the fit may not
be perfect, insulation can include the creation of entirely new choices
because more options equate to more protection from making the less
desirable choice. Arguably, a case could be made for putting this
paternalism in the softer category because subsidies expand choices with a
positive intervention, in contrast to the seemingly punitive intervention
associated with taxation of choices.
To the extent that these subsidy initiatives are tested to ensure that they
actually work—and give the taxpayers return on their tax dollar—they can
be encouraged to proliferate both in variety and geographic scope. If
subsidizing new supermarkets in low-income zones proves to have no
impact, perhaps local tax monies should be deployed elsewhere within
those neighborhoods. If it proves to have a measurably net positive
impact, more such initiative should be pursued.
d. Hard Paternalism, Bans, and Mandates
Hard paternalism can be crisply illustrated through the lens of parental
paternalism. Parents often substitute their own judgments and choices for
those of their children. Ideally, children can be trained to make the right
choices without constant interference and monitoring from parents—
because parents will find monitoring costs too expensive to sustain,
especially as children grow and confront more choices outside parental
presence. Teenagers desire autonomy, while parents prefer the comfort of
the certainty that their children will only make safe choices. Squelched
desire for autonomy can lead to complaints about fairness and, potentially,
power). The other interventions Diller and Graff offer tend to fall into zones of control described in the
section on hard paternalism and bans. They also cite Chicago’s soda taxes. Id. at 92 tbl.2.
317
Id. at 91 tbl.1. Examples include issuance of permits to “green cart” vendors to operate in
communities that need more access to fresh produce, grocery store produce-carrying requirements, and
tax incentives for developers who open new full-service groceries. Id.
318
Id.
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319

rebellion.
The reaction to the Big Gulp ban indicates that the public attitude
toward paternalism in contexts involving private consumption decisions
may be trending negative. That said, hard paternalism can still be
deployed effectively under the right circumstances—for example, in zones
where a degree of government control already exists, and in contexts where
the paternalism proves intangible or difficult for people to see or notice.
Hard paternalism in the form of mandates, though, may prove especially
challenging to implement because mandates do not just remove a choice—
they force action.
i. Zones of Control
Regulators have control over consumption when they literally dictate
the menu choices. These zones of control seem to emerge in areas where
income is lower and the population depends more heavily on public school
meals and the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (“SNAP”).320
Though paternalism directed at the low-income population has proved
controversial at times,321 regulators have already staked out the territory for
general intervention. Importantly, this particular zone of control might
encompass a significant sector of the population facing obesity. As noted,
obesity and other public health problems may be more pronounced in lowincome communities, and yet, in the childhood population, obesity may
already be in decline.322
Childhood obesity, besides constituting an instant problem, carries
negative consequences forward because the social, emotional, and physical
impact of childhood obesity can extend well into adulthood.323 After some

319
The legislative “anti-Bloomberg” flurry in Mississippi, see supra text accompanying notes
259–62, typifies an adolescent rebellion of sorts. See Kim Severson, “Anti-Bloomberg Bill” in
Mississippi Bars Local Restrictions on Food and Drink, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2013, at A16 (describing
the legislation as “the latest and most sweeping expression of a nationwide battle”).
320
SNAP administers what people commonly refer to as food stamps. Supplemental Nutrition
Assistance Program (SNAP), U.S. DEP’T AGRIC., http://www.fns.usda.gov/snap/supplementalnutrition-assistance-program-snap (last visited July 15, 2014).
321
For example, the debate about House Budget Chairman Representative Paul Ryan’s 2014
antipoverty plan has focused on paternalism. See Jamelle Bouie, The Poor Don’t Need a Life Coach,
SLATE (July 25, 2014), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/politics/2014/07/paul_ryan_s_
anti_poverty_plan_the_house_budget_chairman_s_paternalistic.html (offering a paternalism-based
critique); Reihan Salam, Paul Ryan’s Anti-Poverty Plan Is Paternalistic (July 24, 2014),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/politics/2014/07/paul_ryan_s_anti_poverty_plan_is_p
aternalistic_it_s_also_a_thoughtful_compassionate.html (offering a paternalism-based defense).
322
See supra text accompanying notes 160, 177.
323
Mary K. Serdula et al., Do Obese Children Become Obese Adults? A Review of the Literature,
22 PREVENTIVE MED. 167, 175 (1993); see William H. Dietz, Health Consequences of Obesity in
Youth: Childhood Predictors of Adult Disease, 101 PEDIATRICS 518, 523 (1998) (“Several of the
obesity-associated morbidities in children and adolescents require urgent and aggressive therapy.
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battles with the food industry, the USDA promulgated rules to make
school-provided meals324 and other food sold during the school day325 more
nutritious and less obesogenic. Though these actions may indeed help
children during the hours they spend inside a school environment and
influence tastes beyond, it appears that even in advance of these actions,
childhood obesity rates declined for reasons not completely understood.326
It is difficult to imagine much harm resulting from slanting the choice
environment for public school students toward better nutrition, but it may
prove difficult to measure results because other forces may be at work.
Though the historically-rooted zone of paternalistic control over
children in public schools is largely accepted, public school nutrition
reform needs to gain traction and acceptance among the vast numbers of
students and parents touched by the policies—and even modest efforts at
reform may be failing.327 Even if the school zone is controlled to
maximum effect, influence over children’s consumption328 requires
confinement for longer periods than a school day.329 In fact, weight-loss
camps and even one weight-loss boarding school330 emerged to address this
problem, but the costs per child of such programs prove impractical for
offering such an experience to the broad population.331 Some results seem

Furthermore, as severely overweight children and adolescents become more common, the risks of
weight-related complications in adulthood will increase.”).
324
7 C.F.R. §§ 210, 220 (2013).
325
Nutrition Standards for All Foods Sold in School as Required by the Healthy, Hunger-Free
Kids Act of 2010, 78 Fed. Reg. 39,068 (proposed final rule as of June 28, 2013) (to be codified at 7
C.F.R. pt. 210, 220).
326
May et al., supra note 177, at 630.
327
For example, one Kentucky school official said that the students think the healthier food
“tastes like vomit.” Michelle Obama-Touted Federal Healthy Lunch Program Leaves Bad Taste in
Some School Districts’ Mouths, CBS NEWS (Aug. 30, 2013), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301505263_162-57600385/michelle-obama-touted-federal-healthy-lunch-program-leaves-bad-taste-insome-school-districts-mouths/. Children may be rejecting the food under the new program. See Kevin
Fallon, Nutritious School Lunches, or the New Hunger Games?, THE DAILY BEAST (Sept. 28, 2012),
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/09/28/nutritious-school-lunches-or-the-new-hungergames.html (recounting anecdotal evidence that students, and even teachers, are complaining that the
calorie content in school meals is too low).
328
Parents exercise strong influence over children’s habits and one study affirms that seemingly
obvious statement. See Katharine A. Hinkle et al., Parents May Hold the Keys to Success in Immersion
Treatment of Adolescent Obesity, 33 CHILD & FAM. BEHAV. THERAPY 273, 273 (2011) (“[These]
results suggest that helping parents adopt lifestyle changes for themselves, even within the context of
relatively short immersion treatments, may maximize outcomes for obese teenagers.”).
329
If students spend eight hours per day and 180 days per year in school, assuming perfect
attendance, and have sixteen waking hours per day, roughly seventy-five percent of their waking hours
are spent outside of school boundaries. One can adjust the assumptions, but the result will always put
the student outside the school for a significant time period.
330
Sandra G. Boodman, “Fat School,” WASH. POST, May 20, 2008, at HE01.
331
See Karen Grigsby Bates, School Transforms Teens’ Lives, One Pound at a Time, NPR (Dec.
12, 2011), http://www.npr.org/2011/12/12/142661672/school-transforms-teens-lives-one-pound-at-a-
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to indicate that environmental immersion can help children make gains by
controlling and retraining children’s calorie intake and outtake.332 This
example of deploying hard paternalism strategies in an existing zone of
control therefore demonstrates how difficult it may be to effect change in
habits—even in a space where in loco parentis describes the relationship
between educational institutions and children.333
Another zone of control example to consider briefly would be the use
of restrictions on SNAP to control or paternalistically influence the
purchases of those who rely on the program. Some view regulatory control
over SNAP as an opportunity to directly influence the diets of nearly fortyseven-million lower-income Americans—half of them children.334
An interim USDA report on the results of a pilot program that
encouraged SNAP participants to purchase more nutritious foods revealed
that the experiment changed purchasing patterns for the healthier.335 Under
the pilot, participants received a thirty-cent incentive for every dollar that
they directed toward certain fruits and vegetables—and that thirty-cent
incentive could be spent on all other SNAP purchases.336 This 2011 to
2012 project, limited to Hampden County, Massachusetts, revealed that
participants consumed twenty-five percent more of the targeted fruits and
vegetables than the control group.337 The subsidy did not generate
participant resentment toward SNAP, even with the lurking element of
paternalism.338
Regardless of any measure of changes in consumption, political and
moral clashes have hovered over the notion of controlling or restricting the
habits of those who rely on SNAP.339 Logistically, SNAP recipients may
time (noting that one year at Wellspring Academy, a weight loss boarding school, cost $62,500 in
2011).
332
See, e.g., Daniel L. Patrick et al., Weight Loss and Changes in Generic and Weight-Specific
Quality of Life in Obese Adolescents, 20 QUALITY OF LIFE RES. 961, 962 (2011) (measuring positive
BMI effects from a four-week immersion program for adolescents).
333
See Susan Stuart, In Loco Parentis in the Public Schools: Abused, Confused, and in Need of
Change, 78 U. CIN. L. REV. 969, 971 (2010) (describing the parent-institution relationship as a
“voluntary delegation of parental authority,” but critiquing its modern form).
334
E.g., David S. Ludwig et al., Opportunities to Reduce Childhood Hunger and Obesity
Restructuring the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (the Food Stamp Program), 308 JAMA
2567, 2567–68 (2012).
335
U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., HEALTHY INCENTIVES PILOT (HIP) INTERIM REPORT—SUMMARY 2
(2013).
336
Id. at 1.
337
Id.
338
Ninety-five percent of respondents wished to keep participating in the project. Id. at 2.
339
See, e.g., Food Stamps: The Economics of Eating Well, ROOM FOR DEBATE (Dec. 7, 2009,
7:37 PM), http://roomfordebate.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/12/07/food-stamps-the-economics-of-eatingwell/ (showcasing the opinions of six thought leaders about food stamps and healthy food); see also
Conor Friedersdorf, Should Food Stamps Exclude Unhealthy Purchases, AM. SCENE (Dec. 8, 2009), htt
p://theamericanscene.com/2009/12/08/should-food-stamps-exclude-unhealthy-purchases (“[I]t is very
easy for me to imagine why plenty of Americans are uncomfortable with the idea of government
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strategically orient purchasing habits so they can continue to consume the
diet they prefer, rather than the diet that the regulators prefer. For
example, SNAP could be directed toward the purchase of a higher volume
of nutritious foods, but the recipient can still use the resources freed by
SNAP to buy obesogenic items. The government has the opportunity to be
paternalistic in this zone, but serious normative questions remain about
tying an autonomy sacrifice to a food benefit. Redesigning the SNAP
subsidy to directly displace bad choices like soda would be more palatable
to some, but would be much more likely to generate an outcry that is
reminiscent of the Big Gulp ban.
Hard paternalism can be challenging, but possible, to implement
politically in this major public health sphere. Next, I discuss opportunities
for the deployment of hard paternalism where regulators can intervene
somewhat more easily, i.e., when their paternalistic presence is not felt.
ii. Zones of Intangibility
Choices can be removed from the public menu without generating the
feeling that autonomy has eroded. That is, some hard paternalistic
initiatives can be implemented without triggering the perception of loss. If
the regulators eliminate a truly poor choice, there should be an opportunity
for a welfare gain. Regulators may find it difficult to identify these zones
of intangible or hidden paternalism, but they can exist.
Outright bans of generally lawful substances for ingestion prove
difficult, as the tobacco experience demonstrates.340 With food, and
particularly with widely-used obesogenic ingredients, outright bans could
prove especially challenging—unless the public does not object to or
notice the removal of the ingredient. Regulators must find hard food
restrictions that prove intangible or negligibly detectible to the end
consumer. Arguably, the most successful example of an intangible
intervention, a regulation that produced tangible health benefits, may be
the banning of trans fats.
getting into the food police business even more than is already the case, and reacting against the
paternalistic assumptions embedded in the idea that Congress best knows what poor people should
eat.”); Food Stamp Ban on Soda Purchases Is Flat-out Paternalism, AM. COUNCIL ON SCI. & HEALTH
(May 4, 2011), http://acsh.org/2011/05/food-stamp-ban-on-soda-purchases-is-flat-out-paternalism/
(posing slippery slope argument about autonomy and government’s ability to discern “good foods”
from “bad”).
340
With tobacco, partial restrictions have been applied aggressively to zones of control. See
Anemona Hartocollis, City Plan Sets 21 as Legal Age to Buy Tobacco, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2013, at
A1 (describing restrictions in offices, restaurants, and parks—among others). These bans have not
been total, but they have been significant in scope, particularly based on place and age. Smoking bans
in certain places can be justified paternalistically by the desires of nonsmokers who are directly
affected by the presence of smoke. In contrast, the consumption of a Big Gulp or a Big Mac produces
few instant negative externalities. Initiatives based on age are ongoing. New York City health officials
are actively proposing to raise the smoking age to 21. Id.
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Trans fats entered U.S. diets in conjunction with the industrialization
of food production in the twentieth century.341 Trans fats act as a
preservative, provide a boost to flavoring, and contribute to attractive food
texture.342 In 1911, Procter & Gamble rolled out Crisco to retail grocers,
introducing trans fats to the masses.343 Food rationing during World
War II accelerated the use of trans fats, when margarine served as a
substitute for butter.344 Eventually, trans fats would find their way into
common foods, most notably being used in the production of fast food.345
The presence of the substance in the food supply has apparently proven
harmful to public health, as one group of researchers summarized:
[S]tudies and . . . trials indicate that [trans fat] consumption
adversely affects multiple risk factors for chronic diseases,
including numerous blood lipids and lipoproteins, systemic
inflammation, endothelial dysfunction, and possibly insulin
resistance, diabetes, and adiposity. Growing evidence for the
latter effects is particularly concerning given the worldwide
obesity pandemic and high contents of [trans fat] in many
foods marketed toward children.346
Over the past decade, public health officials began to recognize the
harms caused by trans fats and took action, first by mandating labeling,347
which is consistent with weak-form debiasing. This effort had some
tangible impact. For example, in 2007, J.M. Smucker Co. responded to the
labeling requirements by reinventing Crisco’s ingredients entirely, altering
a nearly century-old consumer brand.348 The company reduced the
product’s trans fat content to a point where the FDA would permit its label
to declare zero trans fat content.349 Thus, labeling requirements became a
starting point for change. Nonetheless, to reduce trans fat consumption,
hard paternalism in the form of bans would be required and would find
some success in local implementation, possibly due to the stealthy,
341
A History of Trans Fat, AM. HEART ASS’N, http://www.heart.org/HEARTORG/GettingHealth
y/FatsAndOils/Fats101/A-History-of-Trans-Fat_UCM_301463_Article.jsp (last visited July 15, 2014).
342
Id.
343
Id.
344
Id.
345
See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., TALKING ABOUT TRANS FAT: WHAT YOU NEED TO KNOW
2 (2012) (listing various foods that commonly contain trans fats, including: baked goods, frozen pizza,
fast food, margarines, coffee creamer, and ready-to-use frostings).
346
Shyam Mohan Teegala et al., Consumption and Health Effects of Trans Fatty Acids: A Review,
92 J. AOAC INT’L 1250, 1250 (2009).
347
See 21 C.F.R. §§ 101.1, 101.9(a), 101.9(e)(5) (2013) (mandating that food labeling indicate
levels of trans fatty acids).
348
Crisco Cuts the Trans Fat, CNNMONEY.COM (Jan. 25, 2007), http://money.cnn.com/2007/01/
25/news/companies/crisco/.
349
Id.
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intangible, unperceivable impact of the regulation on consumer autonomy.
As Paul Diller describes, opposition to local food regulation often
comes through the business community, but the business community’s
response to proposed regulations may not be “monolithic” or intuitive.350
Ultimately, with trans fats, it appears that producers and significant food
retailers have voluntarily adjusted to move away from using the
substance.351 Part of the ease of implementing these bans and getting
companies to move more broadly and voluntarily is that unlike the Big
Gulp ban, the tangible impact on consumers would prove minimal. Here,
the paternalism is hidden.
The localized trans fats ban movement is said to have roots in Tiburon,
California, a local zone harboring eighteen restaurants that agreed to
eliminate the use of trans fats through a purely voluntary effort.352 Over
the next few years, regulatory bans on trans fats of various forms were
enacted in Montgomery County, Maryland,353 New York City,354
Philadelphia,355 Nassau County, New York,356 and California.357 Other
jurisdictions have also followed suit to varying degrees.358 Perhaps in part
due to a need for national standardization after the local initiatives,
350
Paul Diller, Intrastate Preemption, 87 B.U. L. REV. 1113, 1134–35 (2007). The national food
chains feared product inconsistency in an industry where consumers expect consistency, as well as the
potential for added operational complexity from maintaining different menus in different jurisdictions.
Id. at 1135. Local restaurants, however, stood to be advantaged by a burden on big chain restaurants.
Id. The National Restaurant Association chose a side and took a hard line against regulation that
“banned the use of a product that was legal elsewhere.” Id.
351
See supra note 200.
352
Jim Staats, Tiburon’s Trans-Fat Ban Started National Movement, MARIN INDEP. J. (Feb. 3,
2007), http://www.marinij.com/fastsearchresults/ci_5155266.
353
Miranda S. Spivack, Montgomery Bans Trans Fats in Restaurants, Markets, WASH. POST,
May 16, 2007, at A1.
354
N.Y.C., N.Y. HEALTH CODE tit. 24, § 81.08(a) (2013). For an illustrative summary, in the
form of guidance to food licensees, see N.Y.C. DEP’T OF HEALTH & MENTAL HYGIENE, THE
REGULATION TO PHASE OUT ARTIFICIAL TRANS FAT IN NEW YORK CITY FOOD SERVICE
ESTABLISHMENTS, HOW TO COMPLY: WHAT RESTAURANTS, CATERERS, MOBILE FOOD-VENDING
UNITS AND OTHERS NEED TO KNOW, http://www.nyc.gov/html/doh/downloads/pdf/cardio/cardiotransfat-bro.pdf (last visited July 15, 2014).
355
Philadelphia Approves Ban on Trans Fats, NBCNEWS.COM (Feb. 9, 2007),
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/17066429/ns/health-diet_and_nutrition/t/philadelphia-approves-ban-transfats/#.Uhj3pJLFXUk.
356
Jordan Lite, Nation Has Heart for Trans-Fat Ban, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Dec. 4, 2007),
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/nation-heart-trans-fat-ban-article-1.272772.
357
California was the first state to ban restaurants from using trans fats. Jennifer Steinhauer,
California Bars Restaurant Use of Trans Fats, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 2008, at A1.
358
The regulatory trend still seems confined to the East Coast and West Coast, making the push
toward voluntary reduction or elimination of trans fats more important for advocates seeking national
change. See State and Local Enacted Trans Fat Bans, NAT’L REST. ASS’N (July 16, 2013),
http://www.restaurant.org/Downloads/PDFs/advocacy/maps/map_transfat.pdf (illustrating, on a map,
locales that have enacted bans on trans fat in restaurants). Trans fats restrictions of some manner are
also in place in six Massachusetts cities, including Boston; New York’s Westchester and Albany
counties; Stamford, Connecticut; Baltimore, Maryland; and King County, Washington. Id.
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industry voluntarism accelerated, in likely recognition of a trend moving
toward bans rather than away from them.
New York City’s ban on trans fats in restaurants has been found to
have positive health effects on the city’s population.359 One study
suggested that, through regulation, “reductions in the trans fat content of
restaurant purchases can be achieved without an offsetting increase in
saturated fat.”360 The study went on to state that the “regulatory strategy
provided equal benefit to patrons of restaurants in high- and low-poverty
neighborhoods.”361
Factors along two dimensions can potentially explain the relative
success of the trans fat hard paternalism movement and the failure of the
Big Gulp ban. The Big Gulp ban had a low potential impact, for reasons
explained previously.362 Trans fat bans have been proven to have a
positive effect on public health.363 But the dominant factor might be the
visible differences when it comes to autonomy. The Big Gulp initiative
removed some autonomy, though as Bloomberg noted, not all autonomy.364
But the autonomy deprivation proved sufficient for the “Nanny
Bloomberg” narrative to accelerate.365 The trans fats ban proved less
tangible, possibly because consumers did not notice that it was missing.
The National Restaurant Association loudly expressed concerns over
switching costs,366 but consumers did not notice much difference in their
food consumption experience. At least anecdotally, they did not taste a
loss of autonomy.
For example, when taste tested, foods that were heavily dependent on
trans fats before the ban were not noticeably different after the ban. The
New York Daily News tested a quintessential Italian pastry, the cannoli,

359

Angell et al., supra note 4, at 81, 84–85.
Id. at 86.
361
Id. at 85.
362
See supra text accompanying notes 298–302.
363
See supra text accompanying note 346.
364
See Campbell, supra note 1 (quoting Michael Bloomberg as stating “The nice thing about the
soda thing is it’s really just a suggestion. So, if you want to buy 32 ounces, you have to carry it back to
your seat in two cups. And maybe that would convince you to only take one, but if you want two you
can do it.”).
365
See Ron Dicker, “Nanny Bloomberg” Ad in New York Times Targets N.Y. Mayor’s Anti-Soda
Crusade, HUFFINGTON POST (June 4, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/06/04/nannybloomberg-ad-in-new_n_1568037.html (showing the Center for Consumer Freedom’s full-page
advertisement in the New York Times, which featured a photoshopped image of Mayor Michael
Bloomberg dressed in drag with a tagline reading “New Yorkers Need a Mayor, Not a Nanny”).
366
See Emily Schmall, Trans Fat War Threatens Restaurants, FORBES (Dec. 21, 2006),
http://www.forbes.com/2006/12/20/trans-fat-bans-biz-cz_es_1221fats.html (“Most of the resistance to
switching from traditional trans fat is coming from the thousands of smaller, privately owned
independent restaurants throughout the U.S., which complain the shift is simply too costly.”).
360
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with and without trans fats, and tasters could not discern a change. With
some more scientific testing, a Consumer Reports test revealed little
difference in the tasting experiences for French fries.368 The Washington
Post asked two prominent pastry chefs to compare traditional Oreos with
trans fat-free Oreos, and little difference was detected.369 Not everyone
agrees, of course370—and tastes may vary across foods—but it is difficult
to find recent taste-based campaigns to attack trans fats. Though public
surveys are sparse, New York consumers in 2008 overwhelmingly
supported the trans fats ban, implying that consumers were somewhat
aware of it and did not bristle about autonomy.371
Perhaps the key to regulatory success in the intangibility zone lies in a
variant of the saying, “what you don’t know can’t hurt you.” In this
instance, success lies in “what you don’t know might help you.” The
challenge in deploying hard paternalism in the intangibility zone is finding
hidden paternalism opportunities that can have a proven and widespread
impact.
iii. Mandates
Mandated behavior might prove to be the most difficult form of hard
paternalism to implement. Mandates do not deprive autonomy through
mere choice elimination—they compel people to do certain things without
an alternative. Generally, people are not forced to ingest substances unless
they are institutionalized or are near death, and the purpose of such

367
See Kristen Brown & Owen Moritz, Can’t Find Fat Tooth. The News’ Taste Test Shows
N.Y.ers OK with Trans-ition, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, July 2, 2008, at 17 (discussing the results of the
newspaper’s survey in Washington Square Park on the first day of the City’s trans fat ban).
368
French Fry Face-Off, CONSUMER REP., http://www.consumerreports.org/cro/magazinearchive/august-2009/food/french-fries/overview/french-fry-face-off-ov.htm (last visited July 15, 2014)
(discussing a taste test of Burger King, McDonald’s, and Wendy’s fries after switching to trans fat-free
oil).
369
Judith Weinraub, What’s Missing from this Cookie?, WASH. POST, Feb. 22, 2006, at F1.
370
Some vociferously expressed that there was a difference. The owner of a fish restaurant in
Portland, Oregon, declared in 2006, “‘[a]fter I tasted the zero trans fat oil, I said take that nasty [stuff]
out of my freaking fryers, because that stuff stays in the freaking fish’ . . . . ‘I’m taking bites of the fish
cooked in it, and the [stuff]’s running down my face.’” Brittany Schaeffer, No Fries for You!,
WK.
(Oct.
25,
2006),
http://www.wweek.com/portland/article-6206WILLAMETTE
no_fries_for_you_.html.
371
The poll, showing that more than seven in ten favored a ban, was commissioned in 2008 by the
Center for Science in the Public Interest. New Yorkers Want Statewide Phase-out of Artificial Trans
Fat, CENTER FOR SCI. PUB. INT. (Apr. 24, 2008), http://www.cspinet.org/new/200804241.html; cf.
Zogby International, RE: Results from New York Survey, CENTER FOR SCI. PUB. INT.,
http://cspinet.org/new/pdf/nytranssurvey.pdf (“[A] survey of eight hundred adults in New York State
shows that a strong majority (73%) are concerned about the presence of artificial trans fat in restaurant
food, and even more (84%) favor regulations that would require restaurants to disclose whether or not
they use trans fats on menus and menu boards.”).
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372

compulsion is not usually weight loss.
The scientific community generally agrees that a sedentary lifestyle
will lead to an array of health problems driven by and related to obesity.
As previously noted, not all studies align, but there appears to be a
consensus that moving people away from sedentary behaviors will reduce
obesity and improve their health along a number of dimensions.373
The sedentary lifestyle may not be addressable through hard
paternalism. Even Mayor Bloomberg conceded as much when, in the
wake of having his Big Gulp ban struck down, he remarked, “Exercise is
great for you, but how do you convince people to do it? And should you
force them to do it? Probably not.”374 Bloomberg spoke to both the
logistical challenge of convincing the public and the normative aspect of
coercing people to exercise.
Softer, weaker forms of paternalism may prove to be the only hope for
getting people to move more. One can only speculate whether changing
default rules, incentivizing gym memberships, or changing office
ergonomics would work—or whether, for example, finding ways to keep
children, who are in a zone of influence, away from the television would
prove effective.
The problem to concede here is that mandated behavior will likely
prove impractical, even when directed against a serious contributor to a
health problem. Paternalism simply proves ineffective. Some of the data
appears to undermine whether soft paternalism can work here, too. People
who tend toward sedentary lives expressly report that their health is
poorer.375 One can speculate about whether these individuals know of the
link or care about it, or whether heavier weight makes activity more
difficult.376 Gallup reports a correlation between reported physical activity
and income levels.377 Do those with higher incomes have more leisure for
physical activity—or better access to superior exercise facilities? If
socioeconomic dynamics drive the sedentary lifestyle problem, will any
form of paternalism be able to get the lower-income segment of the
population moving?
Physical activity may prove to be a key component in reducing
372
See Mary K. Russell et al., Standards for Specialized Nutrition Support: Adult Hospitalized
Patients, 17 NUTRITION CLINICAL PRAC. 384, 384 (2002) (describing the standards that are
implemented in acute care institutions for hospitalized adult patients in need of specialized nutritional
support).
373
See supra text accompanying notes 152–54.
374
Campbell, supra note 1.
375
See, e.g., Joseph Carroll, Regular Exercise: Who’s Getting It?, GALLUP (Dec. 6, 2005),
http://www.gallup.com/poll/20314/regular-exercise-whos-getting-it.aspx (“Nearly 7 in 10 adults who
say their health is only fair or poor are in the low (23%) or sedentary (46%) groupings.”).
376
See id. (noting that overweight people report exercising less).
377
Id. Note that the socioeconomic indicators around physical activity mirror that of obesity at
large.
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obesity. But apart from providing and mandating physical education for
children or providing access to more parks and recreational activities, is
there more that can be done to influence behavior? Would incremental
education work? All of the paternalistic tools appear to be dulled in the
face of this component of the problem.
In general, hard paternalism substitutes the choices of the regulator for
that of the individual or mandates certain behaviors. Hard paternalism may
prove difficult to implement in its purest forms because of the public’s
reaction to the complete deprivation of autonomy. There are spots,
however, where hard paternalism could be deployed to address the obesity
problem or broader public health issues. If the zone of the regulation
already falls within the natural control of the regulator, the implementation
might prove less objectionable. Hidden paternalism, where the regulation
proves intangible to the public but improves public health, could also
provide opportunities for high impact interventions. Nonetheless, these
types of interventional opportunities may still raise the hackles of the
public, and it may prove difficult to identify them on a grander scale.
The obesity problem did not emerge overnight, and it has myriad
overlapping causes.378 Regulators must have a degree of humility in
deploying paternalistic strategies. It is difficult to discern if any single
initiative works or can work—but initiatives require resources. A
paternalistic strategy, whether soft or hard, should be deployed with an
understanding and balancing of the political costs, the financial costs, and
the uncertain impacts.
This Article addresses paternalism in public health, with obesity
leading as the primary illustration because of its centrality to public
health—and its centrality to the recent public dialogue. To generalize
about paternalism and public health, a discussion of obesity is required. In
turn, a discussion of other spheres of public health is also required to see
whether they reinforce the viewpoints about obesity and show general
trends within public health.
I briefly look at three simpler, but also high-profile, public health
issues to see if views about paternalism mirror and reinforce the dynamic
observed in obesity. They are simpler because they address a single,
discrete public health issue—and the paternalism involved typically
focuses on one point on the spectrum.
C. Beyond Obesity: Other Public Health Issues
Major regulatory themes discussed in the obesity context reverberate
with three other public health topics: marijuana, fluoride, and GMOs. For
example, the trends in marijuana regulation and fluoridation seem to
378

See supra Part III.A.
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coincide with some of the political resistance to harder paternalism that is
also evident in the obesity sphere. People generally seem to balk when
regulators restrict personal choice of what to ingest—or how to ingest it—
unless the autonomy loss proves intangible. The debate over regulating
GMOs is more nuanced, but the GMO controversy highlights the notion
that not all paternalism emanates from regulators. To the contrary,
regulators in public health can, in some circumstances, expand choice
rather than restrict choice. And people applaud the addition of choice.
Though I concede again that anecdotes can be matched with
countervailing anecdotes, I will use these three subjects as data points to
demonstrate that paternalism has become a more difficult strategy to
deploy and sustain in public health.
1. Marijuana
In November 2012, Washington State and Colorado passed measures
legalizing marijuana use for non-medical, recreational purposes.379
Washington’s initiative received 55.7% of the vote, and Colorado’s
received 54.8% of the vote.380 Though extrapolating from the election
results may be a leap, some observers recognized these developments as
part of a broader social trend toward freedom of choice and away from
paternalism. For example, The Economist suggested that the local election
results reflected the collective attitude of a “more tolerant country,” which
presumably would favor personal choice on issues like marijuana and
marriage:
The right to marry whom you please may have been in Mr
Obama’s thoughts when he spoke of “the freedom which so
many Americans have fought for” on victory night. The
right to spark up a fat one probably was not. Yet stoners in
Colorado and Washington will be able to do just that after
those two states voted to legalise marijuana for recreational
purposes, an electoral first not only for America but for the
world.
379
An Act Relating to Marijuana, I.M. No. 502, 2013 Wash. Legis. Serv. ch. 3 (West); COLO.
CONST. art. XVIII, § 16, amended by COLO. CONST. amend. LXIV. Oregon’s 2012 marijuana initiative
failed, but possibly for other reasons. See Matt Taylor, Yes We Cannabis: The Legalization Movement
Plots Its Next 4 Years, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 27, 2013), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/201
3/03/yes-we-cannabis-the-legalization-movement-plots-its-next-4-years/274356/ (“An Oregon effort
would almost certainly have prevailed, too, if proponents there hadn’t overreached with toxic
legislative language that scared off donors and earned ridicule from local media”).
380
November 06, 2012 General Election Results, Initiative Measure No. 502 Concerns
Marijuana, WASH. SEC. STATE, http://vote.wa.gov/results/20121106/Initiative-Measure-No-502Concerns-marijuana.html (last updated Nov. 27, 2012); Amendment 64 – Legalize Marijuana Election
Results, DENVER POST, http://www.data.denverpost.com/election/results/amendment/2012/64-legalizemarijuana/ (last updated Nov. 8, 2012).
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The marijuana and marriage votes help confirm what was
already clear from polls: that public opinion is relaxing on
these (if not all) social issues.381
The Controlled Substances Act (“CSA”) lists marijuana as a schedule
one controlled substance.382 Though federal laws and their associated
enforcement present a potential block to state measures, August 2013 U.S.
Department of Justice (DOJ) guidance to U.S. Attorneys indicates that
federal enforcement of the CSA will be limited to certain scenarios.383
These scenarios for continued federal enforcement include sales of
marijuana to minors, drugged driving, and linkage to larger criminal
enterprises.384 Though some may quibble about the significance of the
degree of federal retreat,385 the federal government has taken a step back to
allow the states some room to deregulate marijuana use.386
In the wake of the federal government’s slight retreat, one analyst
predicted that as many as ten states may soon follow through with
legalization initiatives.387 Another analyst even broadly speculated that
with the DOJ’s stance, marijuana legalization has the potential to find a
foothold even in the South.388 In sum, the public attitude appears to be
shifting against marijuana paternalism, and even though the DOJ has not
declared that the states can act unfettered, the federal government seems to

381
Ballot Measures: A Liberal Drift, ECONOMIST, Nov. 10, 2012, at 32, 32. Though linkages can
be made in detail between paternalism and marriage choice, I put a more nuanced discussion aside
because the nexus with public health is more tenuous, even if the political values are common.
382
21 U.S.C. § 812(c)(c)(10) (2012).
383
Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to all U.S.
Attorneys (Aug. 29, 2013) [hereinafter Cole Memorandum], available at http://www.justice.gov/iso/op
a/resources/3052013829132756857467.pdf.
384
Id.
385
Jacob Sullum, Reactions to DOJ Marijuana Memo: Dismay, Exuberance, Skepticism, FORBES
(Aug. 29, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jacobsullum/2013/08/29/reactions-to-doj-marijuanamemo-dismay-exuberance-skepticism/.
386
See Cole Memorandum, supra note 383, at 2 (“Instead, the Department has left . . . localized
activity to state and local authorities and . . . [will] enforce the CSA only when the use, possession,
cultivation, or distribution of marijuana has threatened to cause . . . [specified] harms . . . .”).
387
See Nick Wing, These States Are Most Likely to Legalize Pot Next, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug.
30, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/08/30/marijuana-legalization-states_n_3838866.html
(anticipating that Alaska, Arizona, California, Maine, Massachusetts, Montana, Nevada, Oregon,
Rhode Island, and Vermont will mount legalization efforts).
388
See Patrik Jonsson, As Feds Acquiesce on Marijuana, Might the South Legalize?, CHRISTIAN
SCI. MONITOR (Aug. 31, 2013), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/2013/0831/As-feds-acquiesce-onmarijuana-might-the-South-legalize-video (“[O]ne sees small but potent signs of a legalization
groundswell, in part fueled by the South’s unique contributions to marijuana culture and prohibition.
In Texas and all over the South, there are a lot [of] Willie Nelson-style social and cultural ‘outlaw’
attitudes, all of which overlap with Ron Paul libertarianism.”).
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be adapting to an emerging political reality and a rejection of hard
paternalism.
Some aspects of marijuana deregulation indicate that the rejection of
hard paternalism may be a key factor in and of itself. Marijuana usage
rates have stabilized in the United States over the past decade,389 possibly
reflecting the dynamics of tobacco use over the same period.390 Though
some of the data on usage is murky,391 recreational use of marijuana does
not appear to be rising definitively. Marijuana use by teenagers also seems
to have dropped dramatically since its peak in the late 1970s, even
accounting for a slight rebound in the past few years.392
For the first time in the more than four-decade history of polling on
marijuana issues, a Pew poll in 2013 showed that a majority of people in
the United States supported legalization.393 The sharp contrast between the
growing support for legalization, which outstrips the percentage of the
population currently using marijuana,394 must reflect some degree of a
rejection of paternalism. Put differently, the gap between approval and
usage indicates that some portion of the population must be rejecting the
paternalistic decision of regulators to remove a person’s autonomy when it
comes to choosing to use marijuana.
Paternalistic justifications still remain from a self-harm perspective
when it comes to recreational use of marijuana.395 Yet, the public
increasingly desires to eschew that paternalism in favor of more autonomy,
even if there are harms that can be prevented from such a ban—and even if
389

U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, WORLD DRUG REPORT 2010, at 194 (2010).
See Trends in Current Cigarette Smoking Among High School Students and Adults, United
States, 1965–2011, CDC, http://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/data_statistics/tables/trends/cig_smoking/ (last
updated Nov. 14, 2013) (“From 2001 to 2011, the decline in cigarette smoking stabilized, dropping
from 22.8% to 19%.”).
391
The surveying methods and metrics can vary. Pew’s polling found a different trend, but the
abrupt changes measured in the poll should be accounted for in weighing the quality of the numbers.
See Marijuana Use Increased over the Last Decade, PEW RES. CENTER (Apr. 17, 2013),
http://www.pewresearch.org/daily-number/marijuana-use-increased-over-the-last-decade/ (finding an
increase in marijuana use in the United States as opposed to a stabilization).
392
Percentage of U.S. Twelfth Grade Students Reporting Past Month Use of Cigarettes and
Marijuana, 1975 to 2012, NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, http://www.drugabuse.gov/longdesc/percenta
ge-us-twelfth-grade-students-reporting-past-month-use-cigarettes-marijuana-1975-to-2012 (last visited
July 15, 2014).
393
Majority Now Supports Legalizing Marijuana, PEW RES. CENTER FOR PEOPLE & PRESS (Apr.
4, 2013), http://www.people-press.org/2013/04/04/majority-now-supports-legalizing-marijuana/.
394
Compare id. (showing that, as of 2013, 52% of people in the United States think marijuana
should be legalized), with U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, supra note 389, at 194 (reporting that, as
of 2008, approximately 12% of people in the United States reported using marijuana).
395
For a list of potential harms caused by marijuana use, see Lauren Cox, Effects of Marijuana,
LIVESCIENCE (Nov. 5, 2012), http://www.livescience.com/24558-marijuana-effects.html. For the
respiratory harms associated with smoking marijuana, as opposed to other means of ingesting it, see
Learn About Marijuana: Respiratory Effects of Marijuana, U. WASH. ALCOHOL & DRUG ABUSE INST.,
http://adai.uw.edu/marijuana/factsheets/respiratoryeffects.htm (last visited July 15, 2014).
390
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they will not necessarily be the actors exercising that autonomy. Similar
dynamics to the Big Gulp ban abound here, because the public increasingly
objects to the paternalism in spite of the fact that it would affect the daily
lives of only a small portion of the population.396 The resistance to
paternalism in the obesity regulation debate echoes in the marijuana
debate. Fluoride presents a similar story, but instead of the hard
paternalism being framed as a ban, paternalism in this context more closely
resembles a mandate.
2. Fluoride
It is difficult to identify a more paternalistic intervention than altering
the contents of the water supply with the objective of improving public
health. Even though, with some effort and expense, people can opt out
from drinking tap water397 or in some cases can source well water, if
regulators add a substance to the water to promote public health, they
deprive the public of autonomy.
It is common knowledge that
approximately 60% of the human body is water,398 so when regulators add
a substance to water, they are not only mandating consumption—they are
mandating consumption of something that comprises human essence. The
fluoridation of water since World War II represents a remarkable
acceptance of hard paternalism in public health. One might note that, in
the past, fluoridation could be analogized to trans fats because it could
have been in the zone of intangibility. The fluoride might not have
noticeably changed the water consumption experience, preempting
objections.399
The public health story of deploying water fluoridation to prevent bone
and tooth decay (“caries”) began in earnest in 1945.400 Within eleven years
of convincing public health authorities in Grand Rapids, Michigan, to
fluoridate the water supply, the incidence of caries in schoolchildren there
dropped 60%.401 This remarkable experiment “amounted to a giant
scientific breakthrough that promised to revolutionize dental care, making
tooth decay for the first time in history a preventable disease for most
people.”402
396

See supra text accompanying notes 311–13.
For example, by purchasing bottled water from a non-fluoridated source.
398
The Water in You, U.S.G.S. WATER SCI. SCH., http://ga.water.usgs.gov/edu/propertyyou.html
(last updated Mar. 6, 2014).
399
See Gordon Dillow, Bodily Fluids Fine with Fluoride, ORANGE COUNTY REG., Sept. 23, 2007,
at Cover_B (noting that one cannot see or taste the difference between regular water and fluoridated
water).
400
The Story of Fluoridation, NAT’L INST. DENTAL & CRANIOFACIAL RES.,
http://www.nidcr.nih.gov/oralhealth/topics/fluoride/thestoryoffluoridation.htm (last updated Jan. 6,
2014).
401
Id.
402
Id.
397
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Unsurprisingly, efforts to realize this discovery accelerated across the
country. After World War II, only a negligible portion of the U.S.
population received fluoride in its drinking water.403 By 1960, almost 23%
of the public had fluoride on tap, and 50% would have it by the late
1970s.404 By 2006, 61.5% of the public was fluoridated405—and by a
different measure, the “[p]ercentage of [the] population served by
community water systems receiving fluoridated water” reached 69.2%.406
Another way of looking at the remarkable scale of this paternalistic effort
is that the government found a way to regularly deliver a substance to 60%
to 70% of the public without leaving another feasible choice.
In a few recent instances, communities have successfully rejected
fluoridation efforts promoted by public health officials. Some expressed
fears that the choice made by the regulators displaced a very personal
choice that they would not favor. Another way to frame resistance to
fluoride efforts would be to look at the incumbent regime as the one that
preserves real autonomy. People can always choose to supplement their
oral hygiene with extra dosages of fluoride through other means. If
fluoride is imposed on the public, however, no autonomy remains for
anyone to make his or her own judgments about the science.
The recent debate about fluoridation in Portland, Oregon, focused not
just on science, but also on the paternalistic nature of the initiative.
Portland is the only city among the thirty largest in the United States
without a fluoridated water supply.407 Oregon has the fifth highest rate in
the nation of caries among third-graders,408 and the Multnomah County
water supply serves nearly 20% of Oregon residents.409 In May 2013, the
voters in Multnomah County, a county mostly comprising Portland
residents, rejected fluoridation by a 60% to 40% vote, despite the fact that
pro-fluoridation groups out-fundraised anti-fluoridation groups 3 to 1.410
Scientific411 and socioeconomic412 arguments were brought to bear, but
403
Fluoridation
Growth, by Population,
United
States 1940−2006, CDC,
http://www.cdc.gov/nohss/FSGrowth_text.htm#Data (last updated Oct. 30, 2008).
404
Id.
405
Id.
406
Id.
407
Ryan Kost, Portland Fluoride: For the Fourth Time Since 1956, Portland Voters Reject
Fluoridation, THE OREGONIAN (May 21, 2013), http://www.oregonlive.com/portland/index.ssf/2013/0
5/portland_fluoride_for_the_four.html.
408
Caries Experience, CDC, http://apps.nccd.cdc.gov/nohss/IndicatorV.asp?Indicator=2 (last
updated Jan. 4, 2011).
409
See
Multnomah
County,
Oregon,
U.S.
CENSUS
BUREAU,
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/41/41051.html (last updated Jan. 6, 2014) (exhibiting that out of
Oregon’s 3,899,801 residents, Multnomah County is home to 759,256 of them, which is approximately
19.5% of the state population).
410
Kost, supra note 407.
411
For example, the CDC endorses five studies supporting fluoridation that the National Academy
of Sciences and the National Research Service have conducted regularly since 1951. National
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414

somewhat perplexingly, to no avail.
Anti-paternalism did surface in these arguments. One advocacy group,
Oregon Citizens for Safe Drinking Water, offered this broad declaration as
a final word:
The United Nations has declared that “access to safe
[uncontaminated] water is a fundamental human need and,
therefore, a basic human right.” . . . [M]any individuals hold
that Americans have the right of informed consent regarding
medication. The addition of a contaminated, non-FDA
approved medicament to a public water supply violates both
of these most basic human rights.415
This statement is all about personal sovereignty and personal
autonomy, elevating the ability to choose fluoride-free water to that of a
human right. Another group, Clean Water Portland, not only framed the
issue as one of informed consent, but directly posed the question about
Academy of Sciences on Fluoride in Drinking Water, CDC, http://www.cdc.gov/fluoridation/safety/nas.
htm (last updated July 10, 2013).
412
One premise, for example, is that poorer children will not have access to the dental care and
supplements that wealthier children will have—and that fluoride would serve to help these children the
most. See C.M. Jones & H. Worthington, Water Fluoridation, Poverty and Tooth Decay in 12-YearOld Children, 28 J. DENTISTRY 389, 390–92 (2000) (“The result from this study reaffirms the
effectiveness of water fluoridation [was] the primary preventive measure capable of bridging the
‘dental health gap’ by differentially improving the dental health of those who are socio-economically
deprived.”).
413
See, e.g., Henry Grabar, With Portland’s Latest Rejection of Fluoride, Science Loses Out to
History’s Weirdest Alliance of Paranoiacs, ATLANTIC CITIES (May 22, 2013),
http://www.theatlanticcities.com/technology/2013/05/portlands-latest-rejection-fluoride-science-losesout-historys-weirdest-alliance-paranoiacs/5674/ (“Oregon has one of the highest rates of tooth decay in
the nation, and yet, the state’s biggest city [Portland] will remain an outlier, thanks to the remarkable
efforts of the anti-fluoride lobby, a non-partisan alliance of paranoiacs.”); Kyle Hill, Why Portland Is
Wrong About Water Fluoridation, SCI. AM. (May 22, 2013), http://blogs.scientificamerican.com/butnot-simpler/2013/05/22/why-portland-is-wrong-about-water-fluoridation/ (arguing that voters in
Portland, by electing to reject fluoride, have ignored the scientific evidence of the benefits of
fluoridation, and suggesting that the reason for rejection is mostly political).
414
Political action groups fighting fluoridation raised a number of claims and arguments that
seemed to take hold. See, e.g., Fluoridation Overview, OR. CITIZENS FOR SAFE DRINKING WATER,
http://www.safewateroregon.org/fluoridation.html#P (last visited July 15, 2014) (listing a number of
anti-fluoridation studies and reports that promote voting against fluoridation). Local business interests
also played a role in the debate, particularly those businesses concerned with how fluoride might affect
water quality. See, e.g., Lucy Burningham, Why Brewers and Coffee Roasters in Portland, OR, Don’t
Want Fluoridated Water, BON APPÉTIT (Apr. 17, 2013), http://www.bonappetit.com/trends/article/whybrewers-and-coffee-roasters-in-portland-or-don-t-want-fluoridated-water (“Voters may reject a ballot
measure that would add fluoride to the municipal water supply, an additive that 72 percent of
Americans encounter when they turn on their taps . . . . Why would some Portlanders prefer to remain
in the 28 percent? Because water is the primary ingredient in beer and coffee—for which Portland is
justly renowned—and both brewers and baristas are concerned that fluoridation could irrevocably alter
their products.”).
415
Fluoridation Overview, supra note 414 (emphasis added).
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whether one group’s choice should be imposed on others:
Fluoridation violates the fundamental principle that every
individual has the right to consent to or reject a given
medical treatment. Fluoride meets every legal and medical
definition of a drug. It is intended to “treat,” “mitigate” or
“cure” the disease known as dental caries.

....
Even if you consent to drinking fluoride in your own water, is
it really ethical to require other Portlanders and their
children to ingest fluoride?416
Long-established scientific arguments did not prevail with the public in
Portland. Though resistance to hard paternalism can prove difficult to
isolate, it does lie at the center of resistance to any mandatory public health
policies that affect personal choice.417
Of course, with respect to fluoride, Portland may not represent a trend.
Its voters have been rejecting fluoride measures since 1956.418 Moreover,
Portland—a city where Subaru drivers419 proudly display bumper stickers
that blare, “Keep Portland Weird”420—is concededly an outlier on many
cultural and political matters. But something, if not “weird,” then
otherwise noteworthy, did happen in Portland: voters in the higher-income
neighborhoods on the west side of the city were distinctly more supportive
of the fluoridation measure than those in neighborhoods with a
comparatively lower median income.421 Could voters in the lower-income
neighborhoods have been more sensitive to the paternalism that the elites
embraced?
416
12 Reasons to Vote No, CLEAN WATER PORTLAND, http://www.cleanwaterportland.org/12_rea
sons_to_vote_no (last visited Feb. 27, 2014) (emphasis added).
417
“Choice” has also emerged as a keyword in the anti-mandatory vaccine sphere. See, e.g., State
Vaccine Choice Advocacy, NAT’L VACCINE INFO. CENTER, http://www.nvic.org/resourcecenter/statevaccine.aspx (last visited Feb. 27, 2014) (utilizing “Your Choice” in the headline of the
website); N.H. COAL. FOR VACCINATION CHOICE, http://www.vacchoicenh.org/ (last visited Feb. 27,
2014) (describing how this coalition is seeking to provide New Hampshire citizens with a “pro-choice
vaccination initiative”); VT. COAL. FOR VACCINE CHOICE, http://www.vaxchoicevt.com/ (last visited
Feb. 27, 2014) (displaying “choice” in numerous spots on the main page).
418
See Kost, supra note 407 (detailing reasons behind Portland’s history of rejecting fluoridation).
419
Subarus are so disproportionately omnipresent in Portland, it is a literal joke. See Sonari
Glinton, Beyond Portlandia: Subaru Drives for America’s Heartland, NAT’L PUB. RADIO
(Jan. 28, 2013), http://www.npr.org/2013/01/28/169972505/beyond-portlandia-subaru-drives-foramericas-heartland (describing a Portlandia comedy skit that involved two Subaru drivers).
420
Joseph B. Frazier, Portland, Ore., Celebrates Its Quirky Side, USA TODAY (May 12, 2008),
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/travel/destinations/2008-05-12-quirky-portland_N.htm.
421
See 2013 Portland Fluoride Measure Results, by Precinct, THE OREGONIAN,
http://gov.oregonlive.com/election/2013/fluoride/ (last visited July 15, 2014) (displaying an interactive
map that shows the percentage of voters who voted against fluoridation).
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Portland did not stand alone in facing the fluoridation question. In
recent years, fluoridation has been reexamined but retained in Phoenix,
Arizona, voted down in Wichita, Kansas, and stopped and then reinitiated
after some political changes in Pinellas County, Florida.422 One antifluoride group has compiled an up-to-date list of communities around the
world that have rejected fluoride.423 Fluoridation may no longer be gaining
ground, and it may in fact be losing ground to the anti-fluoride
movement.424 As Dr. Bill Maas, the former director of the CDC’s oral
health division, observed in 2011, “This isn’t something that we’re slowly
expanding across the country and getting one more community
(fluoridated) across the United States. This is people actually saying we
should take this out of the water . . . . It’s amazing to us how it's resonating
with people.”425
The unique coalition standing together in Portland did not break along
traditional political lines, reminiscent of strange bedfellows that united
against the Big Gulp ban.426 On the pro-fluoride side in Portland, the
following lined up: “OPAL Environmental Justice Oregon, the Urban
League of Portland, the Northwest Health Foundation, the campaign funds
422
Joel Millman, Tooth and Nail: Fluoride Fight Cracks Portland’s Left—Liberal City Chews
over Water Vote, WALL ST. J., May 20, 2013, at A1.
423
Communities Which Have Rejected Fluoride Since 1990, FLUORIDE ACTION NETWORK,
http://www.fluoridealert.org/content/communities/ (last visited July 15, 2014). Communities listed
since 2012 span many sizes and regions of the United States: Woodland, Washington; Parkland,
Washington; Portland, Oregon; Kenton, Tennessee; Southwest Harbor, Maine; Au Gres, Michigan;
Tyrone, Pennsylvania; Olivehurst, California; Plumas Lake, California; Smithville, Missouri; St. Croix
Falls, Wisconsin; Balsam Lake, Wisconsin; Pine Island, Florida; Milton, Florida; Bradford, Vermont;
Romulus, New York; Pulaski, New York; Wichita, Kansas; Harvard, Nebraska; Crescent City,
California; Lake View, Iowa; Cassadaga, New York; Santa Fe, New Mexico; Argos, Indiana;
Palisades, Colorado; Pevely, Missouri; Lakeville, Indiana; North Liberty, Indiana; Walkerton, Indiana;
Albuquerque New Mexico; West Manheim, Pennsylvania; Bourbon, Indiana; Bolivar, Missouri; and
Myerstown, Pennsylvania. Id.
424
One analysis suggests that over the much longer arc of time since the 1950s, the fluoridation
forces appear to be winning. See Sarah Kliff, A Brief History of America’s Fluoride Wars, WASH.
POST (May 21, 2013, 9:11 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/05/21/abrief-history-of-americas-fluoride-wars/ (“[T]he Centers For Disease Control . . . described widespread fluoridation as one of the . . . most important public health accomplishments of the 20th
century.”). Nonetheless, after a peak of fluoridation success in the 1990s, the fluoridation movement
has experienced setbacks. See id. (“In the 2000 election cycle, there were 23 fluoridation ballot
initiatives and those were bad news for fluoride advocates, who lost 14 of those fights.”).
425
Donna Jones & Marissa Fessenden, Watsonville Fluoride Battle 10 Years After Approval:
Backers Fight Back as Support Wanes, SANTA CRUZ SENTINEL (Cal.) (Nov. 26, 2011),
http://www.santacruzsentinel.com/ci_19416925 (internal quotation marks omitted).
426
As one Portland-area political science academic, Phil Keisling, summarized, “[The fluoride
debate] really does reshuffle the deck in some fascinating ways that confound traditional lines . . . . It
has created some pretty interesting bedfellows on both sides of the ideological divide.” Helen Jung,
Portland Fluoride Vote: Contentious Issue Sparks a Civil War Among Progressives, THE OREGONIAN
(May 3, 2013), http://www.oregonlive.com/Portland/index.ssf/2013/05/Portland_fluoride_vote_content
.html (internal quotation marks omitted).
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from several Democratic state legislators and [regionally-influential]
conservative talk-radio host Lars Larson.”427 Opposing fluoride were “the
Oregon Sierra Club’s Columbia Group, the Portland NAACP, the
libertarian Cascade Policy Institute, the Kansas Taxpayers Network and an
Indiana-based alternative health company that advocates, among other
things, using tanning beds for vitamin D dosage.”428 One tension remained
evident, according to a local Portland political scientist429—the tension
between “public health and individual rights.”430
The new political line, this tension between public health and
individual rights focuses on a rejection of hard paternalism in public
health. Different values may come into play, even in zones where science
appears to be settled. For obesity and other public health issues,
similarities echo about the inherent value of personal autonomy and the
role of intervention. Here, as with obesity and marijuana use, the
momentum seems to be veering against hard paternalism.
3. GMO Foods
The movement away from paternalism toward autonomy in matters of
personal choice and public health can manifest in different forms. As
noted previously, Gerald Dworkin identifies a broad paternalism that
expands the range of paternal institutions beyond the government.431 In
some matters of public health, the public desires choice and autonomy—
but the natural state of the commercial environment may not provide real
choices, requiring the public to influence the government to intervene to
create that desired autonomy.
The movement with respect to GMO foods reflects such a dynamic.
GMOs are “produced from plants, animals, and microbes that have had
their genetic code modified by the selective introduction of specific DNA
segments through the use of gene splicing.”432 Among the agricultural
benefits of deploying genetic science in food production are “pest
protection” and “herbicid[al] resistance,” which enable better food
yields—and the ability to add nutrients.433 Critiques of the genetic
modification approach appear to mostly center around unknown ecological
risks that, if realized, might be catastrophically irreversible—and around
427

Id.
Id.
429
This tension proved unsettling to those who were more comfortable knowing who their natural
political bedfellows were, as Portland’s daily newspaper, The Oregonian, colorfully chronicled. Id.
430
Id.
431
See Dworkin, supra note 23 (stating that other paternalistic institutions that fall within this
broad understanding can include hospitals or even individuals).
432
CARL K. WINTER & LISA K. GALLEGOS, UNIV. OF CAL., SAFETY OF GENETICALLY
ENGINEERED FOOD 1 (2006).
433
Id.
428
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434

potential allergic reactions to the food products.
The larger-scale entry of GMOs into the food supply inspired a
grassroots consumer movement to lobby regulators to require food
manufacturers to label GMO content, so that consumers would be able to
consciously choose whether to exclude GMO foods from their diets.435
This movement has already influenced the enactment of a state law in
Connecticut436 and a legislation in Maine.437 Additionally, at the federal
level,438 Senator Barbara Boxer and Congressman Peter DeFazio
introduced a bill in April 2013, The Genetically Engineered Food Right-toKnow Act,439 which would require the FDA to enforce GMO content
labeling.440
Public opinion and perception appear to clash loudly with the scientific
consensus about the safety of GMO foods.441 According to the National
Institutes of Health (“NIH”), “Genetically engineered foods are generally
regarded as safe. . . . There are no reports of illness or injury due to
genetically engineered foods.”442 In spite of this established view by the
434
See Genetically Engineered Foods, MEDLINEPLUS, http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/ency/
article/002432.htm (last updated July 5, 2012) (listing potential risks of GMOs).
435
See Dan D’Ambrosio, Labels Sought for Genetically Modified Food, USA TODAY
(June 13, 2013), http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2013/06/12/labels-being-sought-forgenetically-modified-food/2417459/ (discussing the state response to the “decades-old debate about
whether the [GMOs] are dangerous to human health”).
436
The Connecticut law animates upon enactment of similar laws by other states in the region.
See Act of June 25, 2013, Conn. Pub. Act No. 13-183 (to be codified at CONN. GEN. STAT. § 21(a))
(stipulating that the legislation would activate once “(1) Four states, not including this state, enact a
mandatory labeling law for genetically-engineered foods that is consistent with the provisions of this
subsection, provided one such state borders Connecticut; and (2) the aggregate population of such
states located in the northeast region of the United States that have enacted a mandatory labeling law
for genetically-engineered foods that is consistent with this subsection exceed twenty million based on
2010 census figures”).
437
Act of Feb. 26, 2013, Me. Legis. Serv. Doc. No. 718 (to be codified at ME. REV. STAT. tit. 22,
ch. 565). Maine’s governor pledged to sign the bill into law, explaining his strategy to wait for other
jurisdictions to test the constitutionality of similar measures. Steve Mistler, LePage: I’ll Sign Bill
Requiring Labels for Genetically Modified Foods, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD (Portland, Me.)
(July 9, 2013), http://www.pressherald.com/news/LePage-tells-GMO-labeling-bill-sponsors-hell-makeit-law.html (“‘It is to Maine’s benefit to simply delay implementation of the law, and take advantage of
the results of litigation in other states,’ the governor wrote.”).
438
This legislative attempt to label GMOs at the federal level was not the first, but it was the first
with “bicameral” and “bipartisan” support. Joe Satran, Genetically Engineered Food Labeling Taken
on by Congress in Right-To-Know Act, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 25, 2013),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/04/25/genetically-engineered-food_n_3149418.html.
439
S. 809, 113th Cong. § 1 (2013).
440
The proposed legislation would amend the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act to include
“food that has been genetically engineered or contains 1 or more genetically engineered ingredients” as
misbranded “unless such information is clearly disclosed.” Id. § 3(a).
441
For the purposes of this Article, I am interested purely in the dynamics of paternalism in the
debate, not the substance.
442
Genetically Engineered Foods, supra note 434. The NIH does note that “complete safety”
cannot be ensured without adequate testing. Id.
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scientific community, the public expresses uniform discomfort with the
inability to make choices about GMO consumption. A June 2013 poll
indicated that 52% of the public believed that GMO foods are unsafe—but,
more remarkably, 93% supported the notion that “the federal government
should require labels on food saying whether it’s been genetically
modified, or ‘bio-engineered’ . . . . Such near-unanimity in public opinion
is rare.”444 The public is essentially clamoring for regulators to engage in
weak-form debiasing to enable choice where there simply was no choice.
The scientific community has, in one notable case, embraced the
choice argument and flipped it. A Scientific American editorial opined that
“[m]any people argue for GMO labels in the name of increased consumer
choice[, but o]n the contrary, such labels have limited people’s options.”445
The premise is that GMO crops produce less expensive and more nutritious
foods, affording more consumer autonomy and that reduction of GMO
consumption would negatively affect overall food production.446 Of
course, this viewpoint incited nearly instant counterattacks447—but as the
debate continues, public opinion and political momentum appear to be on
the side of labeling. As of September 2013, GMO disclosure legislation is
pending in at least twenty states.448
The unanimity about the value of informed choice and autonomy
seems to be reflected in the words of one state senator after passage of the
Connecticut law: “This law doesn’t ban, or restrict, or tax anything. It
simply lets moms and dads know what’s in the food they’re buying for
their children.”449 The notion of having the ability to know and control
“what’s in the food your children are eating” echoes the fluoride debate’s
often triumphant value: the ability to know and control “what’s in the
443
See, e.g., Editorial, Fight the GM Food Scare, 309 SCI. AM. 10, 10 (2013) (“Instead of
providing people with useful information, mandatory GMO labels would only intensify the
misconception that so-called Frankenfoods endanger people’s health . . . .”).
444
Gary Langer, Poll: Skepticism of Genetically Modified Foods, ABC NEWS,
http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/story?id=97567&page=1 (last visited Feb. 28, 2014).
445
Fight the GM Food Scare, supra note 443.
446
See id. (“Because conventional crops often require more water and pesticides than GMOs do,
the former are usually more expensive. Consequently, we would all have to pay a premium on nonGMO foods—and for a questionable return.”).
447
See David Knowles, GMO Foes Blast Scientific American Editorial Decrying Labeling Laws,
N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Sept. 6, 2013), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/gmo-foes-blastscientific-american-editorial-article-1.1448232 (“A contested point . . . is the contention that requiring
labeling of GMO ingredients will result in higher food prices because genetically engineered seeds can
produce higher yields and require less pesticide.”).
448
Fight the GM Food Scare, supra note 443. “Pending” could be susceptible to many
definitions—under some, bills could be pending in as many as thirty states. Mistler, supra note 437.
449
Press Release, Conn. Governor Dannel P. Malloy, Governor Malloy and Legislative Leaders
Announce Agreement on GMO Labeling Legislation (June 1, 2013), available at
http://www.ct.gov/malloy/cwp/view.asp?A=4010&Q=525816 (quoting Senate Republican Leader John
McKinney).
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water your children are drinking.”
The GMO debate fits comfortably into the broader narrative about the
limits of paternalism in public health. Without legislation, the broader,
hard paternalism of food producers would reign, leaving no visible choices
(or fewer choices). In this case, consumers overwhelmingly reject the
notion of sacrificing autonomy when it comes to choosing the nature of
their food. They continue to press regulators to create autonomy in this
area—just as consumers have pressed for autonomy in many jurisdictions
with respect to fluoridation and the choice to use marijuana.450 In pressing
for autonomy, consumers generally press against paternalism, particularly
hard paternalism. This spirit removes a lot of tools for regulators seeking
to curb obesity and improve public health.
Note also that the GMO debate reveals that the anti-paternalistic wave
should not always be conflated with libertarianism. Libertarianism
eschews public intervention in the market in favor of private solutions.451
In the food market, libertarians would expect non-GMO alternatives like
certified organic products to emerge in response to demand. Here,
according to public opinion, the market did not produce the desired level of
consumer autonomy. The government intervened, at activists’ behest, in
the spirit of anti-paternalism.
***
Taken together, marijuana legalization, fluoridation, and GMO foods
all provide examples of a trend in public health that appears to reflect a
rejection of paternalism. Elements of efforts to regulate obesity, ranging
from the Big Gulp ban to changing the contents of school lunches, also
seem to reflect this rejection. As Part IV will discuss, this dynamic
portends ills for the future use of regulatory tools, soft and hard, to address
the larger, more complex problems like obesity.
IV. ACCEPTING PATERNALISM’S LIMITS IN PUBLIC HEALTH
We’re paying a very high price as a society for obesity, and
why don’t we think about it as a problem of enormous
magnitude to our economy? . . . . We’re creating obesity and
we need to do a man-on-the-moon effort to solve this before
those poor kids in elementary school become diabetic
450

See supra Parts III.C.1–2.
See David D. Friedman, Libertarianism, in 5 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF
ECONOMICS 103, 107–08 (Steven N. Durlauf & Lawrence E. Blume eds., 2d ed. 2008) (“Most of the
arguments against price control, wage control, rent control, usury laws, and similar restrictions on the
terms of market exchange are familiar to any economist. Many libertarians also argue that such
restrictions violate individual rights.”).
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452

middle-aged people.

The man-on-the-moon analogy for solving obesity and other public
health concerns,453 envies but misplaces the popularity and drivers of
support for the Apollo program,454 disregards the complexity of the public
health problem,455 and ignores attitudinal obstacles toward paternalism.
Nonetheless, debunking the man-on-the-moon myth provides a starting
point for understanding the limits of regulation in the public health sphere.
Contrary to current public understanding, with the exception of the
time period around the first moon landings, the public did not unite solidly
behind the Apollo program.456 President Kennedy’s call to launch the
program was embedded inside a larger geopolitical strategy, endorsed by
the public.457 A call to unite popular opinion behind a purely civilian
government effort might prove more important and complex. Putting a
man on the moon did not require individuals to surrender autonomy—it
required a more abstract commitment of tax dollars.458 Also, the problem
of putting a man on the moon did not require changing and controlling a
complex system of human behaviors, as the more challenging public health
problems do. Though ultimately an amazing triumph of human ingenuity,
putting a man on the moon presented addressable physics and logistical
questions, solvable with 1960s knowledge and technology, and a
concentrated and sincere resource commitment.459 Paternalism and
452
Obesity’s Yearly Costs: $4,879 for a Woman, $2,646 for a Man, USA TODAY (Sept. 21, 2010),
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/yourlife/fitness/2010-09-21-obesity-costs_N.htm?csp=34
(emphasis
added) (quoting Dr. Kevin Schulman, Professor of Medicine and Health Economist at Duke University)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
453
See, e.g., Cancer Treatment Myths: Any Truth to These Common Beliefs?, MAYO CLINIC,
http://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/cancer/in-depth/cancer/art-20046762 (last visited July
15, 2014) (“Finding the cure for cancer is proving to be more complex than mastering the engineering
and physics required for spaceflight.”).
454
See Roger D. Launius, Public Opinion Polls and Perceptions of US Human Spaceflight, 19
SPACE POL’Y 163, 165–66 (2003) (suggesting that public support for the Apollo program was not as
great as originally thought).
455
Michelle Obama disregarded this complexity when she said, “[Solving childhood obesity] isn’t
like putting a man on the moon or inventing the Internet. It doesn’t take a stroke of genius or a feat of
technology. We have everything we need right now to help our kids lead healthy lives.” Sheryl Gay
Stolberg, Childhood Obesity Battle Is Taken Up by First Lady, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2010, at A16.
456
Launius, supra note 454, at 166–67.
457
See id. at 172 (noting President Kennedy’s assertion that “[e]verything we do should be tied
into getting on to the Moon ahead of the Russians” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
458
See Trevor Butterworth, To Infinity and Beyond, FORBES (Feb. 17, 2010),
http://www.forbes.com/2010/02/16/eggers-oleary-moon-campaign-book-opinions-columnists-trevorbutterworth.html (stating that it took “$145 billion to achieve lunar triumph”).
459
See id. (“[I]t took 200 university laboratories, 20,000 industrial firms, 400,000 public and
private sector workers, and (when rounded out to 2008 dollars) $145 billion to achieve lunar triumph.
It also required a brilliant, indefatigable project manager, James Webb, and the gift of a government
agency—NASA—that had not pushed paper long enough to calcify into a brittle bureaucracy . . . . Allin-all the space race was an epic competition of human ingenuity run by characters, every bit as driven
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societal dynamics obviously had no opportunity to emerge as issues with
Apollo. One could argue that addressing obesity might be a harder mission
for regulators than the Apollo was for policymakers and engineers.
Though this Article takes on public health regulation generally, the
paternalism involved with obesity regulation provides the most recent and
controversial example. Solving a public health problem like obesity on a
grand scale requires a multi-pronged, full-scale commitment—but some
tactics may prove more pragmatic than others. Undoubtedly, obesity
presents a health crisis, but the complexity of the contributing dynamics
renders the problem difficult to solve. Though the problem has started to
level off by some measures, no consensus has emerged to explain that
trend.
For those who would advocate a total war on the obesity problem460—
perhaps absorbing the Sarah Conly view of harm-prevention—all brands of
paternalism would be deployed to prevent people from harming
themselves.461 Where healthier choices could not be shaped through
market solutions, or tactics on the softer end of the paternalism
intervention spectrum, the government would force the healthier choice,
according to this view.462 A full effort or total war on obesity would run
into two distinct categories of obstacles: (1) hostility toward paternalism;
and (2) the complexity of the problem and the stubbornness of the
problem’s components.
A. Obstacles
The first obstacle category would be the cross-cutting negative public
attitude toward autonomy loss and most forms of visible, hard paternalism
in public health. When regulators or other actors interfere with something
as fundamentally personal as the choice of food, people take notice.
Generalizing to the public health sphere, the rejection of paternalism in
favor of autonomy in the three high-profile contexts discussed in
detail―marijuana, fluoride, and GMOs—all seem to mirror the dynamic in
the obesity realm.
It appears that gently-induced free market
and, perhaps, as possessed as the Greeks who laid siege to Troy. When you think of it like that, when
you conceptualize the problem from design to execution . . . it’s quite understandable why we did put
several men on the moon.”).
460
War, like the moonshot, offers another familiar metaphor. See, e.g., Lydia DePillis, Looks
Like the U.S. Is Winning Its War on Childhood Obesity, WASH. POST (July 12, 2013, 12:54 PM),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/07/12/looks-like-the-u-s-is-winning-its-waron-childhood-obesity/ (using the term “war” to describe the battle against childhood obesity); Dan
Munro, Are We Fighting the Wrong Battle in the Obesity War?, FORBES (June 29, 2013),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/danmunro/2013/06/29/are-we-fighting-the-wrong-battle-in-the-obesitywar/ (discussing the “obesity war”).
461
See CONLY, supra note 11, at 7 (justifying the benefits of paternalistic laws).
462
See id. at 6 (discussing an example of forcing behavior using “soft” paternalism).
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voluntarism—which affects the consumption marketplace through the
changed behavior of large producers—and hidden hard paternalism offer
the sharpest available regulatory tools.463
Of further note is that resistance to public health paternalism may not
even be uniquely American. German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s
successful campaign, which led to her party’s political victory in
September 2013, has been noted for its stand against the Green Party’s
efforts to mandate a “veggie day” in public cafeterias.464 Merkel
proclaimed, “You will never hear from the Christian Democratic Union
party when you should eat meat and when you shouldn’t . . . . [W]e are a
party [that is] confident [that] people can manage their own lives.”465 The
potential globalization of this phenomenon, or at least a prominence in
other Western cultures, has not been explored here, but would speak to a
broader power of the trend.
The second obstacle category would be the factors that drive the
complexity of public health problems. In order to make serious
advancements, given the limits of scientific knowledge, efforts would be
required on a wide variety of fronts. Unfortunately, many efforts would be
blocked due to the weakness of most soft paternalism strategies, and the
rejection of most hard paternalism strategies—except in the most narrow of
circumstances.
The natural resistance points to reducing obesity are stubborn and
many. The causes of obesity are not completely understood, in that it
might prove difficult to measure what causes might be given the highest
priority to address.466 Caloric intake, caloric expenditure, socioeconomic,
cultural, gender, and age factors can prove difficult to untangle as causes.
Difficulty in untangling the root causes makes prioritization of underlying
problems difficult, which in turn is compounded by the challenge of
finding palatable and effective solutions to these problems. Here, for
example, the compulsion of physical activity may prove impractical, as
would reducing the large-scale consumption of a potentially large culprit
like the omnipresent consumption of processed grains.
Changing overall behavior in public health often requires addressing a
463

See supra Parts III.B.1, III.B.2.d.
Josh Gerstein, Germany, “Veggie Day,” and Michelle Obama, POLITICO (Sept. 21, 2013,
7:39 PM), http://www.politico.com/blogs/under-the-radar/2013/09/germany-veggie-day-and-michelleobama-173206.html. One German newspaper referred to the controversy over veggie day as a “s--storm.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
465
Id.
466
Michelle Obama’s efforts through “Let’s Move!” to encourage people to drink more water
may provide yet another example of a regulatory failure to prioritize public health initiatives properly.
See James Hamblin, Why “Drink More Water”?, THE ATLANTIC (Sept. 12, 2013),
http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2013/09/why-drink-more-water/279591/ (questioning the
scientific basis and strategy of the water initiative).
464
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strong natural behavioral obstacle, the present bias. It may be that the
softer paternalistic efforts help debias at the margin, but simply do not
provide the power to put significant dents in this Gordian problem. The
harder paternalism that may work must effectively insulate people from
making bad choices, must be implemented in zones that are already
controlled by regulators, or must be implemented through high-impact
opportunities that do not appear to affect personal autonomy.
Ultimately, regulators confront real boundaries in their attempts to
address major public health issues. In addition to scientific challenges,
public tolerance for autonomy-reducing interventions appears low. The
question emerges about what policymakers should do in light of the nature,
magnitude, and complexity of public health problems—and the limited
toolkit they have for addressing them.
B. Implications for Policymakers
Regulators are in a bind, given the limits of paternalism in public
health. The limits are defined by practicality and efficacy, but the
problems, like obesity, remain significant. Should regulators surrender?
Morally, that might not be an option. Scientists and policymakers might
have the obligation to play the paternal role, even if it proves unpopular.
Nonetheless, unpopular interventions run a risk of backfiring, as Mayor
Bloomberg experienced in the wake of the Big Gulp effort.
In the wake of a serious public health challenge, regulators should
pursue all solutions open to them—but they should do so with a costbenefit rationalization that includes the likelihood that paternalism will
present an obstacle to implementing the solution. Efforts should
concentrate on the areas that science indicates would be the most
impactful, and which would be the most practical to implement.
For example, initiatives that harness the market and promote
voluntarism in areas that could matter (e.g., the voluntary changes made by
food retailers), would meet those criteria. Debiasing initiatives that prove
effective while preserving autonomy might prove weaker, but also could
add up if enough of them were pressed. Opportunities to deploy hard
paternalism should be sought with care, so as to minimize the perception
that the regulators are usurping a tangible choice or are treading beyond the
zone normally ceded to regulators. These opportunities may prove few,
but if sought and pressed aggressively, they may have powerful effect.
Though the opportunities for deploying paternalism effectively in the
public health arena may prove limited, they do exist. If regulators
minimize the perception that they are reducing autonomy, perhaps the
public might give more slack to initiatives that tread on the border.
I do not argue that these challenges to public health regulation should
lead to the hoisting of a white flag. Rather, regulators should be attuned to
public sentiment—and should not only seek the best scientific solutions for
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improving public health, but should also take a highly opportunistic
approach and pursue the most practical course. An integrated response that
accounts for the potential to improve public health along with the popular
tolerance or appetite for regulatory interventions will produce the best
possible social outcomes.
Though this constraint may lack the inspirational call to solve an
immense problem, it may guide regulators toward the most effective
course, even if it proves difficult. After all, if one clings to the moonshot
analogy, the words of President Kennedy may provide guidance,
particularly the clause that follows the most famous line in his 1962 Moon
Speech: “We choose to go to the moon in this decade and do the other
things, not because they are easy, but because they are hard, because that
goal will serve to organize and measure the best of our energies and
skills.”467 Solving public health problems that are more complex than a
moonshot will require organized focus of our energies and skills and tell us
about their boundaries.
V. CONCLUSION
Public health regulation faces the constraint of paternalism in several
spheres, but perhaps most importantly, in the massive problem that obesity
presents. People have natural biases toward consuming in the present
while discounting future consequences. Environmental factors, driven by
socioeconomics and food availability, present obstacles for lowering
obesity rates. Even if those obstacles are solvable, regulators now face
resistance to regulation that appears paternalistic insofar as it reduces
choice.
However, if regulators examine the entire spectrum of options—
ranging from encouraging voluntarism, to debiasing, to insulating from
harm, to bans and mandates—they may identify a mix of initiatives that
combine efficacy with practicality. As we move forward to address
challenging social concerns in an environment where actors value
autonomy, regulators will find it crucial to identify this balance.
Regulatory interventions into personal behavior have proven financially
and socially expensive—a smarter framework for guiding them will create
the momentum needed to solve the serious and complex public health
problems that we face.

467
President John F. Kennedy, Address at Rice University (Sept. 12, 1962), available at
http://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/MkATdOcdU06X5uNHbmqm1Q.aspx (emphasis added).

